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Abstract: 
This study provides evidence on the role of democratic institutions in fostering financial development 
in ten economies in the Southern African Development Community classified into three income 
groups from 1975 to 2013. Polity IV variables, considered as measure of democracy are applied to 
quantify institutions, while bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities proxy financial 
development. Initially, panel regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Square and Instrumental 
Variable estimators and find evidence of a linear and non-linear association between democratic 
institutions and financial development. The instrumental variable regression allows for the joint 
endogeneity of regressors through the use of internal instruments. Evidence from panel regressions 
suggests that democratic institutions are positively associated with financial development for the 
upper middle income countries. A negative relationship is found for the lower middle and low-income 
countries. Applying Bayesian Vector Auto-regressions and variance decomposition of annual proxies 
for financial development, the study determines the most important institutional variables that account 
for variations in financial development. The use of Bayesian inferences mitigates estimation risk, 
sample bias, over-parameterisation and provides better forecasting. The results show that shocks to 
democratic variables positively affect financial development in the upper income countries, with 
substantive democracy and human capital development contributing the most towards variations in 
financial development while the effect is negative for the other income groups but, however, improved 
slightly after 1990. The Markov switching model is applied to show evidence of fragility of financial 
development in the Southern African Development Community region.  Results from the Markov 
Switching Model find that the countries switch between regimes of high and low financial 
development following political regime changes. Countries in the lower middle and low-income groups 
show a greater probability of being in a regime of low financial development while the upper income 
countries show a higher probability of being in a state of high financial development. These 
probabilities improved for the lower middle and low-income groups after 1990, a period associated 
with increasing democratisation. The Markov findings suggest that democratic institutions may have 
helped promote financial development despite the inherent instability of the financial system.  
Therefore, it seems that appropriate government policies in strengthening democratic institutions may 
mitigate instability and foster financial development with the likely potential of producing long-term 
gains in the financial sectors for all the income groups. 
Keywords: Financial development, democratic institutions, IV regressions, Markov inferences 
Bayesian inferences, financial instability hypothesis, Polity IV, bank deposits, private credit, liquid 
liabilities, SADC.      
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study: 
 
The views of economists vary on how financial development (FD) and economic growth 
relate, but what actually determines FD generally remains under researched and seemingly 
non-existent in the SADC region.  The view on the factors that determine of FD has caught 
the attention of researchers in recent years inspired by the work of Levine (1997), who 
contends that the positive link between FD and economic growth does not always suggest 
that FD is exogenous to economic growth. This finding has recently stimulated research on 
the causal elements of FD with some mixed results –, however, with increasing consensus 
weighing on the positive role of democratic institutions on FD. 
The finance growth nexus, however, was pioneered by the seminal work of Schumpeter 
(1911) and has received attention both theoretically and empirically. Schumpeter’s 
assertions highlighted the fact that credit is required by entrepreneurs to finance new 
production techniques and that banks facilitate the intermediation process and as a 
consequence promote economic development. Reasoning along Schumpeterian lines are 
the works of Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969) and Hicks (1969), who argue that 
the saving and investment process is stimulated when more financial products and services 
are provided by financial intermediaries.This in turn has a positive effect on economic 
growth. This view dubbed the “financial structuralist view” gained little grounds on 
development policy largely because of the dominance of the Keynesian “financial 
repressionist” ideology (Ang, 2008). The Keynesians advocated for restrictive measures to 
finance fiscal deficits without an increase taxes. According to Ang (2008) these included tight 
measures imposed on the financial system such as the control of interest rates, increasing 
the reserve requirement and programmes that foster direct credit. Ang (2008) suggests that 
these measures would ultimately dampen the zeal to hold money and acquire financial 
assets and decrease the availability of credit to investorsthereby shrinking the banking 
system and suppressing intermediation. 
The Keynesian view was challenged in the 1970s by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
who addressed the negative effects of financial repression on economic growth and called 
for financial liberation. The policies suggested by the McKinnon–Shaw framework have the 
potential tosuppressthe deepening of the financial sectorand decrease the growth rate in the 
economy. Van Wijnbergen (1982, 1983), led a group of neo-structural economists who 
severely questioned the views of the McKinnon-Shaw school in the early 1980s.They assert 
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that financial liberalisation is unlikely to increase growth in the presence ofinformal financial 
market.  
The 1990s saw the rise of growth models based on investment in human capital, innovation 
and knowledgetogether with the relative merits of financial systems based on banks and 
markets (see Beck & Levine, 2002; Bencivenga & Smith, 1991, 1993 among others) as well 
as the institutional school of thought which holds that understanding the institutional 
environment is imperative for growth with early contributions from Knack and Keefer (1995). 
It is fair to contend that recent work including Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 
2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2002, 2004) among others have more or lessin academic unanimity that political 
institutions that increasing constraint the powers of the government cause growth. The 
above schools of thought highlight the financial and institutional determinants of growth and 
not the institutional determinants of FD considered as being endogenous to growth Levine 
(1998). This finding has recently stimulated research on the determinants of FD with a focus 
on the institutions (Barro, 2008, Cooray, 2011, Huang, 2010, Yang, 2011, Anwar & Cooray, 
2012, among others). 
The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of democratic institutions on FD in the 
upper middle, lower middle and low-income countries according to the World Bank (2015) 
classification in the SADC region. This region has received little attention in the literature on 
the institution-finance relationship thus far. Studies have been limited to the finance-growth 
relationship using mostly endogenous growth models (See Allen and Ndikumana, 1998, 
Aziakpono, 2003, Odhiambo, 2005, Banda, 2007 and Le Roux & Moyo, 2015). We attempt 
to fill this gap in the SADC region by investigating the institutional determinants of FD with a 
focus on democracy. The study builds from the work of Yang (2011), Cooray (2011), Anwar 
and Cooray (2012) and Huang (2010), who contend that political institutions, especially with 
regard to democratic transformation, foster FD while assuming a linear relationship between 
the variables. We posit that FD in SADC countries could be achieved through democracy 
controlling for specific economic and social variables in a relationship that could be non-
linear. We test this hypothesis in a region characterised by countries with improving but 
differentiated levels of FD, following deregulation in the 1990s Brownbridge and Harvey, 
(1998); Nyawata and Bird, (2004) and a wave of democratisation though with fragile and 
predominantly weak institutions Landsberg (2004) a feature of the lower middle and low-
income countries.    
Empirically the study seeks to identify and account for the variation in FD across nations in 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) by focusing on the democratic 
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institutional variables, the interaction between these institutional variables with specific 
economic and social variables (school enrolment, population, black market premium, trade 
openness and government expenditure) in determining FD. The SADC region has witnessed 
a gradual development of its financial sector from 1994 to date, following financial 
liberalisation and a spate of democratisation. This suggests that the emergence of 
democratic institutions, though weak, could be spurring FD while interacting with other social 
and economic variables and those policy makers in the region could target the quality of 
democratic institutions to foster FD. 
The SADC countries under study1 are grouped into income levels according to the World 
Bank classification that is as upper middle, lower middle or as low-income countries. The 
study focuses on a panel of 10 out of 15 economies over the period 1975-2013. The 
exclusion of some countries in the study is due to the lack of available data involving 
important variables used during the period of study. To mitigate uncertainty faced by 
research on the determinants of FD and uncertainty about the composition of the 
explanatory variables (control) in our model, we use the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997) among other methodologies that have been suggested 
and widely discussed. More specifically, in each income group, the compositions of the 
control variables are chosen using BMA, which constitutes updating prior information of the 
variable of interest (beliefs or assumptions) with information revealed in the data rather than 
assumed judging from fundamental economic theory, as has been the case with previous 
finance-growth studies in the region.  
In this investigation, we employ three dependent variables2 as proxies for FD, for each 
income group. Initially, to analyse the data, we use both linear and non-linear models 
together with Bayesian inferences. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) are employed to produce early results. We apply the difference and the 
system GMM, an approach that allows controlling for the joint endogeneity of regressors 
through the application of instruments that are internal. These methods of analysis have 
been widely used in the literature on the relationship between institutions and FD (see 
Huang, 2010, Yang, 2011, Cooray & Anwar, 2012, Deepraj & Nabamita, 2013, Roux & 
Moyo, 2015, among others).  
                                                          
1
Botswana,Lesotho,Malawi,Mauritius,Mozambique,Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, 
2
 The share of bank deposits to the GDP; the share of bank credit to the private sector, defined as the 
credit issued to the private sector by banks and other financial intermediaries divided by the GDP and 
the share of liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries to the GDP. 
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We introduce the Markov Switching Model (MSM) to show that FD may be volatile 
irrespective of the strength of institutions in the region. In classifying FD into two regimes 
(weak or low FD and high FD), we apply the MSM to determine probabilities and smooth 
probabilities of switching between states of weak or low FD and high FD. The Bayesian 
methodology is applied to our analysis to mitigate the estimation risk and sample bias 
benignly neglected in previous investigations. The Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR) 
model is employed to determine impulse responses on FD given shocks on institutional, 
economic and social variables.The most important democratic institutional variables that 
account for variations in FD are determined. These contribute to the literature in the SADC 
region where no such study has previously been executed. We contribute methodologically 
to the body of knowledge by the application of the Bayesian and Markov inferences to FD 
literature. Through applying the Markov Model, we contribute by showing that there is 
instability in FD in the economies under study in general but with a higher probability of 
being in state of high FD in the upper middle income countries and a high probability of 
being in a state of low FD in the lower middle and low-income countries, a result that 
supports the narrow version of the financial instability hypothesis. We also show that the 
effect of democracy on FD can effectively be assessed through its interaction with other 
social and economic variables in a non-linear relationship and that when democracy 
becomes more substantive it leads to positive outcomes for FD. 
1.2 Objectives and Hypotheses of the Study: 
 
1.2.1 Objectives of the study 
 
Recent studies motivated by the work of Levine (1997) suggest that FD could be explained 
by growth and according to Huang (2010) what determines FD remains imperfectly 
understood. The role of institutions has currently become topical among researchers and 
policy makers as a factor that determines FD.  For instance studies by La Porter, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998); Rajan and Zingales (2003); Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005); Haber, North and Weingast, (2007); Yang (2011); Miletkov and Wintoki (2012), 
Marcelin and Mathur (2014), find evidence that law abiding institutions, institutions that 
protect property rights, institutions that ensure the enforcement of contracts as well as those 
that effectively constrain those in power are associated with higher levels of FD. This new 
and crucial area of interest on the determinants of FD is addressed in the SADC region. 
Essentially, the research attempts to answer the question: Are democratic institutions a sine 
qua non to FD? The main objectives of this study are:  
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(i) To determine the effect of democracy and its interaction with specific social and economic 
variables on FD.  
(ii) To determine the probability of switching between states of high FD and weak or low FD 
following political regime changes.  
(iii) To examine how innovations in the democratic institutional variables affect FD compared 
to the policy and social variables, and hence determine the most important variables having 
an influence on FD.  
(iv)  To relate findings to policy designs and suggest recommendations. 
1.2.2 Hypotheses of the study. 
 
According to North (1981:201-202) institutions are “…a set of rules, compliance procedures, 
and moral and ethical behavioural norms designed to constrain the behaviour of individuals 
in the interest of maximising wealth or utility of principals”. This suggests that constitutions 
and electoral rules are good examples of institutions which are often violated in varying 
degrees in developing countries. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002, 2004) highlight a 
range of institutional arrangements that are conspicuously absent in developing countries. 
These include a lack of trust in the rule of law; weak institutions to mitigate risk (where: the 
rule of law is not respected, there are weak property rights and contract enforcements, rulers 
are not effectively constrained). These according to Barro (2008) generally fall under the 
legal and political framework of a country, thought to be brought about by democracy. It is 
widely agreed that democracy constraints the behaviour of rulers and delivers better 
institutional outcomes. By grouping the countries under study into low, lower middle and 
upper middle income, we run Markov switching regressions with constant volatility to 
determine the probability of switching between regimes of high FD and weak or low FD. We 
determine whether first order effects on FD come from the economic or social variables or 
from democracy or when they interact through the use of Bayesian impulse responses. 
Considering that a significant number of SADC countries under study (Zambia, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Swaziland) have achieved democracy at the formal or 
procedural level, and not at the substantive level3, resulting generally in weak institutions 
Landsberg (2004), it would be interesting to empirically investigate whether democracy and 
its interaction with the specific social and economic variables prevalent in the region has 
resulted in meaningful financial deepening in the region. We define substantive democracy 
                                                          
3
 The Polity IV index of democracy for these countries suggest that democracy on the average has 
not attained the substantive level, according to our definition of substantive democracy following the 
period of democratisation considered in the study (1990-2013) 
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as one that not only brings about free and fair elections, the separation of powers and the 
role of opposition parties but it also ensures respect of the rule of law, protects property 
rights,ensure that contracts are enforced, creditor and shareholder rights and puts effective 
constrain on rulers. Formal or procedural democracy on the other hand relates to the 
introduction of the norms, values and standards that regulate the behaviour of states, but the 
states find it difficult to enforce them – the variables that define substantive democracy 
above are superficial or not enforced at all. 
In order to achieve the objectives of the thesis, we will test the following hypotheses using 
the econometric, Markov and Bayesian methods mentioned above. Since strong or weak 
institutions are thought to be established by democracy or lack of democracy respectively 
Barro (2008), we hypothesise that: 
(i) Democracy (procedural or substantive) leads to positive outcomes for FD. 
(ii) Autocracy leads to negative outcomes for FD. 
(iii) Constraints on executives lead to positive outcomes for FD. 
(iv)  Per capita income contributes positively in improving FD. 
(v) The impact of institutional variables on variations in FD is greater compared to social and 
economic variables. 
(vi) The probability of remaining in a state of low FD in countries experiencing low FD is high 
compared to countries experiencing high FD. 
The following arguments inform our hypothesis and the expected signs. Siegel et al. (2004) 
argues that institutions that ensure respect of the rule of law, make sure that property rights 
are protected, ensure that contracts are enforced and put constraints on those in power are 
thought to be brought about by democracy. La Porta et al. (1998); Rajan and Zingales 
(2003); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); Harber et al. (2005) show evidence that these 
institutions are positively linked with increasing levels of FD. These arguments suggest that 
democracy and constraint on executives may be positively associated with FD hypotheses 
(i) and (iii). Autocracy tends to create conditions conducive for political instability which 
negatively affects FD. A study by Roe and Siegel (2011) show strong evidence that varying 
levels of political instability around the world are a primary determinant of differences in FD 
across nations (hypothesis (ii)). In terms of hypothesis (iv), GDP per capita is shown to be 
positively associated with law enforcement La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) where the calibre of 
which the law is enforced improves sharply with the level of per capita income. It has also 
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been shown to have a very strong positive link with institutional quality Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), Gurr and Marshall (2000). Considering hypothesis (v), consensus 
has not been reached among researchers on the primacy of institutions over other factors 
(e.g. geography, integration), Rodrik et al. (2004) that affect variations in income across 
nations. In the same tradition, the study tests the primacy of institutions over other factors 
that affect variations in FD.  Hypothesis (vi) is informed by a version of the financial instability 
hypothesis Minsky (1992) which suggests when the economy experiences prosperity over a 
long period its witches from a stable system to an unstable system in its financial relations 
and hence we argue that such instability affects FD. We argue that instability in financial 
relations could be reinforced by political instability inherent in autocratic regimes thereby 
negatively affecting FD and it increases the probability of being in a state of low FD. 
1.3 Significance of the Study: 
 
The study contributes to the literature on FD by establishing whether political institutions 
have any positive outcome on FD in the selected SADC countries. The period under study is 
from 1975 to 2013, a period marked by political regime changes generally covering 
transitions from autocracy to democracy.  
It is expected that the study will make the following contributions inthe area of FD in the 
SADC region: 
(i) We apply Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to determine the proximate determinants of 
FD in each income group of the countries under study in the SADC region. 
(ii) We assess the role of democratic institutions and the interaction between democracy with 
specific social and economic variables in determining outcomes for FD and that the role of 
democracy could be non-linear.  
(iii) We employ Bayesian Vector Auto-Regressions (BVAR) and inferences thereof to show 
how shocks in the institutional variables affect FD compared to the specific social and 
economic (policy) variables and hence determine the most important variables influencing 
FD for each income group.  
(iv) We show that the probability of staying in a regime of low FD in countries experiencing 
low FD is high compared to countries experiencing high FD by applying the Markov Regime 
Switching Model to FD. The fact that switching occurs between states of high and low FD 
suggests that the financial sectors of the income groups are inherently unstable, lending 
credence to a narrow version of the financial instability hypothesis.  
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Model unpredictability is a feature of experiential research on the factors that determine FD 
and this aspect is mitigated by the application of Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), (Huang, 
2010). According to Levine and Renelt (1992) the reliability of current conclusions on cross-
sectional growth regressions are questionable, particularly where a huge amount of literature 
suggests a variation of economic, social, political and institutional variables as determining 
long-run average rates of growth. The study builds from this and applies the (BMA) for each 
income group in the SADC to measure the robustness of a choice of possible factors that 
determine of FD. 
Secondly, no overall index for FD has been developed in the literature. To overcome this 
gap we apply the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based on measures of FD that have 
been widely applied (Levine and Zervos, 1996; Ang and Mckibbin, 2007; Huang, 2010). This 
will create aggregate indices for FD for any income group that shows that these indicators 
are highly correlated. Where applicable (the upper middle income countries), the study uses 
four standard measures of FD (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000) on which the PCA 
are based on. These include: (i) liquid liabilities: this is one of the major indicators that 
measures the size of financial intermediaries in relation to the economy. It includes: the 
central bank, deposit money banks and other financial institutions; (ii) private credit: This 
variable generally measures the activities of financial intermediariesthat are provided to the 
private sector; (iii) the share of bank deposits: this indicatormeasures the total assets held by 
deposit money banks and finally (iv) the ratio of commercial banks assets to the sum of 
commercial bank and central bank assets.  
Thirdly, the study assesses the role of institutions (democracy) and its interaction with 
specific social and economic variables in determining positive outcomes for FD in the SADC 
region. Most studies have used OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators such as the 
GMM and more recently difference and system GMM to investigate the role of institutions on 
FD. We apply some of these previous methods, as mentioned earlier to determine some 
preliminary evidence. To show instability in FD, the study contributes by introducing the 
Markov Switching Model (Hamilton, 1989), one of the most popular non-linear time-series 
models, to the FD literature. This model would explore the significance of the institutional 
variables in a non-linear relationship on FD by determining the probabilities of being in a 
state of high or low FD for the different income groups. According to Hamilton (1989), the 
merits of the model suggest that it involves multiple structures (equations) that can 
characterise time-series behaviour in different regimes and that is suitable for describing 
correlated data that exhibits distinct dynamic patterns during different time periods. 
9 
 
Fourthly, Muteba (2017) suggests that to account for estimation risk and sample bias 
Bayesian inferences may be applied. Bayesian method overcomes estimation risk because it 
does not rely on historical data to estimate the future i.e. forecast. Since Bayesian method 
averages the parameters generated from the posterior distribution, it in fact deals with the 
bias problem. The study follows this method and employs BVAR to determine how shocks in 
the institutional variables affect FD compared to the specific social and economic variables 
used in the study. We also compute forecast error variance decompositions of FD to 
investigate what democratic institutional variables are most salient affectingFD over time and 
how much they contribute to FD. Sevinç and Ergûn (2009) suggest that BVAR models 
mitigates the over parameterization of VAR models and it is better in terms of forecasting. 
 
1.4 Motivation for the Study: 
 
The study uses a dynamic panel data approach from 10 SADC countries, grouped into upper 
middle income, lower middle income and low-income countries, according to the World Bank 
(2015) classification. The economies of the world are divided according to 2015 GNI per 
capita. The calculation is done using the World Bank Atlas method. The diferent income 
groups include: low-income, $1,045 or less; lower middle income, $1,045 -$4,125; upper 
middle income, $4,125 - $12,736; and high income, $12,736 or more. These groupings tend 
to suggest salient differences and similarities in their economic, social, financial and implicitly 
political structures that may be influencing FD in each of the different income groups. 
Moreover, there is lack of empirical evidence on the institutional determinants of FD in the 
region. The study, therefore, explores research deficiency in this area of interest in the 
region by focusing on the role of political institutions with emphasis on democracy, 
hypothesised as one of the proximate determinants of FD.  
The SADC has witnessed a noticeable gradual development of its financial sector between 
1993 to date due to various financial restructuring programmes that aim to achieve a better 
financial system. Evidence of these programmes can be drawn from the various FD 
strategies incorporated in each country’s National Development Plan. At the regional level, 
SADC under the Protocol on Finance and Investment (2006) envisages the harmonisation of 
financial policies within the region in achieving one of its long-term objectives of macro-
economic convergence.  According to Brownbridge and Harvey (1998) these reforms have 
almost entirely eliminated the repressive financial policies that were prevalent in the region. 
Is the gradual improvement in FD, untested evidence, a result of better and improved 
democratic institutions brought about by regional political integration, governance and 
democratisation? We attempt to empirically answer this question. Yang (2011) argues that 
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institutions that ensure that:  the rule of law is respected, the rights to property are protected, 
contracts are properly enforced and that rulers are effectively constrained, are often thought 
to be brought about by democracy which is associated with higher levels of FD. We posit, as 
a motivation of one of our hypothesis stated above, that democracy at the procedural level is 
a necessary condition for FD. When democracy becomes much more substantive, this may 
serve as a sufficient condition for more meaningful financial deepening. This assertion is 
tested empirically from 1990 to 2013, a period where countries in the southern African region 
were experiencing increasing democratisation. 
 
Considering that most SADC countries (especially in the lower middle and low-income 
groups) may not have achieved democracy at the substantive level, it would be interesting to 
empirically investigate whether improving democratic institutions is resulting in meaningful 
FD in the countries under study. If this is the case, then it would exemplify the contribution of 
democratic institutions in FD in the literature in general and in the SADC region in particular. 
We attempt, in our empirical analysis to fill this gap in the literature in the region, where to 
the best of our knowledge, no such study has been carried out. 
 
Unlike previous studies in the SADC that have used more than one proxy for FD, this study 
reduces the dimensionality of correlated banking measures using PCA for any income group 
(the upper income group) experiencing high correlation of the FD indicators in order to 
circumvent the problem of multi-collinearity in the panel data investigations. The study 
applies bank-based financial sector indicators motivated by the fact that this sector is more 
developed than the stock market sector which is generally hindered by liquidity growth in 
most of the countries under study (Senbet and Otchere, 2008). In our analysis, we show the 
effect of the different explanatory variables on all three dependent variables applied for each 
model. The reason is that the dependent variables (bank-based proxies for FD) operated in 
tandem in the economy. They are interdependent – for instance, a simple model of credit 
creation suggests that as deposits increase, the liabilities of banks increase as well as 
reserves which banks are now able to extend more credit. Therefore, the measures of FD 
used in the study are not mutually exclusive, an approach different from thoseapplied in 
previous studies. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Study: 
 
The study is structured as follows in the six chapters: The first chapter presented the 
background and context of the study.Chapter two provides an overview of states’ policies 
with respect to FD and the health of democracy in all the countries under study.  Chapter 
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three reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of FD with a focus 
on the institutional determinants. The empirical literature critically examines studies on the 
effects of institutions on FD in developed, emerging and developing economies. Chapter four 
begins the empirical section of the study. The different empirical approaches are presented 
to test the hypotheses. All variables applied are defined operationally and the construction of 
the dataset is described and discussed. Control variables used as explanatory variables in 
the study include social variables (human capital development proxy by secondary school 
enrolment and population) and policy variables (output per capita, inflation, foreign direct 
investments, trade openness, government expenditure and black market premium). All 
variables that have the potential to cause serious endogeneity problems are left out. The 
methods of analysis, diagnostics and models used are discussed. The hypotheses are 
tested by using a variety of econometric techniques to ensure reliability of results. Chapter 
five presents and discusses the overall empirical results based on the three main objectives 
of the study. The final chapter summarises the contribution of this work to the field. 
Improvements and possible extensions of this work are presented along with possible policy 
implications and recommendations. These policy ideas are intended to provoke future 
debate and underscore the need for future debate.  In the ensuing chapter, it would be 
imperative to understand the health of governance and democratisation of the countries 
under study as they pursue policies to improve on FD. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COUNTRY SPECIFIC POLICIES ON FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE STATE OF 
DEMOCRACY 
2.1 Introduction: 
 
In this chapter, we present the state of democracy in each country and the level of FD given 
the policies that each country has put in place to foster FD. The policies to promote FD form 
part of SADC’s objectives in general and the national development plans of the countries 
under study in particular, suggesting that SADC countries see FD as crucial in fostering the 
development and growth of their economies. The SADC countries also acknowledge the 
importance of democratic transformation in achieving the objectives of the various 
development plans in place. The strategic framework to improve FD is elucidated more 
generally in the SADC’s protocol for finance and investment. We explore each country’s 
strategic framework with respect to the state of FD and associate it with the level of 
democracy using Polity IV authority trends. The combined polity scores (democracy minus 
autocracy) are used to show authority trends. Transformation towards democratisation and 
commitment to democratic rule by governments in the region began in earnest in the 1990s. 
The countries under study except for Zimbabwe and Swaziland show an improvement in 
authority trends from the 1990s onwards. 
 
According to Polity IV Trend Graphs (CSP, 2014), figures 1a, 2a and 3a shows each 
country’strends in democracy (the country’s annual Polity scores) from 1946-2013. The 
graphs show grids denoting upright thresholds for democracy with values greater than six 
and above and autocracy with values less than negative six and below. A horizontal line is 
designated to show the end of the cold war in 1991. The trend graphs also provides 
exceptional details on special polity conditions, including periods of factionalism or 
dissension with values of 6 or 7 and represented by red trend lines; periods of foreign 
interventions (interruption) carry the value -66 and are shown on the graphs with dashed 
purple lines; periods of anarchy (interregnum) are given the value -77 and are denoted with 
dashed black lines and periods of transition following a year of independence, are given the 
value -88 with the trend shown by dashed green lines. Judging from average authority 
values4 for the period (1975-2013) we determine whether the countries under study have 
achieved procedural or substantive democracy according to our definition. Polity 2 index of 
democracy (often referred to as the combined polity score) is obtained by computing the 
                                                          
4
 These average values are the author’s own calculations. An average score of 6 and above suggests 
substantive democracy otherwise procedural. 
 
13 
 
difference between the democracy and autocracy score. There are six authority 
characteristics which determine the democracy and autocracy scores. These include:  
regulation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, operational 
independence of chief executive or executive constraints, regulation and competition of 
participation. Applying the above variables countries are assigned scores based on how 
democratic or autocratic they are. The scores range from 0 to 10 with higher scores 
reflecting more democratic regimes. Correspondingly, the Polity 2 (democracy minus 
autocracy) ranges from -10 to 10. Values closer to 10 denote regimes that are more 
democratic. We obtain some early results on the effect of the Polity IV variables on FD for all 
income groups by running robust OLS regressions without any control variables. This 
section further serves to justify the study and informs how FD is high on the agenda of the 
various states’ policy makers.  
 
2.2 Financial Sector Development Strategies, Trends and the State of Democracy 
 The Protocol on finance and investment “seeks to foster harmonisation of the financial and 
investment policies of the State Parties in order to make them consistent with objectives of 
SADC and ensure that any changes to financial and investment policies in one State Party 
do not necessitate undesirable adjustments in other State Parties” RISDP (2006: 78).  
Harmonisation of financial policies within the region underscores the importance of FD in 
each member state’s economy. Harmonising financial policies suggests that each country in 
the region should be able to achieve a financial system that is effective, rival and 
strongnecessary for ensuring sustainable economic growth and development. 
The strategic objectives and actions that are going to be taken to improve FD are spelt out in 
the SADC’s (2006) Protocol for Finance and Investment. The SADC (2006) financial sector 
and investment strategic objectives and actions include, among others: more cooperation 
ofstate parties and the central banks to ensure exchange controls; establishing principles 
that ensure the convergence of the legal and operational frameworks of central banks; 
working together and harmonizing the payment clearing and settlement systems among 
central banks; central banks cooperating in the area of information and communications 
technology (ICT); working together on bank supervision amongst central banks; working 
together in the activities of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) in the region; working 
together in the area of informal financial institutions and the services offered; easing the 
development of capital and financial markets in the region and working together to improve 
in the stock exchanges in the SADC region. 
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These measures explicitly or implicitly tend to support the view that FD contributes towards 
growth and development of which the SADC group recognises. What determines FD 
remains material and untested in the region. In the study, we contend that institutions, 
especially democratic institutions may be vital in determining the state of FD and this 
association may be direct or indirect. 
According to the SADC (2006) Protocol for Finance and Investment there are, however, 
institutional arrangements responsible for the implementation of the protocol to foster the FD 
process. These institutional arrangements according to SADC (2006) embody the following: 
the integrated Committee of Ministers, Committee that constitute Ministers in charge of 
Finance and Investment, the Committee made up of the Central Bank Governors of the 
region, an oversight panel responsible for peer review. For successful implementation of the 
protocol, the committee of ministers of finance and investment would ensure that sub 
committees are created for purposes deemed appropriate. 
 
We suggest that these institutional mechanisms would be more effective in a democratic 
environment for them to foster meaningful FD. One may infer from such institutional 
arrangements that leaders of the SADC region strongly acknowledges that in order to 
achieve economic growth and development (and implicitly FD) there has to be stable 
political, social, legal, economic and financial conditions.  Article 5 of the SADC Treaty 
explicitly affirms that the SADC member states are committed to “promote common political 
values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions that are 
democratic, legitimate and effective” SADC, (2006:5).  These institutional aspects tend to 
suggest that democracy could be seen as a proximate determinant of FD in the region. 
  
The member states of SADC ultimately intend to attain a monetary union though each state 
will have autonomy in the running of their respective economies and financial sysytems 
(African Development Bank Group, 2010). We briefly assess the national strategic 
development plan under each country’s Financial Sector Development Strategy to determine 
if there are any specific initiatives at the national level that would boost or encourage FD. We 
associate the policies in place or envisioned with the state of democracy and the state of FD 
in each country under study according to their income group. Figures 1a, 2a, 3a, and figures 
1b, 2b, 3b generally indicate the authority trends and trends in FD (using the three proxies) 
in each country respectively. Generally, some volatility in FD is observed before 1990 in all 
the countries and more severely in the lower middle income and low-income countries. This 
period is associated with weaker average levels of democratisation. However, from 1990 
onwards the volatility in FD is much lesser, a period where the SADC countries generally 
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embraced democratisation. These trends tend to suggest a relatively positive effect of 
democracy on FD especially for the upper middle income countries independent of the 
interaction of any macro-economic variables. The following sections consider each income 
group and evaluate the FD strategies, trends and the state of democracy together with OLS 
regressions based on the effect on Polity IV (authority) variables on FD in the absence of 
controls. 
 
2.2.1 Upper middle income countries 
 
BOTSWANA – THE NATIONAL VISION 2016 
The financial sector strategy for the tenth National Development Plan will involve the 
following aspects, which reflect the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
that were jointly shouldered with the IMF and the World Bank in 2007: Recommendations 
from the IMF (2007) and the World Bank (2007) on the financial sector assessment 
programme are summarised as follows: social and economic inclusion in the financial 
services and access policy; development of financial instruments that serve a wide range of 
sectors and accessed by a wide section of the community e.g., the use of technology in 
executing payments and settlements; Looking into the gains and risks when engaging in 
regional and global trade agreements, such as SADC protocols, Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations; update legislation 
that protect consumers and ensure sustainable financial stability; effectuate compliance in 
relation to disclosure stipulations, reporting standards and comprehension of financial 
products and costs involved; and, curb possibilities for fraud, money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism. 
 
The government of Botswana (2009) seeks to create an environment conducive for financial 
sector development. This will be achieved byinstituting suitable regulatory structures that 
enhance increasing competition, promote innovation, improve consumer education and 
infrastructural development, and easing market entry and exit and the growth of institutions. 
The government will capitalise on its economic policy position to influence change by 
encouraging innovation in the financial sector. For instance, introducing smartcard based 
payments systems and by providing improved and timely data. 
 
Clearly, one can deduce that there are national strategies geared towards improving FD in 
Botswana and the role of government is sacrosanct in achieving that goal. It is only in a 
democratic setting that the government will play such a role effectively.  According to Polity 
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IV Project on political regime characteristics and transitions (1800-2013), Botswana obtained 
an average score of 7 out of a 10 point scale on its institutional democracy, with a score of 8 
out of 10 for the past 10 years. During this period, the autocracy scores were 0, reflecting a 
combined polity score of 7 and 8 on 10 as indicated above. The average authority values for 
the period 1975-2013 for Botswana is 6.4 as shown in (table 1a below), a value that is above 
the lower limit of our definition of substantive democracy. Before 1990 the average value 
was 5.6 and improved to 6.9 after 1990. These fairly suggest that the country’s democratic 
credentials are in place, which may positively affect FD as shown in figure 1b below. 
 
MAURITIUS- FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT – 2007 
 
Growth in the Mauritian economy is strongly linked by strong performances in four sectors. 
These include: financial services, ICT and the sea food sectors. Policy makers have been 
motivated to promote the financial services sector as another major pillar of the economy 
and establishing Mauritius as a regional financial center. 
 
To further financial deepening in Mauritius, the financial services development Act (2007) 
recommended the establishment of the Financial Services Commission. The objectives of 
the Commission are as follows:  to improve on the administration of financial services and 
also on global business activities; to promote good policies both in the financial services and 
global business sectors; emphasise policies that would ensure transparency, efficiency and 
fairness in the financial and capital markets in the country; to carry out research into new 
areas of development in the financial services sector; to embrace new challenges in the 
financial services sector; to capitalise on new opportunities and promote the creation of jobs 
and sustainable economic growth; to ensure a sound and stable financial system in 
partnership with the central bank of Mauritius; to establish a commission that will develop 
policies and priority areas of development in the financial services sector and make 
recommendations to the minister in charge of financial affairs. The commission 
recommended the following: The promotion, development, fairness, efficiency and openness 
and accountability of financial institutions and capital markets; ensure the protection of the 
public who are investing in non-banking financial products through suppression of crime and 
unethical behaviour; and ensure that the financial system in Mauritius is sound and stable. 
(Government gazette, 2007). 
 
According to AEO (2013) the management of public finances and structural reforms are 
important requisites for strong and sustainable governance end results and promoting 
competitiveness. However, the country experienced a slight drop in the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index, falling from a rank of 39 in 2011 to 43 in 2012 (out 
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of 183 countries). The implication of the droptranslates into lack of public confidence in the 
government’s anti-corruption efforts; the prosecution of public figures charged with 
corruption in 2012 dented the public’s confidence more especially as the process dragged 
on. 
 
Generally, governance in the country has been good taking into consideration Polity IV 
scores. The country obtained a score of 9 from 1975 to 1981 and 10 from 1981 to 2013, with 
combined polity scores of 9 and 10, respectively (see figure 1a below). For Mauritius, the 
average authority values for the period 1975-2013 is 8.9 (table 1a below), clearly indicating 
substantive democracy. Before 1990 the average value was 8.6 and improved to 9.0 after 
1990. These suggest that positive GDP growth rates and good governance may be 
anchored to the strong financial performance. The effect of substantive democracy can 
easily be discerned from the improving trends in its FD for the whole sample period (see 
figure 1b below).  
 
NAMIBIA VISION 2030 - FINANCIAL SECTOR STRATEGY – 2011-2021 
 
The financial sector strategic plan for Namibia recognises that the financial sector is 
important in promoting economic growth in the country.The National Planning Commission 
(2011) of Namibia developed a financial sector strategy to improve the development of the 
financial sector after identifying weaknesses in the sector. The crucial frailties of the financial 
sector include: a superficial financial market; little rivalry, limited financial buffer, capital 
markets that are not developed; insufficient and ineffective regulation; very little access to 
financial services; limited knowledge on financial services and vulnerability of consumers; 
absence of active consumer movements, lack of skills in financial management; and the 
domination of foreign firms owning financial institutions. 
 
The Ministry of Finance (2011) envisages that by the end of year 2021, the following should 
have been achieved:  A financial system that is developed, deepened and efficient; 
regulators of very high standards, recognised and respected worldwide; a financial system 
that is stable, competitive and well regulated; less dominance of foreign ownership of 
financial institutions; a financial sector that is highly inclusive; a financially literate population 
that is protected of the financial services and products offered. 
 
The government of Namibia recognises the importance of FD in contributing towards growth 
and development as expatiated in its financial sector strategy. The implementation and 
success of the plan will depend significantly on democratic governance in the country among 
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others. Considering that democracy may foster FD, Namibia may have to do more in 
effecting good democratic governance compared to its peers in the upper middle income 
group, judging from its Polity IV scores for institutional democracy from 1990-2013. The 
country achieved on average a combined polity score of 5.4 out of 10 during this period (see 
figure 1a below). Namibia is considered an outlier in this income group, with its polity scores 
tottering around the borders of substantive democracy. There are no scores for Namibia 
before 1990 and since 1990 the score has been constant on an average of 5.4 (table 1a 
below) corresponding with improving levels of FD comparatively to the period before 1990 
where there were such high levels of volatility (see figure 1b below). 
SOUTH AFRICA- NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN - 2030 
 
The National Planning Commission (2011) notes that the South African financial sector is the 
most sophisticated in the SADC region and the country has not leveraged this asset enough 
to promote economic growth and create employment. The commission recommends that 
with the support of government these sectors can vigorously expand on the continent, with 
countries that have strong connectionswith the economy of South Africa. This tends to 
suggest that the government recognises the important role of this sector in contributing 
towards growth and development. 
 
The National Development Plan (2011) identifies the following priority areas that should be 
improved on: Increase accessibility of financial services to the poorer sections of the 
population; lowering the costs of these services and infrastructure; encourage the extension 
of credit to small and medium firms engaged in productive investments; public private 
partnerships in the following areas: increasing business lending; provision of advisory and 
support services, state financed initiatives that are labour intensive; encourage private 
firmsespecially those in the construction sector to partner with South African banks in 
providing project finance for contracts on the continent. 
 
According to the National Development Plan (2011), good governance is an important 
requirement in creating a conduicive environment for the private sector (financial institutions) 
to extend sufficient credit to businesses, especially to smaller firms. Sufficient credit 
extension to firms in need will lead to greater business investments and jobs creation. One 
of the government’s strategic financial objectives is to increase financial inclusion, especially 
of the historically marginalised groups. With an efficient and stable financial sector access to 
banking and insurance services to the poorer sections of the population will be improved 
through the promotion and mobilisation of household savings and broader access to credit.   
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A report by Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A), (2016), suggests that South Africa 
benefits from a strong and well developed supervisory framework and thatboth bank and 
non-bank regulators share information withauthorities regularly, conduct liquidity risk reviews 
and are working on developing a framework to analyse macro-prudential risk. The MFW4A 
(2016) report also mentions that the domestic banks in South Africa are well capitalised 
above the new Basel III levels and are currently operating with an average capital adequacy 
ratio of 15% or 12% for Tier 1 capital. According to the MFW4A (2016) report,the banking 
sector is highly concentrated with four banks having over 80% of the banking assets and 
these banks remain profitable, well capitalised and adequately provisioned despite the 2008 
economic downturn. International expansion of the banks especially in the SADC region has 
guaranteed substantial market share. 
 
 The Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) (2014) identifies a number of changes in 
respect to the regulatory environment, product offering and the number of participants 
resulting in a greater level of competition from smaller banks which have targeted the low-
income and previously unbanked market. This suggests that South Africa has significantly 
improved on its financial inclusion. The Financial Sector Charter has been the main driver of 
financial inclusion in South Africa (BASA, 2014). According to the Finscope (2013) survey 
about 75 percent of adults in South Africa are banked and a total of 79 percent adults are 
formally served - are banked and have access to formal bank products/services. However, 
significant challenges remain in expanding access to affordable and expanding financial 
services. There still exists a major divide between the ability of salaried and non-salaried 
individuals to open bank accounts, lending to small and medium enterprises remains low 
and the availability of saving and insurance products is limited (Finscope, 2013). 
 
Associating good governance with democracy and Polity IV scores, South Africa obtained a 
score of 3.6 on the average from 1975 to 1990 and an average of 7 between 1990 and 
2013. The average authority values for the period 1975-2013 is approximately 6 (table (i) a 
below). These mean values considered the period of transition where a score of zero may be 
allocated. The scores suggest that the country’s democracy is in-tact and may have 
contributed to its present state of FD. The country has the most developed financial sector in 
the region. 
 
The trends in FD for this income group showed some instability before 1990 except for 
Mauritius that shows a smooth relatively constant improvement in FD for the whole period. 
Volatility in FD is most remarkable in Namibia before 1990 where one could not determine 
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any authority trend but showed a marked improvement after this period. On the whole, for 
this income group, the period after 1990 showed improvements in FD (see figure 1b below.) 
Figure 1a, Authority trends: upper middle income countries 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014 
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Figure 1b, financial development trends5: upper middle income countries  
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Table
6
 1a Average authority values: Upper middle income 
 
Botswana 
                               
Mauritius Namibia 
South 
Africa 
Before 1990 5.63636 8.66667 0 3.63636 
After 1990 6.9697 9.09091 5.45455 7.05628 
Whole (1975-2013)  6.41414 8.91414 5.45455 5.96257 
Notes: Higher values of authority represent more democratic regimes based on Polity 2 (democracy minus autocracy) scores 
 
                                                          
5
 These graphs are drawn by the author using data from the three financial development indicators 
from 1975 to 2013. 
 
6
 The values in all the tables in this thesis are the author’s own calculations. 
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Table 1b below, show early results on the effect of institutional variables (Polity IV) on FD. A 
summary of the analysis is reported in table 1c.  The results are based on the analysis of z-
statistics and probabilities of each regression using all three dependent variables. The 
results for this income group generally suggest that the powers of the chief executive were 
not constrained enough before 1990 and become more constrained after 1990 thus playing 
a positive role in improving FD. Substantive democracy played a positive and significant role 
in improving FD after 1990 though its role before 1990 was positive but not significant while 
the role of procedural democracy has generally been negative and insignificant.   Autocracy 
was negative before 1990 and became positive after 1990 suggesting that the decrease in 
autocracy may be playing a positive role for FD. These results on the whole seem to 
correlate with the observed trend in FD as explained by the institutional variables. 
Table 1b, early results on the effect of institutional variables (Polity IV) on financial development. 
  Dependent variables   
Explanatory variables Bank deposits Private credit Liquid liabilities  
     
Autocracy (1975-1990) 0.24(0.63) -0.05(0.84) -0.33(0.83)  
Executive constraints (1975-1990) 0.04(0.63) -0.15***(0.00) -0.83***(0.00)  
polity IV (1975-1990) -0.01(0.90) -0.03(0.43) -0.60***(0.01)  
S Polity IV (1975-1990) 0.04(0.63) 0.03(0.57) 0.53***(0.01)  
 18 21 17  
Autocracy (1990-2013) 0.17(0.62) 0.05(0.72) -0.41(0.11)  
Executive constraints (1990-2013) 0.16**(0.03) -0.11*(0.16) 0.77***(0.00)  
polity IV (1990-2013) 0.01(0.81) -0.02(0.11) -0.14***(0.00)  
S Polity IV (1990-2013) 0.17***(0.00) 0.24***(0.00) -0.66***(0.00)  
 17 16 10  
Observations 151 151 151  
Notes: The table shows robust OLS regressions for the cross-section of upper income countries. The specifications include a 
constant but the estimates are not reported on the table.: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** 
denote significance at 5%, and *** denote significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. All variables 
are defined as in section 4.3 above. 
 
Table 1c, summary of regression results – upper middle income countries 
1975-1990 
Autocracy Negative and insignificant 
Constraint on executives  Negative and significant 
Procedural democracy (Polity) Negative and insignificant 
Substantive democracy (S Polity) Positive and insignificant 
1990-2013 
Autocracy Positive and insignificant 
Constraint on executives Positive and significant 
Procedural democracy (Polity) Negative and insignificant 
Substantive democracy (S Polity) Positive and significant 
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2.2.2 Lower middle income countries 
 
LESOTHO – NATIONAL STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2012-2017 
 
The strategic framework for financial improvement generally recognises the importance of 
the financial sector in the social and economic development process. Based on the 
recommendations of the African Development Bank Group (2013) on the weaknesses of the 
financial sector, the plan identifies systemic reforms to mitigate a very low financial 
intermediation, under-developed money and capital market, a financial sector that is highly 
concentrated with limited competition, financial exclusion and a weak legal and regulatory 
framework .  It is in this vein that measures will be taken to harness the sector’s full potential 
so that it can facilitate and support economic growth and development in Lesotho. According 
to the National Strategic development Plan (2012), the strategic objectives and actions that 
are being taken to improve the financial sectors’ direct and indirect contribution to Lesotho’s 
growth and development include; improving financial stability and soundness by, amongst 
other things, strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework to deal with risk and 
minimise external shocks; increase access to financial services by, for example, 
operationalising the credit guarantee scheme, the national identity system and the credit 
bureau; enforcing effective administration of new land laws and leasing laws so that land 
could be used as collateral; and strengthening the legal framework and operations of the 
commercial court to improve contract enforcement (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2012).  
 
The National Strategic development Plan (2012) outlines specific strategies to improve 
financial sector development. These include:  increasing the alternatives for mobilising 
financial resources by facilitating the development of financial and capital markets and 
exploring the possibility of establishing diaspora bonds and other investment instruments to 
finance development; promote the establishment of low cost and competitive savings 
instruments with stable returns and long-term contractual savings for investment so as to 
inspire the savings culture in Basotho; and establish an automated clearing house with the 
necessary infrastructure in an endeavour to improve efficiency of the financial sector.  
 
From the above strategies, one can deduce that there are steps towards improving FD at the 
national level. Government’s effectiveness in creating an enabling environment for these 
policies to be implemented is crucial and we contend that it is through democratic 
dispensation that the government would be able to effectively implement such policies. 
Based on the Polity IV report on institutional democracy, Lesotho performed rather poorly 
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with an average of 0 on 10 from 1970 to 1992 and improved dramatically to 8 from 1993 to 
2013 as a result of its autocracy score falling to 0 during this period. A possible reason could 
have been its improvement in democratic governance. However, the trends suggest some 
volatility in FD up to the year 2000 and thereafter showed some slight stable improvement. 
The average authority values for the period 1975-2013 for Lesotho is -0.35 (see table (ii)a 
below), a value far below our threshold of 6, justifying why this country is far from achieving 
substantive democracy. The value improved from -6.36 between 1975 and 1990 to 3.93 
between 1990 and 2013, suggesting improvements in democratisation but at the procedural 
level. 
 
 In the World Democracy Audit report (Freedom House, 2011), Lesotho is ranked above 
average, at 57 out of 150 countries and 8th in the African Union (World Democracy Audit, 
2011). This indicates relatively good performance in terms of protection of political rights and 
civil liberties. Lesotho’s rankings for press freedom and handling corruption are 62 and 58 
out of 150 and 149 countries, respectively. These improvements of late may be reflecting 
positively in its FD strategies. 
 
SWAZILAND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY – VISION 2022 
 
The main focus of Vision 2022 is to achieve a significant improvement in its human 
development indices by relying on a political environment that is stable; ensuring social 
justice; and sustainability in its economic development.The National Development Strategy 
(1999) identifies key macro strategic areas which include: effective management of the 
economy, empowerment of its people economically, improve on the development of human 
resources, agriculture and industries, channel more resources into research and 
development and the management of the environment. According to National Development 
Strategy (1999) the strategies within the different sectors of the economy include: the 
management of the public sector, macro-economic management, the development of 
physical infrastructure, agricultural development, land and rural development, the provision 
of economic services, education and training programmes, the health of the population and 
the general welfare of society at large.  
 
From the above, the study deduces that the major strategies being recommended for the 
financial services sector passively relates to credit, monetary co-ordination, efficiency and 
empowerment. No in-depth implementation strategies are provided. Weak governance and 
corruption was a key factor behind the 2011 fiscal crisis. This correlates with Polity IV scores 
for the country – achieving a 0 on 10 for the period 1975-2013, with a combined polity score 
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ranging between -10 and -9 during this period. The authority mean values are negative for all 
periods – before 1990 it stood at -9.0 and after 1990 it is -8.3 (see table 2a) an insignificant 
improvement, suggesting a very weak institutional democracy, at best at the procedural level 
which could be impacting negatively on FD in the country. 
 
ZAMBIA FINANCIAL SERVICES DEVELOPMENT PLAN – VISION 2030 
 
Major reforms of the economy were introduced in Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s following 
deterioration in the standards of living and economic performance. Despite these reforms, 
challenges that come with an expanding and more a diversified economy are still being 
experienced amidst widespread and growing poverty levels (Ministry of finance and national 
planning, 2011) 
 
A poverty reduction strategy was introduced in 2002, motivated by the recommendations of 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) after identifying certain obstacles impeding 
economic development. One of the sectors identified was the financial sector and its limited 
contribution to growth and development of the economy. In the same spirit as the PRSP, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund evaluated the financial system in Zambia 
through the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), (2011). The following 
weaknesses in the financial sector were established: 
According to the FSAP (2011), the financial system is dominated by commercial banks with 
a banking environment characterised by very low intermediation; the net interest margin 
banks and fee income in relation to banks’ assets were determined to be among the highest 
in Africa; banks are highly exposed to systematic risks; the structures in place for a financial 
safety net are virtually absent; the financial system was still exposed to a very weak 
supervisory processdespite meeting most international standards;the knowledge and skills 
required by the financial sector to run efficiently could not be met by the labour market; 
resources to train supervisory staff are limited; the credit culture of the public is undesirable; 
the government’s huge involvement in the financial led to conflict with stakeholders; 
administrative inefficiencies and inefficiencies in the process of tax remittances to the central 
bank of Zambia (BoZ) led to delays causing some float in the financial system; the 
secondary market activity for securities still remains extremely low; lack of fiscal and 
monetary policy coordination creates volatility in the inter-bank money market; The central 
bank of Zambia still uses direct instruments such reserve ratios in its monetary policy 
implementation framework.; huge fiscal deficit financing has created contortions in the 
financial markets; domestic debt management is poor and unsustainable.  
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In light of the above, these weaknesses had to be addressed by the FSAP (2011) 
systematically and coherently to achieve the vision of the financial system. The Zambian 
financial system is envisaged to develop to more stable, effective and market-based financial 
system that would ensure efficiency in its mobilisation and allocation of resources necessary 
to steer theeconomy towards transformation, sustainability in growth and the reduction of 
poverty (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2011).  
 
In order to realise effective financial deepening of the Zambian economy, effective 
democratic governance is crucial. Judging from Polity IV scores for Zambia on institutional 
democracy, the country has had some wavering democratisation. From 1975-1990 the score 
was 0, with a combined polity score of -9. It improved to 6 from 1991-1995, with a combined 
polity score of 6, fell to 3 between 1996 and 2000, with a combined polity score of 1. This 
was as a result of the stalling of the democratisation process since the 1991 elections and 
institutional failure in the country resulting in the domination of the executive by the ruling 
party Landsberg (2004). The score, however, improved to 5 between 2001 and 2007 and to 
7 between 2008 and 2013, with combined polity scores of 5 and 5, respectively. The 
average authority values improved from -8.1 before 1990 to 3.5 after 1990 suggesting that 
Zambia is experiencing democracy at the procedural level. The values for the whole sample 
period, however, remains negative at -1.3 (see table 2a).   Such silhouettes of good and bad 
governance could have been a cause for the financial sector weaknesses probably leading 
to its poor growth and development performance.  
For all the countries in this income group the FD trends showed some volatility before 1990 
where the state of democracy was relatively weak before gradually improving thereafter (see 
figure 2b below). 
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Figures 2a, Authority trends: lower middle income countries 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014 
 
Figure 2b,financial development trends: Lower middle income: 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
LL PC BD
Financial development trends, 1975-2013: Lesotho
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
LL PC BD
Financial development trends, 1975-2013: Swaziland
 
28 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
LL PC BD
Financial development trends, 1975-2013: Zambia
 
Table 2a, Average authority values: Lower middle income 
 
Lesotho       Swaziland 
                     
Zambia 
Before 1990 -6.3636        -9.0909 -8.1818 
After 1990 3.93939        -8.3117 3.54978 
Whole 1975-2013 -0.3535        -8.6364 -1.3384 
Notes: Higher values of authority represent more democratic regimes based on Polity 2 (democracy minus autocracy) scores 
Table 2b, early results on the effect of institutional variables (Polity IV) on financial development. 
  Dependent variables   
Explanatory variables Bank deposits Private credit Liquid liabilities  
     
Autocracy (1975-1990) 0.15*(0.10) -0.24(0.38) -0.09(0.19)  
Executive constraints (1975-1990) -0.17**(0.04) -0.01(0.95) -0.01(0.93)  
polity IV (1975-1990) -0.06(0.57) 0.47(0.11) 0.20**(0.01)  
S Polity IV (1975-1990) 0.02(0.54) -0.36***(0.00) -0.14(0.24)  
 09 09 05  
Autocracy (1990-2013) 0.06(0.12) 0.14(0.28) -0.31(0.36)  
Executive constraints (1990-2013) 0.03(0.80) -0.13(0.75) -0.13(0.71  
polity IV (1990-2013) -0.01(0.72) 0.07(0.56) 0.20(0.08)  
S Polity IV (1990-2013) 0.01(0.34) -0.18***(0.00) -0.03(0.41)  
 10 26 09  
Observations 113 113 113  
Notes: The table shows robust OLS regressions for the cross-section of upper income countries. The specifications include a 
constant but the estimates are not reported on the table.: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** 
denote significance at 5%, and *** denote significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. All variables 
are defined as in section 4.3 above. 
The results in table 2b above are based on the analysis of z-statistics and probabilities of 
each regression using all three dependent variables. The results indicate that before 1990 
autocracy negatively affected FD and after 1990 the effect on FD is positive. Though the 
results are statistically insignificant it seems to suggest that decreasing autocratic rule in 
these countries may be having a positive effect on FD. Constraints on executives are found 
to be negatively affecting FD for both periods apparently indicating that the preferences of 
the monarchies (in the case of Swaziland and Lesotho) tend to dominate that of the 
populace, thereby having a negative effect on FD. As expected substantive democracy 
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negatively affects FD in both periods and surprisingly the effect of procedural democracy is 
positive but insignificant for both periods. One may conclude initially that decreasing levels of 
autocracy and improving democratisation at the procedural level may be having a positive 
effect on FD while limited constraints on the powers of the executive may be impeding FD, a 
result that tends to reflect the trend reflected in the graphs. A summary of the regression 
results is presented in table 2c below. 
Table 2c, Summary of regression results – lower middle income countries 
1975-1990 
Autocracy Negative and insignificant 
Constraint on executives  Negative and insignificant 
Procedural democracy (Polity) Positive and insignificant 
Substantive democracy (S Polity) Negative and insignificant 
1990-2013 
Autocracy Positive and insignificant 
Constraint on executives Negative and insignificant 
Procedural democracy (Polity) Positive and insignificant 
Substantive democracy (S Polity) Negative and insignificant 
  
 
2.2.3 Low-income countries 
 
MALAWI GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY II (GDSII) - 2011-2016 
 
The overall objective of the GDSII (2011) is continued poverty reduction through sustainable 
economic growth and infrastructure development. The key priority areas include: Agriculture 
and food security, transport infrastructure, industrial development, mining and tourism, 
education science and technology, public health, sanitation, malaria and HIV/AIDs 
management, integrated rural development, child development, youth empowerment, 
climate change and natural resources and environmental management. 
Interestingly, the financial sector is not explicitly mentioned in the document. However, the 
Malawi Financial Sector Development Strategy was developed in 2007 but key questions 
remained, namely: how to define and prioritise the various steps, and how the required 
implementation work will be funded. The Malawian government approached the World 
Bank’s Africa Financial Sector team and after receiving expert advice and recommendations, 
theysubmitted a FIRST-funded Financial Sector Development Strategy (FSDS). On the 
premise of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) the entire strategy was 
finished in 2010. The strategy contained a clear planned out roadmap of actions and 
procedures that will contribute towards a sound, efficient and inclusive financial sector. 
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FinScope (2008) identified challenges from the demand and supply side in the Malawian 
financial sector. The demand side exemplified the degree of the challenges facing Malawi: 
The study revealed that the financially excluded population of Malawi stands at 55 percent 
and that only 26 percent of the population with access to finance were formally banked. 
According to FinScope (2008) acompatible study from the supply side established some key 
barriers to financial access as: (i) limited access to financial service points (branches and 
outlets); (ii) high costs of financial transaction; (iii) capacity constraints; (iv) increased 
government’s involvement in the financial sector hence crowding out the private sector; (v) 
public-private initiatives in the financial sector are not co-ordinated and harmonized by the 
market to ensure better access to financial services.  
The government of Malawi in its GDSII (2011) recognises that broad-based growth and 
development flourishes with good democratic governance. This also holds for FD in the 
country with recognition of a framework necessary to improve FD. Polity IV scores of 
democratic governance for Malawi portrays weak but improving democratic governance from 
1975 to 2013. The country obtained a 0 score from 1975 to 1993, improved to 6 from 1994 
to 2000, fell to 5 between 2001 and 2002, was 6 in 2003 and 7 in 2004 and fell to 6 between 
2005 and 2013 (see figure 3a). The average authority values for the whole period is negative 
at -1.8 showing generally high levels of autocracy. However, the values improved from -8.1 
before 1990 to 2.6 after 1990 (see table 3a) suggesting improved levels of democratisation 
but at the procedural level.  One may contend that wavering democratisation in the country 
may have been contributing to the low and volatile levels of FD (see figure 3b below). 
 
MOZAMBIQUE – FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, 2010-2020 
According to the Financial Sector Development Strategy (FSDS), (2010), the  Mozambican 
government recognises that the country’s financial inclusion ranks among one of the lowest 
in the SADC region and over the past two decades the government has completed several 
initiatives with the intention to boost and deepen the financial sector.  The strategy identifies 
two factors that may have contributedto the lack of progress in increasing financial access:  
The first impediment is structural in nature and relates to limited financial intermediation as a 
result of weak credit culture and the increased costs and risks that limit the provision of 
financial services. The absence of adequate or poor physical infrastructure, lack of the use 
of technology in the provision of financial services, a legal and regulatory framework that is 
weak, inadequate reporting by non-bank financial institutions and difficulties with credit 
information facilities and framework to ensure effective credit enforcement.The second 
hindrance relates to: a banking sector that is not competitive, high fixed expenses and 
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interest spreads, and high gloomybank services fees. These tend to reduce the impetus to 
intermediate deposits into loans and increase borrowing costs (FSDS, 2010) 
 
The government in its FSDS (2010) plan aims at achieving the following for both the bank 
and non-bank financial sectors:Use monetary policy to achieve financial stability, improve on 
regulatory and supervisory framework and financial sector safety nets; improving financial 
access through various financial sector development policies such as national financial 
inclusion policy, competition policy, financial literacy, consumer protection programme and 
financial sector research and financial sector infrastructure. Non-bank financial sector 
development, these include the pension sector, insurance, capital market development and 
the micro finance sector. 
 
The Mozambican government’s recognition of the crucial and positive role that financial 
deepening contributes towards growth and development cannot be overemphasised. Again, 
government’s role in creating an enabling financial environment may depend very much on 
the state of democracy in the country. According to Polity IV scores, the state of democracy 
in the country has slightly improved: from a score of 0 from 1975-1993 to 5 from 1994 – 
2013. From 1975-1993 the combined polity score ranged between -8 and -6 indicating the 
level of autocracy during this period but from 1994-2013 its Polity IV scores  improved to 5. 
(See figure 3a below). The average authority values in table (3a) indicate that for the whole 
sample period (1975-2013) democracy has been weak (negative value of -1.4). Before 1990 
the value was -7.0 and improved to 2.5 after 1990 suggesting that this country’s democracy 
is at best procedural. Trends in FD shows some remarkable improvements after some high 
volatility before 1990 (see figure 3b below) indicating that improving its democratic 
governance is paramount in achieving the goals spelt out in its financial sector development 
strategy. 
 
ZIMBABWE – MEDIUM TERM PLAN (MTP)-2011-2015 
The MTP (2011) is an economic development strategy that is supposed to guide all other 
government economic policy blue prints and set out clearly the national priorities from 2011 
to 2015. According to the MTP (2011), the economy of Zimbabwe faces the following pivotal 
structural problems: The sovereign risk profile of the country is threatened by economic and 
political uncertainties; high rates of unemployment, poverty and highly conspicuous income 
gap; increasing ‘informalisation’ of the economy; poor infrastructure; and an economy with 
very low savings and investments that negatively impact on growth.  
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The vision of the MTP (2011) is enhancing a democratic developmental state anchored by a 
growing and transferring socially just economy. However, the institutions for democracy 
(participation, social dialogue, transparency and accountability) are very weak. The plan 
does not explicitly state strategies for financial sector development especially how financial 
inclusion will be achieved, considering that about 80 percent of Zimbabwe’s population is 
unbanked. This could be due to the de-facto dollarisation of the economy and loss of 
monetary policy independence. 
Political and regulatory ambiguity could be hindering the development of the financial sector 
and its contribution to economic growth. Polity IV scores for institutional democracy in 
Zimbabwe portrays a gradual decline from 1975 to 1998 (A score of 7 between 1975 and 
1978, 5 between 1980 and 1982, 3 from 1983-1986, 0 between 1987 and 1998. It increased 
to 1 between 1999 and 2008 and 3 between 2009 and 2011). Corresponding to the above 
dates, the combined polity scores were 4, 1, -6, -3, -4 and 1 respectively (see figure 3a 
below). The average authority values are negative after 1990 (see table 3a below) 
suggesting increasing autocracy. Clearly, the country’s degenerating state of democratic 
governance may be having serious negative repercussions FD as indicated in figure 3b 
below. 
 
Figure 3a Authority trends: low-income countries 
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Source: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014 
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Table 3a, Average authority values: Low-income 
 
 Malawi             Mozambique 
                                             
Zimbabwe 
Before 1990 -8.1818             -7.0303 0.84848 
After 1990 2.68398              2.5974 -3.8961 
Whole (1975-2010) -1.8434             -1.4141 -1.9192 
Notes: Higher values of authority represent more democratic regimes based on Polity 2 (democracy minus autocracy) scores 
Table 3b, early results on the effect of institutional variables (Polity IV) on financial development. 
  Dependent variables   
Explanatory variables Bank deposits Private credit Liquid liabilities  
     
Autocracy (1975-1990) -1.2***(0.00) -1.9***(0.00) -0.23(0.54)  
Executive constraints (1975-1990) 0.13***(0.00) 0.14***(0.00) -0.13***(0.00)  
polity IV (1975-1990) -0.17(0.60) -0.37(0.39) -1.5***(0.00)  
S Polity IV (1975-1990) -0.52*(0.08) -0.02(0.60) -0.42(0.17)  
 30 21 41  
Autocracy (1990-2013) 0.14(0.42) 0.20**(0.02) -0.08(0.84)  
Executive constraints (1990-2013) 0.09(0.20) 0.07(0.65) 0.41(0.36)  
polity IV (1990-2013) -0.13*(0.09) -0.24(0.03) 0.04(0.78)  
S Polity IV (1990-2013) -0.04(0.17) -0.04(0.26) -0.04(0.81)  
 14 12 07  
Observations 113 113 113  
Notes: The table shows robust OLS regressions for the cross-section of upper income countries. The specifications include a 
constant but the estimates are not reported on the table.: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** 
denote significance at 5%, and *** denote significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. All variables 
are defined as in section 4.3 above. 
We analyse table 3b above using the z-statistics and probabilities of each regression with all 
three dependent variables. The results in table 3b above show how autocracy was 
negatively affecting FD before 1990 and having a positive effect after 1990 suggesting that 
decreasing autocratic rule (except for Zimbabwe, the outlier for this income group) could be 
contributing positively towards FD. Constraint on the executive powers of the chief executive 
is positive for the two periods, an institutional factor that may have a positive effect on FD. 
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However, both substantive and procedural democracies have been negative for both periods 
though statistically insignificant. These results suggest that the decreasing levels of 
autocracy coupled with constraint on executive powers of the chief executive may have been 
positively affecting FD after 1990 thus seemingly matching FD trends for this group of 
countries. Another possible explanation could be that those in power may have carried out 
policies that are positive for FD, thus masking or reducing the negative effects of 
undemocratic rule on FD. A summary of the results is presented in table 3c below. 
Table 3c, Summary of regression results – low-income countries 
1975-1990 
Autocracy Negative and significant 
Constraint on executives  Positive and significant 
Procedural democracy (Polity) Negative and insignificant 
Substantive democracy (S Polity) Negative and insignificant 
1990-2013 
Autocracy Positive and insignificant 
Constraint on executives Positive and insignificant 
Procedural democracy (Polity) Negative and insignificant 
Substantive democracy (S Polity) Negative and insignificant 
  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The chapter looks at the different strategic policies instituted by each country’s authority to 
improve the levels of FD in their respective economies. The depth of each country’s policy 
design and implementation suggest that FD is recognised as sacrosanct by authorities and 
as a means of achieving growth and development. In addition, the authorities in the 
countries under study do recognise the importance of political stability both within each 
country and in the region to be in place to achieve their various growth and development 
targets. Based on these, the study introduces trends in authority and how they could be 
affecting the trends in FD for each income group. FD in all income groups generally shows 
an upward trend with less volatility after 1990, a period where countries in the region 
experienced varying levels of democratisation. The average authority values (Polity IV 
scores) are used to determine whether each country’s democracy is substantive or 
procedural for the period under study. Robust OLS regression7 results tend to roughly 
support the trends in authority and FD, a result considered as early because of the exclusion 
of control variables and other more robust estimation techniques to achieve the objectives of 
the study. We now proceed and review the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of FD with a focus on the institutional determinants on the next chapter. 
 
                                                          
7
 Robust MM estimations are applied to mitigate the effects of outliers in the data.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A financial system embraces banks, financial markets and other financial intermediaries 
such as pension funds and insurance companies which are regulated and supervised by the 
central bank. Levine (1997) contends that financial markets, instruments and institutions 
mitigate the effects of the cost of information and transaction which according to Merton and 
Bodie (1995) helps to facilitate the allocation of resources across time and space in an 
uncertain territory.  The role of financial sector is pivotal in the functioning of the economic 
system. Merton and Bodie (1995) contend that by utilising productive resources to facilitate 
capital formation through a wide range of financial instruments, it meets the various 
demands of surplus anddeficit units thereby mobilising saving for investment purposes. The 
financial system, therefore, ensures efficientresourceallocationacross the different sectors of 
the economy. 
We consider in this study a broader definition of FD suggested by ih k, Levine, Feyen and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2013) – one that involves improvements of five key financial functions: (i) 
engaged in the production and handling information about possible investments and 
distributing capital based on the information obtained; (ii) systematically checking individuals 
and firms and balancing the interest of stakeholders after allocating capital; (iii) Promoting 
trade, diversification and mitigating risks; (iv) Marshalling  and putting together savings; and 
(v) Easing trade of goods, services and financial instruments. We contend thatthe chosen 
proxies of FD are closely linked to this definition; credit provided to the private sector and 
bank deposits as proxies are closely linked with (i), (ii) and (iv) above. Savings are mobilised 
by financial intermediaries, the bulk of which are channelled towards investment purposes. 
Financial intermediaries would monitor and assess individuals and firms to mitigate the 
asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. The problems 
created by asymmetric information are major impediments to well-functioning financial 
markets Mishkin (2016). Various financial instruments are used to facilitate trade between 
financial intermediaries and individuals and firms. The amount of deposits received and 
loans provided would depend on the size of financial intermediaries respective to the 
economy of where the central bank plays the crucial role of monitoring. 
Financial sector development is important in achieving the growth objectives of any 
economy. Ang (2008) points out thatinnovation andthe accumulation of human and physical 
are viewed by growth theory as the principal determinants of economic growth with minimal 
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attention given to the financial sector.  Ang (2008) asserts that this is a seemingly an 
inaccurate conclusion since a strong financial system is essential to the strong foundations 
of the economy and any policy designs to improve on economic development would be 
inadequate without taking into consideration the development of the financial sector. We 
argue that the development of the financial sector depends on the quality of institutions of 
the country in question which is brought about by democracy. This suggests that the 
emergence of democratic institutions in the SADC region, though weak Landsberg (2004), 
could be spurring FD and that policy makers can target institutional quality for FD to improve. 
Empirical growth studies have increasingly supported, though with different degrees, the 
importance of FD on economic growth. While there is evidence according to Huang (2010) 
that there exist a positive relationship between FD and economic growth, the questions of 
what determines FD and how to develop financial markets is crucial and still remains 
underresearched and requires more attention by researchers. On the factors that cause of 
FD, the importance of institutional advancements for FD has been implicitly indicated by 
Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson (1996) and Olson (1993) who argues that, as opposed to 
autocracies, democracies directly stimulates investments through a betterprotection of the 
rights to property and the enforcement of contracts. Huang (2010) finds that the depth of 
democracy is crucial in affecting FD and that the quality of institutions has positive short run 
effects on FD in developing nations of French legal origin or when they are ethnically 
divided. 
In this chapter, we begin by reviewing the functions of financial systems in relation to how 
these functions have been performed following the process of democratic consolidation of 
the countries in the SADC region. According to Joubert (2008), the entire African continent 
and the SADC region in particular, has made tremendous strides towards multi-party 
democratic governance and is now in the stage of consolidation, though the region still faces 
a plethora of democratic deficits which may be threatening the endurance of the 
consolidation process.  We provide some preliminary evidence on the effect of democratic 
passage on FD by assessing to some extent how efficiently these functions have been 
performed following democratic transformation in the region. This would be valuable in 
shedding more light on the need for FD in the region. We discuss the empirical literature on 
the progression of thought on finance and institutions and their relevance in the SADC 
region, a research area conspicuously absent in the studies of finance and growth in the 
region. In essence, we explore the move from finance-led growth theoretical and empirical 
studies to the institutional determinants of FD. 
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3.2 The Functions of Financial Systems 
 
The development or maturity of a financial system could be judged from how efficient they 
perform the functions of resource allocation, (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980, Boyd & Prescott, 
1986), mobilisation of savings (Sirri & Tufano, 1995), improving diversification and risk 
reduction (Gurley & Shaw, 1955, King & Levine, 1993), facilitating transactions (King & 
Plosser, 1986) and monitoring borrowers and exercising corporate control (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976, Grossman & Hart, 1980). Empirically, these views gained considerable 
support with the use of cross-country and firm level data. Evidence can be drawn from the 
works of Gerschenkron (1962), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993), 
Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine (1998), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000a), Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2000), Beck and Levine (2002), Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel (2001), Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).  
These views demonstrate how mature financial markets can improve the prospects of 
growth by efficiently performing the above functions. What determines the development or 
maturity of a financial system in order for them to efficiently perform these functions remains 
untested in the SADC region. The efficiency in which these functions have been performed 
by financial institutions in the SADC region would suggest whether the countries under study 
require more effective policies in place to improve development in the financial system. We 
argue that the effectiveness of these policies would very well depend on governance of the 
country in question and effective governance may only be achieved through effective 
democratic consolidation. Joubert (2008), in a study uses four key variables to assess 
democratic governance in the SADC region which explicitly match the hallmarks suggested 
by Matlosa (2006). These include: representation and accountability; citizen participation; 
local governance; economic management and corporate governance. These generally 
match variables of the combined polity score obtained from the Polity IV Database. The 
functions of the financial system include: 
3.2.1 Mobilising savings 
 
According to growth theory by Gurley and Shaw (1955), the twointerrelated avenues through 
which FD can affectgrowth are the capital formation and the productivity of the factors of 
production channels. Gurley and Shaw (1955) suggest that the investment route focuses on 
the ability of the financial sector to overcome rigidities through mobilisation of savings which 
are then channelled for investment purposes in the sectors of the economy that require 
them. The process increases capital formation and higher levels ofeconomic growth. 
Wicksell (1935) holds the view that the proper synchronisation of the saving and investment 
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decisions of firms and households are executed by financial markets and intermediaries. 
Wicksell (1935) concludes thatfinancial systems induce mobilisation of savings by putting 
together the diverse saving of consumers and channelling the funds via lendingto firms to 
finance investment projects. 
The SADC (2006) protocol on finance and investments sets out policies for FD in the region. 
It emphasises the need for liberalisation of the financial sector, by allowing key instruments 
such as interest rates and credit distribution to be determined by the market. Escalating the 
extension of credit to viable investment projects especially to small and expanding firms has 
been one of the common objectives of each country’s FD strategic plan. To induce 
mobilisation of savings, these countries have designed policies in place to accommodate the 
financially excluded sections of the population. Increased liberalisation since 1990 has yet to 
address significantly the region’s level of savings. The World Bank (2013) report on Gross 
Domestic Savings (GDS) and Domestic Credit Supply (DCS) as a percentage of the GDP 
indicates that in the SADC region, the upper middle income countries attained an average of 
22.99% for GDS and 69.54% for DCS., with an average negative saving rate of -7.53% and 
13.97 for DCS for the lower middle income countries and an average GDS of 3.77% and 
13.84% for DSC obtained by low-income countries.8 
According to Moyo, Sill and O’Keefe (2014), many contributing factors other than financial 
policy, such as lack of infrastructure, labour issues and political instability (in some of the 
countries, e.g. Zimbabwe) have all impacted negatively on economic development in the 
region. These factors are seemingly hindering the FD policy implementation process, 
thereby having a negative effect on FD itself. We argue that to effectively mobilise savings, 
the financial system must have attained a certain level of development which in turn is 
determined by effective governance, brought about by substantive democracy. 
On the aspect of socio-political instability consensus has not been reached on its effect on 
development. For instance, Huntington (1993) notes that instability can inhibit political 
development before a government are able to fully develop conflict resolution institutions. 
Olson (1982) contends that instability can be good for development because it breaks up the 
power structure, and allows for a more efficient set of institutions to develop. Venieris and 
Steward (1987) theorise that instability breeds uncertainty which lowers savings, capital 
accumulation and subsequently growth. We assert that instability, a brainchild of poor 
governance inhibits saving mobilisation and hence the development of the financial sector. 
                                                          
8
 The determined averages are the author’s own calculations. According to the World Bank (2015) 
classification, the upper middle income SADC countries include; Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and 
South Africa. The lower middle income countries include; Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia. The low 
income countries include; Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
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3.2.2 Allocating resources 
 
Tobin and Brainard (1963) qualitatively presents the total factor productivity channel, which 
underscores the part, played by technological innovations in decreasing information 
asymmetries that impede efficient financial resources allocation and properwatch over 
investment projects. This view is shared byTownsend (1979); Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990); King and Levine (1993b); ih k, Levine, Feyen and Demirguc-Kunt (2013), among 
others.  
Efficient allocation of resources is realised in a well-functioning financial system. Tobin and 
Brainard (1963) contend that entrepreneurs are in a better position to obtain credit at lower 
interest rates and on more favourable terms when they are capable of assessing their 
investment projects.This are made possible by financial intermediaries. Diamond (1984) 
notes that information acquisitioncosts create the need for financial middlemen 
wherebycooperation between individuals or groupswith financial intermediaries economise 
on costs associated with both obtaining and handling information about investment 
opportunities and their corresponding returns thereby improving resource allocation. 
According to the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (2006), SADC policies are 
geared towards encouraging more efficient resource allocation by engaging in strategic FD 
policies and encouraging investment. Policy reforms and investment strategies undertaken 
in member states have generally improved the business environments of each member state 
in the following aspects: the creation of agencies that promote investments; ensuring that 
investors are protected and ensuring more clarity in terms of investment codes and practices 
(SADC, 2006).As a consequence of the fact that there is increasing investment 
competitiveness among the member states, agreeing on an investment policy regionally has 
often reached a deadlock where member states feel that coordination of such policies may 
not be of the best national interest (SADC, 2006).  
Bagehot (1873) argues that appropriate organisation of savings can promotethe efficient 
allocation of resourceswhich will eventually stimulate technological innovation, a crucial 
requirement for attaining higher growth rates. We argue that a necessary ingredient for 
resource allocation stems from financial sector development where according to Levine 
(1997) capital from disparate savers or surplus units are amalgamated for investment 
purposes. We contend that the financial system starts the process of resource allocation and 
only a developed financial system would guarantee efficient resource allocation.  An 
important determinantofa developed financial system in any country is effective governance 
brought about by democracy. We suggest that if the democratic credentials of a country are 
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not in place, it may impact negatively on the mobilisation of savings, resource allocation and 
finally on FD. 
This function of financial institutions could be linked to political development via the actions 
of civil society. Civil society is an interesting dimension of political development and exerts 
much influence in both politics and markets (Scholte, 2000). Diamond (1994) asserts that 
civil society is the space where the population can share experience, promote their interests, 
learn the values of civility and build trust. He stresses that civil society is autonomous from 
the state and self-supporting. More importantly, civil society is an essential component of 
viable democracy. Helliwell and Putnam (1995) in a study of civic organisations in Italy find 
that the strength of these organisations is positively associated with growth. White (1994) 
investigates the relationship between civil society and the recent wave of democratisation in 
developing countries. The study highlights the ambiguity of the term ‘civil society’ and 
proposes a definition which may prove serviceable in discovering the political role played by 
civil society in facilitating or impeding democratisation. Fukuyama (2001) asserts that social 
capital is an externalized informal standard that enhancescollaborationamong individuals. He 
points out thatin the economic sphere it reduces transaction costs and in the political sphere 
it promotes the kind of associational life which is necessary for the success of limited 
government and modern democracy. We argue that the purpose of civil society demands is 
ultimately to increase their access to financial resources and their effective use of these 
resources through investment9. The power and influence of civil society depends on the level 
of democracy in the country. This suggests that civil society, a vital component of democracy 
could influence resource allocation and hence FD.  
3.2.3 Risk Amelioration 
 
Financial institutions may evolve to facilitate risk amelioration arising from the presence of 
information and transaction costs. The two types of risks associated with information and 
transaction costs are liquidity and idiosyncratic risk and thatuncertainties involved with 
converting assets into a medium of exchange is associated with liquidity risk (Levine, 1997). 
Following a similar thought, Fukuyama (2001) contends thatinformation and the cost of 
transactions may impede liquidity and exacerbate liquidity risk. He further asserts that 
market frictions necessitate the establishment of financial markets to bolster liquidity, hence 
creating liquid financial markets that make trading of financial instruments less costly. Stiglitz 
                                                          
9
 We assume that a “happy” civil society is one that has been empowered through education and 
training. Such an empowered society can easily access financial resources and effectively use these 
resources contributing positively towards the development of the financial sector. The inclusion of 
school enrolment as a proxy for human capital development is thus crucial as a control variable which 
arguably signifies the quality of civil society of the country in question. 
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(1985) is of the viewthat high liquidity accelerates investment returns, minimises uncertainty 
and ultimately generates more growth. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) assert that 
amelioration of liquidity risks faced by individuals facilitates investment activities and helps to 
avoid liquidations. In a nutshell, the financial systems theory holds that enhanced liquidity 
stimulates savings rates and eventually the rate of economic growth. 
On the other hand the emergence of financial markets helps to curb idiosyncratic risk, a type 
of risk associated with projects, firms and industries at the microeconomic level (Saint-Paul, 
1992 and Obstfeld, 1994). An efficient financial system facilitates the diversification of 
portfolios in order to hedge against risks. Levine (1997) contends that various financial 
markets such as banks, security markets and others extend a channel through which 
trading, pooling and risk diversification can be realised and that risk diversification of 
services earned from financial systems can positively influence economic growth in the 
future by changing resource allocation and savings rates. Saint-Paul (1992) and Obstfeld 
(1994) suggest that financial markets which can ease risk diversification tend to instigate 
portfolio shifts in favour of projects that yield higher expected returns and hence greater risk-
sharing makes for the efficient allocation of capital which stimulates savings and investments 
and hence growth. 
We argue that for enhanced liquidity and portfolio diversification to be achieved within and 
across countries, the financial system must be efficient to ensure increases in saving and 
investments. Diversifying portfolios in different countries will depend on how politically stable 
these countries are. Democratically stable economies would propagate a faster development 
of the financial system and ensure the gains of diversification. It ensures a climate of 
transparency of rules and regulations, a legal system that guarantees property rights and 
contract enforcements and a system void of corruption. According to a survey by the Rand 
Merchant Bank (2012) on the challenges of doing business in SADC, lack of qualified human 
resources, crime and corruption, lack of transparency of rules and regulations, as well as the 
legal environment were perceived, among others, as serious challenges. These may apply 
to different SADC member states in varying degrees with South Africa, Zambia and 
Mauritius having the most developed regulatory framework in the region Rand Merchant 
Bank (2012). These challenges may be signalling poor democratic governance in the 
countries in question, which may have serious negative implications on FD and their 
financial systems in performing the function of risk amelioration. This may also impede the 
process towards financial integration. 
Brown (2008) argues that independent financial markets can reduce risk in a way that 
government policy cannot because the government is a source of risk. We argue that good 
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governance reduces instability and would ensure proper functioning of financial markets. 
Brown (2008) also suggests that better developed financial markets are a product of 
democratically stable economies where there are better opportunities for individuals and 
firms to reduce any consequence of instability on their savings and investments. In a stable 
and democratic economy institutions that:are characterised by well-defined and established 
laws, protect the rights to ownership of propertytogether with the proper implementation of 
contracts and effectively constraintthose in power would ensure that a variety of instruments 
are available to savers and investors that may allow them to hedge their investments. As 
such it becomes less likely to reduce or revoke their stake in any investment and hence 
keeping the level of investments stable and limiting the negative economic effects. This 
feeds back into the FD process and improves FD. Amidst a bank run or speculative attack or 
any form of financial crises in general, it would be within the realm of state intervention 
through the appropriate institutions that stability could be brought back to the system – the 
2008 financial crisis is a classic example. We, therefore, suggest that risk amelioration by 
financial institutions may be effective in a democratic setting where there is good 
governance which may act as an insulating factor to any form of instability in the financial 
system, hence improving FD. 
3.2.4 Facilitating transactions 
 
Apart from curtailing information and transaction costs, Gurley and Shaw (1960) contend 
that making available credit facilities and ensuring that payments are made facilitate 
business transactions. Transforming primary securities into indirect securities is the main 
function of financial intermediaries and taking advantage of economies of scale in the 
process profits are generated through lending and borrowing. According to Ang (2008) 
financial intermediaries lower the cost of searching and obtaining funds and monitoring 
borrowers which ultimately decreases the cost of obtaining information and hence greatly 
easing transactions. Following the same train of thought, Levine (1997) notes that financial 
agreements that minimise the cost of negotiations can promote specialisation, technological 
innovation and economic growth, a view pioneered by Smith’s(1776) postulations. Hicks 
(1969), argues that an important aspect of industrial development is the adoption of 
technologies requiring highly illiquid capital investments. The adoption of such technologies 
becomes economically viable in the presence of low cost financial markets that provide 
liquidity to investors. Bencinvenga, Smith and Starr (1995) hold the same view and contend 
that by implication the cost of transactions in financial markets affects the equilibrium level of 
technology and hence growth.  
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The efficiency of the supply of credit and payments guarantee will depend on how developed 
the financial system is which in turn depends on the government’s policy with regards to 
developing the financial sector. Every SADC country under study has policies in place 
towards enhancing the efficiency of the financial sector but with varying levels of financial 
sector development. According to the World Bank (2013) statistics on domestic private credit 
from 1990 to 2012, the SADC countries under study portrayed an increasing trend on this 
aspect. This is the period where most of these countries experienced democratisation. This 
tends to suggest that good governance brought about by democracy may have been having 
a positive impact on FD. We may not want to take this observation as conclusive evidence; 
however, it is strikingly consistent with the data observed. 
3.2.5 Exercising corporate control 
 
Apart from risk amelioration and information acquisition, financial markets may come into 
being to minimise the acquisition of information and administration costs of checking firm 
managers and exerting corporate control after the financing activity. Financial intermediaries 
perform the monitoring activity of firms and households by using specialised resources at a 
much lower cost.  Bernanke and Gertler (1989) note that outside investors would be 
discouraged from borrowing moreif the cost of verifying project returns increase. Hence, the 
cost of verification may impede efficient investment. Diamond (1984) suggests thatproper 
financial arrangements with financial intermediariesmay reduce monitoring costs. From the 
financial market point of view,a managers’ performance could be assessed from an 
estimation of the company’s worthbased on stock price movements leading to improved 
corporate controls, which may bring to bear a positive influence on growth, with a positive 
feedback effect on FD. 
We posit that effective corporate control may be difficult to execute in a hostile environment 
where the cost of monitoring firms naturally increases, exerting a fall in borrowing. Creating 
an enabling environment for business by government is therefore imperative and this may be 
achieved in a democratic setting where the cost of acquiring information and monitoring 
managers are minimised, hence improving the efficiency of the financial sector. A hostile 
business environment, probably due to lack of property rights and contract enforcements or 
the lack of transparent rules and regulations may negatively affect the development of the 
financial sector and hence effective corporate control. 
According to a study carried out by Finmark Trust (2013) in the SADC region on the ease of 
doing business, among other objectives, the upper middle SADC countries ranked among 
the first 5 out of 14 countries. These countries have the most developed financial sectors in 
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the region. The low-income countries are ranked among the bottom 4 – the more difficult 
places to do business and exhibit the least developed financial sector. These facts suggest, 
though not tested, that corporate control may be much easier to exercise in the upper middle 
income countries than in the low-income countries. Though the formal trappings of 
democracy (holding of elections on time) are in place in these countries, deep-seated 
governance challenges still face countries in the region, especially the countries falling in the 
middle and low-income groups. From the above analysis, we infer that the ease of doing 
business may reflect the level of governance in the country in question which tends to affect 
corporate control and hence FD.    
3.3 From Finance-led Growth to the Institutional Determinants of Financial 
Development 
 
3.3.1 Finance – growth nexus 
 
The finance and growth nexus was pioneered by the work of Schumpeter (1911) who 
contends that credit is required by entrepreneurs to finance new production techniques and 
that banks facilitate the intermediation process and as a consequence promote economic 
development. Reasoning along Schumpeterian lines are the works of Gurley and Shaw 
(1955), Goldsmith (1969) and Hicks (1969) who are of the view that increasing saving and 
investment and ultimately economic growth can be achieved by the creation of many 
financial intermediaries and a multiplicity of financial products and services. 
The Keynesian view was challenged in the 1970s by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and 
popularised by Kapur (1976), Mathieson (1980), Fry (1988), Pagano (1993) who assume 
that in a classic low income economy investment is financed without credit from financial 
institutions and can be realisedonly if enough stock pile saving is mobilisedto constitute 
deposit taking by financial institutions. Then enter the “financial liberation view” where 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) addressed the negative effects of financial repression on 
GDP growth and called for financial liberation. It is worth noting that the SADC economies 
experienced a wave of financial liberalisation in the 1990s accompanied by impressive 
progress towards democratic governance Matlosa (2006). We reason along the same lines 
with the “financial liberation view” and argue that achieving financial liberation may not be 
effective without transformation towards democratisation and commitment to democratic rule 
by governments of the countries under study in the SADC region. 
 
Criticism of the McKinnon-Shaw school in the early 1980s was led by Van Wijnbergen (1982, 
1983), Taylor (1983) and Buffie (1984)–These are economists who believe in structural 
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adjustments in determining goods, output and income achieved through the market forces –
they pointed out that financial liberalisation is unlikely to increase the GDP in the existence 
of informal financial markets, a view supported by Fry (1988) who contends that rivalry and 
efficiency in informal financial markets is far less compared to commercial banks. Owen and 
Solis-Fallas (1989) later argue that the claim by neo-structuralists that unorganised credit 
markets play an important role in executing effective intermediation is highly impracticable. 
We assert the presence of curb markets is a feature of developing economies in general and 
the extent of the presence of these informal financial markets could be judged from the 
percentage of the population that is financially excluded (the unbanked). According to 
Finmark Trust (2013), of the countries under study, only South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius 
and Namibia achieved financial inclusion of more than 50 per cent. This suggests that the 
rest of the population is either formally or informally serviced by the curb market. Generally, 
the countries in the SADC emphasise in their financial sector development strategic plans, 
the need for financial inclusion. For this to happen, we suggest that it could only be effective 
in a democratic setting. We follow Van Wijnbergen (1982, 1983), Taylor (1983) and Buffie 
(1984) and argue that curb markets may hinder FD in the SADC and that instituting 
democratic governance in the SADC countries under study, with a harmonised policy of 
financial inclusion would significantly diminish the existence of curb markets and foster FD. 
Simply put, if curb markets impede financial liberalisation as suggested by the neo-
structuralists, then democratic governance which advocates for financial inclusion may 
reduce the proliferation of these markets by fostering financial inclusion and thereby 
accelerating the process of FD. 
The 1990s saw the growth of endogenous growth models. A number of papers demonstrate 
that FD improves the flow of information and others show that it tends to reduce the 
efficiency of resource allocation when government restrictions are in place. The policy 
implication of the latter view suggests that the eradication of government impediments may 
promote growth in the real sector in developing economies (see Greenwood and Javanovic, 
1990; Bencivenga and Smith 1991, 1993; Saint-Paul, 1992; King and Levine, 1993b; 
Pagano, 1993; Bencivenga, Smith and Starr, 1995; Greenwood and Smith, 1997; Blackburn 
and Hung, 1998). An important extension to the body of knowledge on the relationship 
between finance and growth have steered the focus of research on the relative benefits of a 
financial system based on banks and a financial system based on the markets (see Allen & 
Gale, 1999, 2000; Beck & Levine, 2002; Ergungor, 2004; Levine, 2005). 
Studies in the SADC region on the finance-growth relationship have focused mainly on 
growth models and the value of a financial system based on banks. Allen and Ndikumana 
(1998) using four indicators of financial intermediation and three panel techniques found a 
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positive association between FD and GDP per capita. Aziakpono (2003) researched the 
finance-growth relationship in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and his findings 
suggest that of all the SACU countries examined, South Africa’s domestic financial 
intermediation is the most effective in stimulating growth. Takaendesa and Odhiambo (2007) 
explored the causal link between finance and growth in two SADC countries – Zimbabwe 
and Malawi and find a two-way causal pattern between FD and growth in Malawi and none 
in Zimbabwe. Odhiambo (2005) finds similar results as in Malawi in a study of the causality 
relationship between finance and growth in Tanzania. In a study of the finance-growth 
relation of Zambia’s economy, Banda’s (2007) conclusions corroborates with the findings of 
Odhiambo (2005) though using a different methodology. Le Roux and Moyo (2015) in a 
study of 15 SADC countries suggest that the relationship between financial liberalisation and 
economic growth is a short-run phenomenon and recommends that SADC adopts measures 
to increase the level of financial openness in the region in order to increase economic 
growth.  In a comparative study of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and SADC, Mahawiya (2015) finds that inflation above the threshold of 17.9% 
and 14.5% respectively for both regions presents statistically significant detrimental effects 
on FD. In a country specific study of municipalities in South Africa, Obikili (2015) investigates 
the significance of political competition on economic growth and shows that in democracies, 
governments with more freedom to make decisions and less threat from opposition political 
parties are linked with faster economic growth and improvement in the supply of some public 
goods. 
The policy implications of growth models suggest that government restrictions should be 
abolished to promote real growth. We argue that these restrictions could only be effectively 
eliminated in a democratic environment and may directly or indirectly positively affect FD - 
duly recognised by SADC member states in the SADC Treaty (2006) which stipulates that 
member states shall gradually develop similar values politically, systems and institutions, 
promote peace and ensure security for all, among others, with the ultimate goal of attaining 
higher levels of development and economic growth (SADC, 2006). 
The above studies in the SADC region generally show the merits of FD on economic growth, 
while holding political institutions (e.g. democratic governance) as given except in the micro 
study of political competition in municipalities by Obikili (2015) as mentioned above. What 
determines FD is material and lacking in the literature in this region, a gap that we attempt to 
fill. The role of democratic institutions takes centre stage in this study moving away from the 
finance – growth nexus to the institutional causes of FD with a focus on political institutions 
and their effect on FD. 
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3.3.2 Institutional determinants (democracy and financial development) 
 
The late 1990s saw the emergence of the institutional school of thought which holds that 
understanding the institutional environment is imperative for FD and has recently attracted 
considerable attention from both theorists and empiricists (Fergusson, 2006; Beck and 
Levine, 2004). The law and finance school emphasises the differences in legal origin in 
explaining the difference in FD across countries. La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny 
(1997, 1998), Djankov et al. (2007). La Porta et al (1998), Rajan and Zingales (2003), 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Haber, North and Weingast (2008) argue that institutions 
that ensure: respect of the rule of law, make sure property rights are protected, contracts are 
enforced and constrain those in powerare shown to have achieved higher levels of FD, a 
thought adopted in this study.  
The protagonists of the legal school of thought of FD argue that the dissimilarity between 
financial systems based on banks and financial systems based on the marketsis immaterial. 
For instance, Levine (1998, 2000, 2001) and Levine et al (2000) using cross-country data 
from La Porta et al (1997, 1998) on differences in corporate law, regulation and law systems, 
argue that what is crucial for FD is establishing a general legal framework in an environment 
in which financial systems can effectively and efficiently operate. The legal view, therefore, 
asserts that only that part of FD that relies on the legal system is important for promoting 
growth in the economy. As highlighted above, Yang (2011) asserts that of central importance 
and at a rudimentary level, the legal institutions could be thought of and being brought about 
and reinforced by democracy. Contrary to the above views, Marcelin and Mathur (2014) 
present a framework for understanding the interactions between political and legal 
institutions, property rights protection, and their implications for FD and find little support that 
common law legal heritage is more suitable than French civil law for some key features of 
FD. They conclude that different types of institutional and market reforms are more relevant 
to financial intermediation than legal systems. We argue that market reforms and legal 
heritage may affect FD through political stability which in turn depends on the state of 
democracy. The more democratic a country is the more effective market reforms would be 
and the more independent the judiciary would be to ensure property rights and contract 
enforcements.  
Recent studies have exemplified the fact that a positive electoral democratic system 
contributes positively to FD. According to Siegle et al (2004) democracy ensures that: 
political power is not concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or groups, those in 
power put in place systems that react quickly and positively to the needs of citizens, there is 
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transparency, there is a system of self-correcting mechanisms without external help and 
other aspects of good institutions. Haber et al., (2007) contends that democracies, by 
encouraging citizens to influence or support government and to compete for political power 
may limit state involvement in the financial system which are sometimes exploitative and 
opportunistic and thus bring about more rivalry and efficiency in the banking system. North 
and Weingast (1989) suggest that when there is no political competition, what will be of 
crucial importance to ensure that property rights are protected and that contracts are 
enforced will be the fact that political power is not concentrated in the hands of a few 
individuals or groups.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) contend that countries that greatly limit 
the powers of the government will guarantee greater protection of property rights which 
ultimately lead to more efficient banking and market financial system.  In the same line of 
thinking, La Porta et al., (2002) is of the view that democratic regimes limits government 
takeover of financial institutions hence encouraging FD. Rodrik (2000) argues that 
democracies deliver better institutional outcomes because they tend to create more equal 
opportunities for people, especially in the fields of health, education and employment 
opportunity, which manifests itself in a higher share of wages in the national income. In 
general, therefore, according to Rodrik (2000) democracy helps to build better institutions 
based on local knowledge: political systems that advocate more involved forms of citizen 
participation and curbing excessive concentration of power are the most successful in 
assembling knowledge from within the country. Democracy is thought of as an institution 
beyond others which is crucial for building other good institutions (Rodrik 2000). Therefore, 
as a meta-institution, democracy ensures effective constraints on governments and effective 
policy implementation strategies which positively impact on FD. 
 
Huang (2010) argues that in countries where there are no political checks and balances and 
power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of powerful people, they will be more 
prone to take care of their interests and limit political participation and competition in the 
system. If such a powerful group controls an inordinate amount of political power, then the 
more dictatorial the system which ultimately hinders FD. This, therefore, means limiting the 
power of elite groups through checks and balances increases political participation ensures 
the political rights of citizens, ensures that individual rights are protected by the law from 
unjust governmental or other interference. With these guaranteed, the efficiency of 
institutions would be increased which is advantageous to FD (Huang, 2010). Girma and 
Shortland (2008) find that FD is promoted where there is regime change from autocracy to 
democracy as a result of a general increase in wealth. Inferring from this argument, we 
assert that an increase in wealth would increase savings and investments and ultimately 
growth. Intermediation is thus increased, a positive feature of FD.  We argue that for 
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democracy to have a real positive effect on FD, it should be substantive10 rather than just 
procedural.  
 
Building from the work of Yang (2011), Cooray (2011), Anwar and Cooray (2012) and Huang 
(2010), who contend that political institutions, especially democratic transformation foster 
FD, we posit that FD in SADC countries could be achieved through democracy, controlling 
for specific economic and social variables in a non-linear relationship. We test this 
hypothesis in a region characterised by countries with improving but differentiated levels of 
FD following deregulation in the 1990s Brownbridge and Harvey (1998) and a wave of 
democratisation though with fragile and predominantly weak institutions Landsberg (2004). 
Most previous empirical studies on the effect of institutions on FD suggest a linear 
relationship. We contend that the effect of democracy on FD could be through interactions 
with certain social and economic policy variables in a relationship that is non-linear. In this 
respect we follow Minier (2007) who investigated the indirect effect that institutions may have 
on growth after allowing for several types of non-linearities. We build on this and suggest 
that the impact of democracy on FD may be non-linear through their interactions with policy 
variables. 
 
While the positive impact of democracies on FD is mostly positive and convincing as 
exposed above, some studies have shown that this assertion is somehow ungrounded on its 
effects on FD and others on growth. On the effect of institutions on growth, the primordial 
role of institutions in promoting economic development is discounted by Chang (2003) who 
concludes that institutional development is not the sine qua non of economic development, 
and institutional reforms in developing countries should not be imposed from outside, but 
should be allowed to evolve naturally and internally. This argument may accord with the 
central conclusion of Rodrik (2000) study and the pioneering research by Hausmann, 
Pritchett and Rodrik (2005: 303) on ‘growth accelerations’, who suggest that everything we 
know about economic growth that indicates large-scale institutional transformation is not so 
necessary for getting growth started, but is very important for sustaining it. These 
conclusions suggests that the negative effect of institutions on growth may not be conducive 
for FD if institutions are not in-built and allowed to evolve naturally but imposed from outside. 
Contemporary, the argument seems to correlate with political instability created in some 
                                                          
10
We define substantive democracy as one that not only brings about free and fair elections, the 
separation of powers and the role of opposition parties but ensures respect of the rule of law, protects 
property rights as well as contract enforcements, creditor and shareholder rights and puts effective 
constrain on rulers. 
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countries around the world as international organisations try to encourage and secure 
democracy leading to the affected countries experiencing low growth and FD. 
 
Some recent studies have shown a weak association between democracy and FD. An 
empirical study by Yang (2011) finds that the development of the stock market is negatively 
associated with FD. He contends that the development of the banking sector positively 
relates to democracy in cross-sectional regressions but vanishes when using panel 
regressions. Barro (2008) argues that democracy can hamper growth in the nascent 
developmental stage caused by: the tendency of the majority voting to support programmes 
that reapportion income from rich to the poor, policies that increase taxes and other 
distortions that reduce incentives. Also, Barro (2000) suggests that democracies may give in 
to pressure groups that redistribute resources to themselves; for example agricultural 
lobbies, defence contractors and trade unions. Barro’s (2000) conclusions corroborates with 
that of Alesina and Perotti (1994) in their early survey of the political economy of growth who 
assert that growth is influenced not so much by the nature of the political regime (democracy 
or dictatorship) but by the stability of the political regime transitions from dictatorship to 
democracy, often associated with socio-economic instability, which are typically periods of 
low growth. These findings were based on the proxy or proxies for FD applied and the stage 
of economic development of the country or countries in question. 
 
Studies on the effect of institutions in FD and growth in developed and developing 
economies as highlighted above show mixed results. It should be worth noting that there is 
inconclusive evidence that institutions matter for FD and growth. We build on this evidence 
and test our hypothesis in SADC region where we are not aware of any studies exploring the 
role of institutions on FD. The methodology and empirical analysis in this thesis attempts to 
fill this vacuum.  
3.4 Stylised Facts and Empirical Evidence: 
 
Stylised facts, as well as empirical evidence provide credence to the role of institutions in 
promoting FD. Brown (2008) suggests that political development should include a form of 
democratic government that allows for broad participation by the population with a 
competitive electoral environment and a high level of political freedom, civil liberties and 
protection of the rights to property. The quality of institutions should be sufficient to 
adequately address the needs of the society and have sufficient conflict resolution 
mechanisms to allow for problem solving within the political system (Brown, 2008). This 
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suggests that political development is the process of change in the political system which 
reflects the goals of economic and FD.  
3.4.1 Stylised facts on the determinants of financial development 
 
We explore some stylised facts on the link between some important institutional and policy 
variables used in the study and FD. As mentioned earlier, a huge body of research 
underscores institutions as a core factor in determining long-run economic growth with some 
studies showing evidence of the effect of geography to be via institutions (see Acemoglu, 
Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Easterly & Levine, 2003 and Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004).  Huang (2010) applies BMA and general to specific analysis 
to show the effect of institutions, policy and geography on FD. He finds that institutions 
dominate in explaining variations in FD compared to policy and geography – the powerful 
role of institutions on FD is highlighted over geography and policy variables. The findings 
suggest that attempts by the government to improve the standard of institutions (together 
with sound macro-economic, trade and social policies) could have a beneficial significance 
on FD. A possible implication may be that institutions could be interacting with these policy 
variables to affect FD, a feature that suggests non-linearities and taken into consideration in 
this study. 
We follow Huang’s (2010) (BMA) procedure to determine the proximate determinants of FD 
in the SADC region using institutional, economic and social policy variables. We contend 
that institutional quality (good governance) could be achieved more effectively in a 
democratic environment which ensures a trustworthy institutional and legal system and a 
society where all its citizens will be actively involved in the development of the country.We 
suggest that these features (and much more) of quality institutions are essential recipes 
conducive for FD. We argue that this relationship may be non-linear by exploring interactions 
between democracy and policy variables to see the effect on FD – in which case the effect 
would be indirect. 
3.4.2 Empirical evidence on cross-country and panel studies 
 
In this section we review cross-country and panel studies on finance and growth, institutions 
and growth and institutions and FD. We only mention the various contributions of each study 
in the literature and methods therein. The relative merits and demerits of panel studies would 
be explored in the methodology section of the study.  We include this section motivated by 
the fact that the thesis is based on panel studies and to show how some of the methods 
used in this study deviate from the previous studies in general and of the region in particular, 
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where no previous study has been executed neither on the basis of the institutional 
determinants of growth nor on the institutional determinants of FD. This highlights our 
methodological contributions to the wide body of literature.  
3.4.2.1 Finance- growth nexus 
 
Panel proof on the relationship between finance and growth could be drawn from De 
Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) who empirically find that FD leads to increased GDP growth 
except when the financial liberation process is unregulated. Odedokun (1996) finds that 
growth in low income countries respond more to FD comparatively to upper middle income 
countries. From a micro perspective, Rajan and Zingales (1998) using data from industry 
find that industries that depend on external sources of finance show improved performance 
in countries that possess much more developed financial intermediaries and markets. Beck 
et al. (2000) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2000), find a robust positive link between FD and 
income per head, total factor productivity and capital accumulation growth rates.Their 
findings also show a positive link between FD on both savings and investment rates though 
not very significant statistically. It is worth noting that the results of the latter authors are 
influenced by specific effects in each country and the application of the different proxies of 
FD. Ndikumana (2005) show evidence that different indicators of FD relate favourably with 
investment in the local economy. The implication of Ndikumana’s (2005) study suggests that 
the growth of financial systems increase capital availability conducive to capital 
accumulation. 
Henry (2000) show evidence that the capitalisation of the stock marketaugments private 
investment in nine of eleven developing countries. In a similar study Rousseau and Watchel 
(2000), find thatfinancial intermediation and stock market liquidity increases per capita output 
growth. The study also finds a weak relation between stock market capitalisation and output. 
By studying the effect of stock markets and the banking sector on growth, Beck and Levine 
(2004) note that though both banks and stock markets contribute positively towards growth, 
the financial services provided by stock markets is different from those provided by banks. 
 Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) find evidence that the development of institutions that 
channel funds from lenders to borrowers is crucial and positively affect economic growth and 
that variation in FD across countries is due to variations in legal and accounting systems. 
The work of Beck and Levine (2002) corroborates with results of Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
which suggest that industries which depend more on external finance tend to grow at a 
faster rate in economies with much more sophisticated financial systems. Rousseau and 
Watchel (2002) contend that finance tends to retard growth when inflation reaches a 
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threshold level of 13%-25% and the effects are remarkably positive when inflation falls below 
the 6%-8%limit. Calderon and Lui’s (2003) conclusions reveal a bi-directional relationship 
between FD and economic growth with a stronger impact in developing economies. They 
contend that finance affects growth through the investment and productivity growth channels 
with the latter channel being more pronounced. Christopolous and Tsionas (2004), show that 
FD and economic growth are co-integrated with a long-run uni-directional causality running 
from finance to growth. By separating countries into three groupings based on how 
financially developed they are Rioja and Valev (2004) show evidence that suggests finance 
as having a strong positive link on real GDP growth in countries where their financial 
systems are more developed.That is not the case in less financially developed economies 
where it has been noted that the relationshipequivocal. 
On linearities and non-linearities on the finance-growth connection, Ketteni, Mamuneas, 
Savvides and Stengos (2005) contend that the relationship is linear only when two-way 
interactions between economic growth, initial per capita income and human capital are 
considered. In the same spirit, Stengos and Liang (2005), using a semi-parametric approach 
indicates that the association between finance and growth is non-linear. However, the results 
would depend on the proxies of FD applied.  
 All the above panel studies adopt methods using annual data which generally includes: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Generalised Least Squares (GLS), Instrumental Variable 
(IV), regressions and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), Vector Auto-Regressions 
(VARs) and Vector Error Correction Models (VECM), semi-parametric partial linear model 
and augmented semi-parametric partial linear models when non-linearities are investigated. 
In most cases the results indicate that FD positively impact on economic growth, though in 
some cases a weak relationship is established. Some studies suggest a bi-directional 
causality and others show no feedback effect. In all, these relationships have been shown to 
depend on the level of income of nations, the level of development of financial markets and 
intermediaries and a host of government and trade policies control variables. Putting the 
accumulated evidence under the microscope of meta-analysis Valickova, Havranek and 
Horvath (2014) conclude that the literature as a whole documents an average positive 
association between FD and economic growth. This conclusion corroborates with an earlier 
meta-analysis study by Bumann, Hermes and Lensink (2011) showing on the average a 
positive but weak significant effect of financial liberation on economic growth. If finance 
contributes moderately towards economic growth, then putting in place or improving those 
factors that determine FD is important. We focus on democracy and argue that the 
relationship may not necessarily be linear as the above studies generally seem to suggest. 
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3.4.2.2 Institutions and growth nexus 
 
The theoretical models of growth of (Solow, 1965; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965; Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Aghion & Howitt, 1992) have 
brought significant intuitions in the literatureon the mechanics of economic growth. North 
(1990) argues that though these theories are still vibrant in economics and their contributions 
noteworthy, they have arguably not been able to put forward a basicexposition of the 
mechanics of economic growth. Earlier, North and Thomas (1973) suggest that innovation, 
economies of scale, education, capital accumulation, and others are only near determinants 
of growth andin their view; differences in institutions provide the underlying reason behind 
comparative growth. North (1990:3) offers the following definition: “Institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction”. He further emphasised the key implications of institutions since, “In 
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or 
economic” North (1990:3). Central to this study is the hypothesis that political institutions 
(democracy) influence financial outcomes and are derived internally – they are, at least in 
part, determined by society or a segment of it as suggested by North (1990).  We 
contendthat the influence of democracy may be indirect through the interaction of social and 
economic policy variables. Before exploring the effects of institutions on FD, we begin by 
examining some panel models on the effects of institutions and growth.  
Studies have empirically tested the theoretical models on institutions and growth and there is 
potent evidence that variations in institutions account for heterogeneous growth rates among 
countries. Theoretical and empirical evidence is provided by Acemoglu, et al., (2002) that 
variations in economic institutions provide some basic explanations for the diverse 
differences in economic development across states because of the power of institutions in 
shaping economic outcomes and constrains on the agents. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2005) contend that the effect of institutions on economic growth is more significantin the 
long-run. 
The empirics on institutions and growth have generally followed a trend where the different 
institutional variables enter the analysis. For instance the following variables have been 
more prominent in the empirical analysis on the relationship between institutions and growth: 
political stability, property rights and contract enforcements, democracy, the quality of public 
and civil service, graft, ability of government to formulate and implement good policies and 
regulations, well defined and established laws that are fairly applied and enforced, public or 
individual preferences in investment decisions, the efficiency of government regulation of 
business, civil society, political rights and civil liberties, societal norms, remittances, among 
56 
 
others (See Acemoglu et al. 2003; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2004; 
Rodrik et al. 2004; Kauffman et al. 2005; Lee & Kim, 2009; McClaud & Kumbhakar, 2012; 
Anwar & Cooray, 2012; Siddique & Ahmed, 2013; among others). The effect of trade and 
geography on growth controlling for the institutional quality is explored by Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2003) and finds a positive influence of trade and geography on growth. 
Inspired by North’s (1981) theoretical model on rent seeking, Mauro (1995) analyses 
empirically how graft may restrict investments and have a negative impact on economic 
growth.In a study, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) assert that high taxes and 
the strength of regulations may not be the cause of the unofficial economy but that this is 
triggered by the level of corruption. This argument suggests that corruption increase the size 
of the informal economy leading to low levels of growth. A different view is held by the effect 
of the strength of regulations. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2001) in a 
study argue that high levels of regulation are translated into high levels of corruption. Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997) show evidence that corruption can decrease the effectiveness of 
productive effort and the standard of investments provided by the public sector which 
negatively affects growth. Wei (2000) points out that corruption in a host country reduces 
foreign direct investment thereby havinga negativeeffect on growth. 
Sarte (2001) asserts that the effectiveness of the policies of governmentis paramount in 
explaining economic growth and differences in growth among countries. The intuition behind 
this institution demonstrates that the problems faced by countries politically, lack of foresight 
and excessively complicated administrative procedures or red tape can lead to inefficient 
spending resulting in large budget deficits which have the potential of reducing growth 
(Sarte, 2001). Evidence on the negative link between political instability and growth can be 
drawn on a study by Alesina and Perotti (1994) as well as Londregan and Poole (1990). In a 
study of 135 economieswith regards to the remittances of migrants, Catrinescu, Leon-
Ledesma, Piracha and Quillin (2009) argue that a stable government can direct remittances 
through formal channels (i.e., via financial institutions) to its recipients. This allows for bank 
intermediation which has been shown to have a positive effect on economic growth.  
Siddique and Ahmed (2012) using an index of institutionalised social technologies along with 
its sub-indices (institutional and policy rents, political rents and risk reducing institutions) as 
measures of institutions find evidence that institutions of institutional and policy rents 
substantially influence long-run economic growth whereas institutions that reduce risk and 
inhibit political rent were not statistically significant in some cases. This evidence 
corroborates with findings by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) who argue that in the absence 
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of formal risk reducing institutions, informal arrangements develop to provide protection in 
their place. 
The protection of property rights is widely recognised as being the state’s responsibility. 
Gradstein (2004) presents a model where economic performance and enforcement of 
property rights may reinforce each other. Existing empirical evidence that offers tentative 
support for this theory include: the work of Chong and Calderon (2000) where the authors 
explicitly test for mutual causality between good governance and growth, suggesting multiple 
institutional equilibria whereby good institutions promote growth which then leads to the 
adoption of good institutions. Hall and Jones (1999) employ subjective evaluation of aspects 
of governance, such as bureaucratic efficiency, corruption, maintenance of law and order, 
supplemented by the degree of openness to international trade and present robust findings 
on the positive effect of good governance on growth. Similar findings were reached by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) while using an enlarged dataset and a much 
wider battery of measures of governance quality based on a variety of sources though 
incidentally dismissing the trade openness variable.    
 The effect of institutions on growth is not limited to the above panel studies. Generally, the 
theoretical and empirical studies on institutions and growth seem to corroborate in varying 
degrees with Acemoglu et al.,’s (2001) conclusions which suggest that political institutions 
play an important role in determining how economic institutions can positively affect 
economic growth. They suggest that for this to be possible, rent seeking by those in power 
must be checked to limit the amount of rent to be captured, their powers constrained and a 
comprehensive enforcement of property rights by those holding political power. Some 
studies show evidence that long-term authoritarians appear to be better for growth than 
democratically elected politicians who succeed in prolonging their term of office (see Bueno 
de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow, 2002). In the same spirit, Nkurunziza and Bates 
(2003) contend in a study of African economies, that for a given level of democracy, there is 
an optimal period of tenure beyond which the incumbent leader harms economic growth. 
The optimal tenure period is largely influenced by the strength of the direct impact of political 
stability on growth.  
The empirical models on the effect of institutions and growth have generally used annual 
data and the following estimation techniques: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Instrumental-
Variables (IV) Regressions, Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) and more recently the GMM System. The results, though mixed, generally 
seem to suggest that legal and political institutions matter for growth with a feedback 
relationship in some cases. Our review so far shows that finance is important for growth to 
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take place and in some studies; there is evidence of a bi-directional causality; that 
institutions promote growth and there is also evidence of a positive feedback effect. If there 
exists in some studies a two-way causality between FD and growth and in others a positive 
feedback effect between institutions and growth, then we use this logic to posit that 
institutions may affect FD. We address this new area of interest in the SADC region where 
we are unaware of anyprevious and hypothesise that democracy and its interaction with 
specific social and economic variables could promote FD in arelationship that may be non-
linear. The stage is now set for our review of panel models on the institutional determinants 
of FD. 
3.4.2.3 Institutions and financial development 
 
Roe and Siegel (2011) bring forward strong empirical proof that instability in the political 
system impedes FD, with its variation of primary determinants that bring about differences in 
FD around the world. The study further reveals that exogenously determined political 
instability holds back FD with legal origin, trade openness, basic geography of latitude and 
corporate law quality as control variables. Empirical results in a study by Chinn and Ito 
(2005) suggest that a when financial markets are more open, it linearly and non-linearly 
contributes towards the development of equity markets. They assert that the non-linear 
contribution is via legal and institutional factors and their level of development – a feature 
that is widespread in upper middle income economies comparatively to the lower middle and 
low income economies. 
Empirical evidence by Huang (2010) suggests that the development of institutions positively 
affect FD in the short period in low income countries. The study brings forth precursory 
evidence suggesting that periods of democratisation is commonly followed by growth in FD. 
Deepraj and Nabamita (2013) investigates the role of political institutions and culture in 
creating an efficient financial infrastructure for a country and show evidence that both these 
types of institutions - political institutions and culture – not only jointly promote FD but 
behave as complements - the presence of efficient political institutions augment the 
effectiveness of culture and thus, FD is enhanced. 
Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2008) reveal evidence which suggest that the 
following variables are important determinants of FD: the government’s ability to formulate 
and implement sound policies, the level of regulatory quality, a system where all people and 
institutions are subject to and accountable by the law and the extent to which all relevant 
information pertaining to banks are released. They argue that to promote FD in developing 
economies governments should rather build strong institutions that increase the 
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effectiveness of private banking instead of privatising or subsidising state banks. Bacerra, 
Cavallo and Scartascini (2012) build a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence that 
credit dependence and the role governments play in credit markets would determine the 
degree of opposition to FD. Their empirical findings suggest that the development of credit 
markets is positively linked to lower opposition to FD only in countries with sound and 
effective government capabilities. Miletkov and Wintoki (2012) argue that the positive link 
between institutional development and FD is due not only to the positive effects of 
institutions on FD but also can be explained, at least in part, by the effects of exogenous 
changes in FD on the quality of institutions. These findings by Miletkov and Wintoki (2012) 
suggest that FD itself has a positive causal effect on the quality of property rights and legal 
institutions in a country – an indication of bi-directional causality. Aggarwal and Goodell 
(2009) in a study document that national preference for market financing increases with 
political stability, societal openness, economic inequality and equity market concentration 
and decrease with regulatory quality and ambiguity aversion. The results are likely to be of 
interest in assessing the impact of political and sociological developments on banks and 
other financial institutions.  
A study by Yang (2011) using cross-sectional data finds that democracy is positively linked 
with the development of banks though the relationship vanishes when panel regressions are 
applied. The empirical results suggest, with caution that democratic regimes does not 
guarantee increasing levels of FD. The findings seems to corroborate with the work of 
Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) who contend that democracies seem to increase 
political competition and the quest for public office but have little effect on the policies of the 
government. In the same tradition as Siegel, Weinstein and Halperin (2004), we argue that 
the positive effect of institutions on FD, whether legal or political may be attributed to 
democracy since it ensures that: political power is not concentrated in the hands of a few, 
the government react timeously to the needs of the citizens, the government is transparent, 
there are self-correcting mechanisms within the political system and other good institutions. 
This relationship may not necessarily be direct. We also contend that the relationship 
between institutions and FD may exhibit significant indirect effects. We assert that this 
evidence is at most suggestive unless being put under the critical eye of meta-analysis to be 
able to draw meaningful conclusions generally on the relationship – an avenue for further 
research on literature survey. 
The estimation techniques applied by most studies to determine the effect of institutions on 
FD are similar to those applied in determining the effects of institutions on growth with the 
primordial aim of dealing with the problem of endogeneity.  Again, the results though mixed, 
generally shed credence to the positive role institutions play in determining FD. After 
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applying some of the current widely used techniques as discussed above, we deviate and 
contribute methodologically to the body of knowledge by applying the Bayesian and Markov 
inferences to test the effect of democracy on FD in the SADC region. 
According to Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) the institutional 
measures widely used in the literature are flawed because they are not built to reveal either 
restrictions on government or lasting characteristics of the political landscape – they 
measure outcomes rather than institutional constraints and that these measures sometimes 
reflect the decisions made by power-holders rather than restrictions on government (e.g., a 
country ruled by a dictator who freely chooses good policies should not be ranked as having 
good institutions). They are highly inconsistent and exhibit mean-reversion and are hardly in 
correlation with the unbiased legal restrictions on government (Glaeser et al., 2004). If 
democracy does not adhere to the above, this could serve as a limit to the study in terms of 
its explanatory power. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The chapter begins by discussing the functions of the financial system in relation to how the 
different countries under study are faring in terms of efficiently performing these functions. 
These functions relate explicitly and implicitly to the proxies of FD applied in the study. We 
argue that the state of democratic governance in each income group/country would have a 
significant influence on how these functions are performed which ultimately determines how 
developed the financial system is. The literature on the finance growth nexus is described, 
with studies in the SADC region being dominated by endogenous growth models of FD. 
Studies on the institutional determinants of FD are seen to be conspicuously absent in the 
region. We focus on the effect of political institutions especially democracy (which is seen as 
an institution beyond other institutions) on FD. We highlight the fact that past studies on the 
effect of democracy and FD have been both theoretical and empirical. Empirical analysis on 
the link between institutions and FD in the literature has yielded mixed results with a trend 
skewing more to a positive relationship. The empirical strategies to test the various 
hypotheses in the literature have been largely IV techniques with the objective of mitigating 
endogeneity and omitted variable biases but to a limited extent. By suggesting the Bayesian 
and Markov inferences, we argue that these biases could be better taken care of.  Finally, 
we acknowledge the weaknesses that may inhibit the institutional measures highlighted 
above, though there is still no consensus among institutional economists on these issues. 
The Polity IV measures are still widely accepted as a measure of the state of democracy of 
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countries. The study proceeds in the next chapter and specify the models and estimation 
techniques that will enable us achieve our three main objectives. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the models that will be used to test the hypotheses 
postulated in the study, variable selection and operationalisation. The models would test the 
following aspects based on our hypothesis: (i) The effect of institutions - democracy, 
autocracy and constraint on executives on FD; (ii) the probability of switching between 
regimes of high FD and low FD following political regime changes and (iii) examine how a 
shock in the institutional variables affects FD compared to the social and economic variables 
(real variables). First we specify the different models that will be used to test the hypotheses. 
Secondly, we present a conceptual description of each variable followed by 
operationalisation. We provide a summary of the data followed by panel data techniques. 
The use of panel data is justified through its merits. Its demerits are also highlighted together 
with the endogeneity problem, which still comprises a significant research gap despite 
developments in recent methods to erradicate this problem. Finally, appropriate diagnostic 
tests are presented to ensure robust results.   
4.2 Model Specification 
 
The models that have been widely used to test the effect of institutions on FD include, 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable Regressions (IV) which include 
Two Stage Least Squares Regression (TSLS), Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), 
Difference and System Generalised Method of Moments (system GMM) (See Yang, 2011; 
Huang, 2010; Cooray, 2011; Deepraj & Nabamita, 2013; Hafer, 2013; Siong Hook, Hui Boon 
& Azman-Saini, 2014; among others).  
 
In our initial analysis, we apply OLS, GMM, difference and system GMM to test the effect of 
political institutions (democracy) on FD. To test how shocks on institutional variables used in 
the study impact on FD compared to social and economic variables we apply the Bayesian 
Vector Autoregressive Model (BVAR). Though the primary aim of using the BVAR models is 
for forecasting, our main objective of applying the BVAR is to determine how FD reacts to 
impulses of the institutional variables compared with the social and economic variables used 
as controls. To determine whether the probability of staying in a regime of weak/low FD in 
countries experiencing weak/low FD is high compared to countries experiencing a higher 
level of FD, we apply the Markov Switching Model assuming constant volatility. In order to 
test our hypotheses we specify the following models. We begin with the traditional models 
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that have widely been used to test this relationship (OLS and GMM) before specifying 
models that are now popular in dealing with endogeneity (difference and system GMM). 
  
Estimation method 1: OLS and GMM. 
To determine the significance of explanatory variables in explaining FD we begin our 
analysis by estimating a panel model using the following estimation techniques: Robust 
Ordinary Least Square (ROLS) and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). We use robust 
least square - MM estimations to cater for outliers in the panel. The benefit of using panel 
data is that it takes into consideration more degrees of freedom and greater variability in the 
sample than cross-sectional data, with the effect of improving the efficiency of the estimates, 
Greene (2011). We use IV estimations to tackle the likelihood of endogeneity of institutional, 
policy and social variables that act as regressors. Endogeneity bias may result in estimates 
that are not robust. Recently these methods of analysis have been widely applied in the 
literature on the connection between institutions and FD (see Huang, 2010; Yang 2011; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011; Anwar & Cooray, 2012; Miletkov & Wintoki, 2012; Bacerra, Cavallo & 
Scartascini, 2012; Deepraj & Nabamita, 2013; among others).  In the spirit of Huang (2010), 
we make an informed choice of control variables for each income group by employing the 
significant variables determined by the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)11. We start with the 
traditional OLS estimator to estimate the model and modify it step by step by applying, 
GMM, difference and system GMM estimators for each income group.  
The panel model takes the following form: 
 =  + +       (4.1) 
Where: is a measure of FD in a country,  at time  (these include bank deposits, private 
credit and liquid liabilities);  is the value of institutional variables which include democracy 
(procedural or substantive12 -We measure substantive democracy by the variable “S Polity 
IV”.  We use dummy variables to compute a series for each country. Where the index of 
democracy (the combined polity score) is greater than or equal to six, it takes the value 1 
and 0 otherwise. Marshall (2014:31) suggest that “Polity IV denotes cases of ‘major 
democratic transition’ defined by a six-point or greater increasein the combined POLITY 
score”) or interaction between democracy and specific economic or social variables, 
executive constraints, autocracy;  is the value of control variables determined by BMA;  
                                                          
11
 We use the approach developed by Raftery et al. (1997) 
12
 In determining whether a country’s democracy standings are procedural or substantive, we 
computed the mean polity IV values for the period under study (1975-2013). Where the mean value is 
greater than 6, we suggest that the country’s democracy is substantive otherwise procedural. 
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is the time fixed effect;  is the country fixed effect;  is the random error term that 
represents all other variables. We hold that the transitory errors  are not carried over into 
future time periods 
First we determine the effect of institutions without controls. Equation 4.1 without controls 
collapses to  = + . Then a step by step introduction of controls 
(  and interactions are done based on variables of the best five models determined by 
BMA. This procedure is executed for all estimators specified in our initial analysis. Non-
linearities in the relationship between institutions and FD would be exposed by interactions 
between democracy and specific BMA determined control variables.   
Model 2: Difference and System GMM 
According to Roodman (2009), the difference and system GMM estimators are appropriate 
for panel analysis and contain assumptions about the process of data-generation which have 
not been dealt with by the other IV estimators. These include that fact that: 
(i) The current realisations of the dependent variable may be influenced by past ones in a 
dynamic process. 
 (ii) There may be fixed individual effects which are randomly distributed and does not favour 
cross-section regressions that assume time independent effects. They accommodate a 
panel setup, where changes over time can be used to ascertain the values of the estimated 
variables. 
(iii) Some of the explanatory variables may be endogenous. 
(iv) The unsystematic shocks may have individual-specific patterns of unequal variabilityand 
the errors associated with a given time period carry over into future time periods. 
(v) The unsystematic shocks do not correlated across individuals. 
 Also, Roodman (2009) contends that some exogenous variables can have an effect on past 
ones, for instance the lagged dependent variable. The estimators do not allow for external 
instruments to be included in the model suggesting that only the lags of instrumental 
variables may be included. Instrument proliferation has, however, been identified as a 
potential weakness of the difference and system GMM. It has been noted by Roodman 
(2009) that this bias is common to all IV regressions and becomes more accentuated when 
the numbers of instruments increase. Sadly, there seem to be little direction from past 
studies on the appropriate number of instrumentsand even when the instruments are not 
“too many” the bias is still encountered (Ruud 2000: 515). To mitigate the possibility of bias 
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due to instrument proliferation we follow Miletkov and Wintoki (2012) and limit the instrument 
set to at most two lags of the regressant and regressors. The different estimation techniques 
allows for robustness checks of the estimates for each method used. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggested the system GMM 
estimator that allows controlling for the joint endogeneity of regressors through the 
application of instruments that are internal. This involves combining equation (4.1) with a first 
difference equation (4.2). We instrument equation (4.1) is with the first differences of the 
variables that have been lagged, while the equation (4.2) is instrumented with lagged levels 
of the variables making them exogenous to fixed effects13. Equation (4.1) is transformed to 
take the following form: 
 =  + +  
          (4.2) 
The definitions of the variables are the same as in equation (4.1). The GMM estimator is 
based on the assumption that the error terms are not serially correlated and that the 
explanatory variables are weakly exogenous or not correlated with future realisations of the 
error terms under which the following moment condition holds for the first difference 
estimator; 
[ ; where  and   (4.3) 
[ ; where  and   (4.4) 
[ ; where  and   (4.5) 
Equation (4.1) is instrumented with lagged first differences of variables which lead to the 
additional moment condition as follows: 
[ ; for        (4.6) 
[ ; for        (4.7) 
[ ; for        (4.8) 
Where , , and  are the lags of first differences. 
                                                          
13
 Cooray (2011) contends that lagged values do not always serve as good instruments and the 
estimated results may be sensitive to the choice of instruments. The use of other instruments may be 
attempted by the researcher, though this may be impeded by the lack of data. This problem has been 
highlighted in recent studies by Barbosa and Eiriz (2009) and Suyanto, Salim and Bloch (2009). The 
use of other instruments (such as stock market variables) in the study is impeded by unavailability of 
data in most of the countries under study.  
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We capture non-linearities in the relationship between democracy and FD by executing 
statistical interactions between democracy variables and the policy and social control 
variables for each income group of countries. 
Model 3: Markov Switching Model (MSM) 
We apply the Markov Switching Model to FD. Essentially, we determine the probabilities and 
smooth probabilities of moving from a state of weak or low state of FD to a high FD state and 
the expected duration of being in a particular state. We suggest that if policy makers are 
informed of the volatility and duration of such volatility as a result of institutional and 
economic shocks, appropriate policies may be executed to ensure stable improvement in 
FD. 
Hamilton’s (1989) MSM, is one of the most widespread non-linear time-series models that 
studies have applied in the past. According to Hsu and Kuan (2001), the model involves 
numerous equations that can distinguish the behaviour of the data series in different 
regimes. When switching occurs between the different arrangements, the model can express 
more intricate constant changing structures. Hsu and Kuan (2001) notes that a new 
characteristic of the MSM is that what governs the transition process is an unseen factor that 
ensues a first order Markov chain which is appropriate in explaining data that is connected 
and that exhibits changing structures in distinctive periods of time. 
This study applies the first version of the MSM that emphasis on the average behavioural 
pattern of the variables (Hamilton, 1989). This version of the MSM and other modifications 
have been extensively used to analyse economic data and financial time-series data; (see 
Hamilton, 1988, 1989; Engel & Hamilton, 1990; Lam, 1990; Garcia & Perron, 1996; Diebold, 
Lee & Weinbach, 1994; Engel, 1994; Filardo, 1994; Sola & Driffill, 1994; Kim & Yoo, 1995; 
Schaller & van Norden, 1997; Kim & Nelson, 1998; Ang & Bekaert, 2002; Haas, Mittnik & 
Paolella, 2004; Bianchi, 2012, among others). 
We estimate the following Markov Switching Model with conditional mean: 
if  = 1 
           (4.9) 
if =2     
Where  ; the definitions of the variables are the same as in equation (4.1).  = 1 
and =2 are the two states – high FD and weak/low FD. 
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The essential attributes of  are simultaneously resolved by unsystematic features of 
shocks  and the variable that describes the regime  In particular, Kuan (2002) suggest 
that the Markov state variables mutates the model structures and the changing probabilities 
determine the duration of each state. The categorisation of the regimes in the Markov Model 
are based on probability and determined by data. Kuan (2002) contends that since the state 
variables are not observable it may be difficult to interpret.  
The first-order supposition of the Markov modelnecessitates that the probability of being in a 
stateis conditional on the previous state, with the following transition matrix, (Hamilton, 
1989): 
  ₽   ₽  
 
   ₽  ₽  
 
       =         (4.10) 
 
Where represents the statechanging probabilities of  given that 
The state changing probabilities satisfy . The transition matrix controls the 
unsystematicresponse of the state variable in question, and it contains only two parameters 
 
The expected time periodto be in state 1 is given by: 
and the expectedtime periodto be in state 1 state 2 is ; see 
Hamilton (1989). 
The appropriateness of the MSM is informed by the the following hypotheses: 
The switching parameters (intercepts) are the same. 
The state variables are independent – It can be expressed compactly as 
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Rejecting  suggests that switching does occur. Accordingly, Hamilton (1996) suggests that 
conventional likelihood tests may be applied to test the hypothesis of independent state 
variables such as the Wald test. 
Model 4: Bayesian Vector Auto Regression (BVAR). 
In order to obtain the parameters of interest for BVAR we estimate the following panel vector 
auto-regressions:  
 
  (4.11) 
 
Where: are the measures of FD (bank deposits, private credit and liquid 
liabilities respectively) in a country  at time .  is the value of democracy (procedural or 
substantial or interaction between democracy and specific economic or social variables;  
is the value of control variables determined BMA;  is the time fixed effect;  is the country 
fixed effect;  is the unsystematic error term that captures all other variables. We assume 
that the transient errors  are a vector of shocks that may be simultaneously connected but 
are unconnected with their own past values and unconnected with all the explanatory 
variables. The parameters  are of interest. According to Gianni and Giannini 
(1997) the past values of variables determined within the model appear as regressors, 
hence simultaneity is not a problem and the estimates of OLS are reliable. Furthermore, 
though the shocks may be simultaneously connected, OLS yields accurate estimates and is 
the same as GLS since all the equations in the model have homogenous explanatory 
variables (Gianni and Giannini, 1997). 
 
According to Sims and Zha (1998), the fundamental aspect of Bayesian analysis requires an 
understanding and a determination of the prior, likelihood and posterior distributions. In 
Bayesian statistics and econometrics, the researcher’s belief is considered external 
information and forms the prior while the likelihood is the information contained in the data. 
Both the prior and the likelihood are probability distributions using external information and 
the data sample respectively. Applying Bayes’ theorem, the prior distribution is combined 
with the likelihood to determine the posterior distribution (Sims and Zha, 1998) 
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Litterman (1986) notes that the ultimate goal of Bayesian estimation is to determine the 
posterior mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of the parameters of interest. Given that 
 denote the parameter of interest and  the data, the prior distribution,  
the likelihood, then the posterior distribution  is the distribution of  given the data 
and may be derived by: 
     (4.12) 
The denominator  is a normalising constant which has no randomness 
and thus the posterior is commensurate with the likelihood multiplied by the prior, given by 
. We relate this general framework to the BVAR models, according to 
Sims and Zha, (1998). To link this conventional structure to BVAR models, the likelihood 
function and the posterior moments can be derived Litterman, 1986, Sims and Zha (1998). 
We apply the Litterman/Minnesota prior distribution and it is very popular in the BVAR 
literature, Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984)14. The Litterman/Minnesota prior is a prior type 
based on normal distribution. The MCMC simulation technique used to obtain the 
parameters of equation (4.11) is the Gibbs sampler.  
We apply BVAR to determine impulse responses and forecast variance decomposition on 
FD given shocks on institutional, economic or social variables. We use the impulse response 
function to determine the impact of shocks on the present and subsequent values of the 
dependent variables. According to Pesaran and Shin (1998) a shock to a particular variable 
does not only affect that variable but passed on to all the other dependent variables via the 
VAR structure which is dynamic. Consequently, Pesaran and Shin (1998) finds that if the 
innovations of the error term happening during the same period of time are uncorrelated, 
then the impulse response interpretation would be straight forward. They note that 
innovation on a particular variable is then simply a shock to the dependent variable in 
question.It has been observed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) that innovationsare often 
correlated, and seen to have a common featurethat cannot be linked with a particular 
variable and as suchit is common practise to mutate the impulses to make them 
unconnected for proper interpretation.Given that the transformation is Ω, then: 
         (4.13) 
Where:  is a diagonal covariance matrix.The researcher, discretionally, may include any of 
the options below for  the researcher may set the impulses to one unit of one standard 
                                                          
14
 We rely on Litterman (1986) for the formal derivation of the likelihood function, posterior and prior 
moments. See appendix.  
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deviation of the residuals; make the impulses statistically independent (orthogonal) by 
reciprocating the Cholesky element of the error covariance matrix (Lutkepohl, 2007); make 
general the impulses by constructing a set of statistically independent innovations that does 
not respond to VAR ordering; determine structural decomposition that makes use of 
statistically independent transformation projected from structural factorisation matrices (see 
Gianni and Giannini (1997);  Pesaran and Shin (1998); Lütkepohl (2007). More importantly, 
we compute forecast error variance decompositions of FD to appraise the crucial 
determinants over a certain time period and their part played in bringing about FD. 
4.3 Variable Description and Operationalisation: 
 
4.3.1 Dependent variables 
 
In the hypotheses, we use three dependent variables as proxies for FD to provide the 
greatest possible insight into the effects of FD. Our primary measures of FD include (i) the 
share of bank deposits to the GDP (hereafter bank deposits). This includes the total assets 
held by commercial banks and other financial institutions that deal with demand deposits as 
a percentage of the GDP.(ii) the share of bank credit to the private sector, expound as the 
credit issued by banks and other financial intermediaries to the private sector expressed as a 
percentage of the GDP (hereafter private credit). These do not include credit issued by the 
government or any of its agencies, the central and developmental banks. This measure 
encapsulates the activities of financial intermediaries in general that are furnished to the 
private sector. These two are standard measures of FD used in different studies (see King 
and Levine, 1993; Huang, 2010; Aggarwal, Demirguc-Kunt and Peria, 2011; Miletkov and 
Wintoki, 2002, among others). (iii) We include two additional measures15; the ratio of 
commercial bank assets over the sum of commercial bank and central bank and liquid 
liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries taken as a percentage of the GDP. 
Huang (2010) contends commercial bank assets divided by the sum of the assets of 
commercial bank and central bank (hereafter commercial bank/central bank) taken as a 
percentage of the GDP elucidates the advantages of the financial system as described 
above.The study applies liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries 
(hereafter liquid liabilities) as one of the proxies for FD.Huang (2010) suggests thatthis 
indicator measures the size in relation to the economy of financial intermediaries. It includes 
three types of financial institutions: the central banks, commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. We follow the view of Levine (1997) that the indicators of FD used in the study 
                                                          
15
 One variable will be dropped in the lower middle and low income group of countries. This would be 
done depending on how these variables are correlated with each. For the upper income group of 
countries, the variables are highly correlated so we apply the principal component analysis.  
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are more appropriate for developing economiesbecause they are skewed more towards 
bank development than the development of the capital market. The functions of the financial 
system discussed in the literature review are more likely to be dispensed by banks. 
4.3.2 Explanatory variables: potential determinants 
 
The prospective determinants of FD in this study are chosen from a variety sources. These 
determinants of FD constitute variables that are time-invariant (fixed factors) and those that 
are time variant (evolve slowly over time) such as the factors that deal with institutions 
(Huang, 2010) The candidate determinants are grouped into three categories – institutional 
variables, policy variables and socialvariables. 
 
4.3.2.1 Institutional variables 
 
This study applies some general institutional indicators, with a focus on political institutions 
and the role they play in affecting on FD. Our primary institutional variables are drawn from 
the Polity IV Database, Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2014) averaged over 1960 to 2013. The 
different variables include a measure of democracy that reflects the quality of government, 
the right to vote in public or political elections, political checks and balances and the right to 
participate in the civil and political life of the society and a state without discrimination or 
repression.Sometimes this variable is referred to as the “combined polity score”, and it is 
computed by deducting the autocracy from the democracy score (Marshall et al. 2014). The 
variables used in computing the democracy and autocracy scores include: (the rule of law, 
how different groups or organisations compete for political power, transparency in the hiring 
of executives, non-interference in the duties of the chief executive andlimits on the decision 
making powers of the chief executive). Each country is ranked on how democratic or 
autocratic they are based on the aforementioned criteria. The scores are quantified and 
ranges from 0 to 10. Correspondingly, the polity 2 score ranges from -10 to 10. Higher 
values suggest more democratic regimes (Marshall et al. 2014). 
Our next main institutional variable of interest is the constraint on executives, which 
according to Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) is arguably the 
appropriate measure of institutions since it measures institutional constraints and not 
outcomes. Constraint on executives indicates the extent to which the chief executive must 
take into account the preferences of others when making decisions. Marshall et al. (2014) 
operationally defines this variable as one that measures thelimits on the decision making 
powers of the chief executive, whether they are individuals or as a group. Any accountability 
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group16 may press on such limitations. In democracies in more developed nations the 
legislature plays this role. The embracement of democracy has seen African countries adopt 
legislatures though accountability groups that is in most cases de facto one-party regime. 
According to Marshall et al. (2014) what is important and concerning, however, are the 
mechanisms that would ensure checks and balances in the decision making process. 
Constraint on executives carries a 7 point scale with higher values showing greater 
independence of the chief executive. For standardisation purposes, we rescale all values to 
lie between 0 and 100 (as percentages) before estimating the models.  
We apply the log of GDP per capita as a measure of the quality of legal institutions and the 
level of economic development in a country which have been shown to have a positive effect 
on FD, motivated by the works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 
1998); Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). 
The justification behind the use of per capita income as a proxy for legal institutions arises 
from its association with law enforcement (La Porta et al, 1997, 1998) where the quality of 
law enforcement improves sharply with the level of per capita income. In related studies, 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a), Gurr and Marshall (2000), show a very strong 
link between income per capita and institutional quality (voice and accountability, regulatory 
burden, rule of law, graft, constraint on executives and property rights) in advanced and 
developing economies regardless of the institutional measure used. Applying the aggregate 
governance index, Kaufmann et al., (1999b) show a very strong positive correlation between 
per capita income and the aggregate governance index. Therefore, using per capita income 
as a measure of the quality of legal institutions may have been motivated by its high positive 
and significant correlation with the quality of law enforcement, institutional quality and the 
aggregate governance index. 
4.3.2.2 Policy variables 
 
To examine whether macro-economic variables, serving as control variables, explain cross-
country variations in FD, the study applies a variety of economic and trade indicators. To 
account for country size and the level of economic development we include the real GDP per 
capita, defined as the log real GDP per capita (Aggarwal et al. 2011). To capture macro-
economic mismanagement and fluctuations the study uses the standard deviation of the 
annual rate of inflation as proposed by Huang (2010) over 1975-2010. Inflationary effects on 
FD have been shown by the work of Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) - they suggest that 
inflation distorts economic agents’ decision making regarding nominal magnitudes, 
                                                          
16
 Other accountability groups may include: the party in power, the military, influential advisers and an 
independent judiciary. 
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discouraging financial intermediation, and promoting savings in real assets. Sulaiman 
(2014), shows evidence that FD is negatively correlated with inflation both in the short and 
long-run, in a study of the relationship between inflation and FD in Nigeria, Generally, the 
association between inflation and real economic activity is negative especially with countries 
where inflation rates are high. Some studies have shown that the threshold levels of inflation 
do matter and have an effect on FD (See Barnes (2001), Khan, Senhadji & Smith (2001), 
Keho (2009) among others). Both theoretical and empirical findings suggest that there are 
thresholds, possibly more than one in the relationship between financial activity and inflation. 
This is contingent on the specific measure of FD of a country (Sulaiman, 2014). In this study, 
we consider inflation as a control variable for all income groups and whether or not it would 
be used in the different models in the different income groups would depend on the results 
from BMA. 
A black market premium17 according to Fischer (1993) signals a significant imperfection in 
the exchange market. This, in turn, typically has adverse implications for economic 
performance. Research has shown that countries with significant black market premiums 
tend, on average, to have lower rates of economic growth (Fischer, 1993). While there are 
theoretical studies that show the level effects of black market premium, there has been no 
study, to our knowledge, that links black market premium to FD. Studies investigating the 
determinants of FD employ black market premium as one of the battery of control variables 
suggesting it may be playing an important role in influencing the effect of other variables on 
FD. For instance, Gupta (1981) argues that an increase in the black market rate (increasing 
its premium), given the official exchange rate, creates an incentive for residents abroad to 
channel their remittances through the black market. This increases the receipts in terms of 
the local currency but decreases the amount of foreign currency accruing to the central bank 
and reduces the aggregate level of deposits. Aggarwal et al. (2011), Demirguc-Kunt, Lopez-
Cordova, Martinez Peria and Woodruff (2011) provide evidence of a positive link between 
remittances and FD. This suggests that if remittances are channelled through the black 
market, per se, as a result of an increase in premium, this may negatively affect FD through 
a decrease in deposits and credit intermediated by the local banking sector. Generally, we 
contend that exchange market imperfections make it hard for foreign exchange to flow to the 
most productive activities, thus impairing the allocation of resources and hence FD. We 
define black market premium as the logarithm of one plus the black market premium divided 
by 100.  
                                                          
17
 Black market premium: It is calculated as the premium in the parallel exchange market relative to 
the official market (i.e. the formula is (parallel exchange rate/official exchange rate-1) x100). 
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According to Cooray (2011), the government’s participation in the financial sector can be 
classified under two views: the political view and the development view. Proponents of the 
political view include La Porta et al. (1999, 2002) and Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) argue 
that in a quest to achieve its political objectives a clash of government’s interest may lead to 
dissatisfactory results especially in countries where property rights are not very strong. The 
development view argues that a strategy that government can use to beat market failure and 
increase development in developing countries is by decreasing costs and increasing access 
to finance (Gerschenkron, 1962 and Lewis, 1950). We argue that government expenditure is 
mostly determined by the political objectives of the government in power to achieve some 
developmental goals. If this is the case, then government involvement may yield positive or 
negative outcomes for FD depending on how skewed its policies are towards its political 
goals with conflicting interests and away from its developmental interest. We measure the 
size of the government by including government expenditure, defined as log of government 
spending as a percentage of the GDP (Cooray, 2011).  
Chinn and Ito (2002, 2006) find that current and capital account openness are positively 
affecting FD. To capture this aspect we use openness in the current account defined as the 
logarithm of one plus trade share, the sum of exports and imports, over GDP. 
 Capital account openness is captured in the study by foreign direct investments, 
defined as log of foreign direct investment to the GDP (Do & Levchenko, 2007). Across the 
balance of payments, these flows intermediated by banks may affect FD. Current theoretical 
and empirical studies support the view that the level of trade openness in a country is related 
to both its quality of institutions Levchenko (2007) and its level of FD Beck (2002; Rajan & 
Zingales, 2003 and Do & Levchenko, 2007). Where trade openness is determined by BMA 
as an appropriate control variable to be included in the model for an income group, an 
interraction with democracy is carried out to determine its effect on FD.  
4.3.2.3 Social variables 
 
The study applies two social variables in the model – human capital development measured 
by secondary school enrolment and population. The stock of human capital plays an 
important role in the process of economic development (see Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). We 
suggest that effective intermediation by banks would be limited given inadequate levels of 
human capital development. The association may be indirect through its interaction between 
institutional or policy variables. From the political point of view, the role of human capital 
development can be interpreted following Lipset’s (1960) views, who suggest that human 
capital leads to more harmless politics and a low incidence of political upheaval or conflict in 
society. Lucas (1988) argues that the main societal benefit of human capital development is 
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not improvements in technology but political: courts and legislators replace guns. We infer 
from this argument and suggest that improvements in political stability brought about by 
democracy improve human capital development which is conducive for FD. School 
enrolment and years of schooling have been used as control variables in the literature of the 
nexus between institutions and FD and as a proxy for human capital development (see 
Glaeser et al. 2004; Cooray, 2011; Anwar & Cooray, 2012; Vieira, MacDonald & 
Damasceno, 2012; among others). We define human capital development as the logarithm 
of secondary school enrolment as in Anwar and Cooray (2012) with the data sourced from 
the World Development Indicators (2015).  
The study uses total population as one of the control variables which measures the size of 
the market. According to the World Development Indicators (2015) total population is defined 
following the de facto definition. It includes all those who live permanently in the country 
irrespective of their legal status or citizenship. It excludes those seeking asylum that are not 
permanently resident in the country where they are seeking asylum in. Huang (2010) 
contends that there is a strong connection between the size of the population and the 
indices of FD. This relationship can be drawn from the fact that smaller economies tend to 
have higher proportion of liquid liabilities and private credit with a possibility of considerably 
affecting the general results when analysing panel data (Huang, 2010). Our data, however, 
does not exhibit this trend. The correlation between liquid liabilities and population [-
0.0857(0.30)], private credit and population [-0.012(0.88)] are both negative and insignificant 
considering the probability values in parenthesis (P>0.05).  In this study the level of 
population is used in logs in order to mitigate heteroscedasticity. 
4.4 The Data 
 
The primordial objective of this study is to determine the impact of political institutions, 
particularly democracy on FD in the SADC region. The main focus of interest is a panel of 10 
out of 15 economies in the region over the period 1975-2013. Annual data for a period of 38 
years is ample for a panel data study that is characterised by constant change. The sample 
begins in 1975 due to the availability of financial data. We use a bootstrap-based multiple 
imputation methodology to deal with any missing data, Honaker and King (2010:563). “What 
multiple imputations do is to fill in the holes in the data using a predictive model that 
incorporates all available information in the observed data along with any prior knowledge”.  
The procedure involves creating separate data sets and maintaining the observed data while 
the missing values are determined using different imputations. The multiple imputation 
techniquetakes good account ofall information in a data set and hence more appropriatefor 
conventional statistical procedures; the method does not come up with any new data values 
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and as such gives precise estimates of uncertain deductions resulting in the process. The 
fact that the technique does not “manufacture” any data, it gives precise estimates of the 
unreliability that may stem from any deductions (Honaker & King, 2010). 
The data for our dependent variables is obtained from the World Bank’s Financial Structure 
and Economic Development Database (2015), while that of institutional variables are drawn 
from the Polity IV Database (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr, 2014) averaged over 1960 to 2013 
The data for our explanatory control variables are obtained from the World Development 
Indicators (2015) and from the Penn World Table 7.1 (2015). A summary of the different 
variables, description and sources will be presented in appendix A. 
 
4.5 Empirical Strategy 
 
4.5.1 Why panel data? 
 
The data for each income group is normalised18 to make comparison easier before we 
proceed to combining it into a panel dataset. According to Gujarati (2003), panel data has 
many benefits over cross-section or time-series data: (i) first, since panel data, as in the 
case of this study, relates to countries over time, thereis non-uniformity in the dataset. The 
strategies of panel data estimation can effectively deal with such non-uniformity by 
designating variables that are individual and specific. Second, panel data gives “more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency” (Gujarati, 2003:673). Third, panel data enables more 
complicated behavioural models and minimises the possibility of bias if broader aggregates 
were used. Wooldridge (2002) notes that panel data is also used to allow unobserved 
variables to be correlated with explanatory variables in the panel. In comparison with cross 
sectional or time series data panel data has the advantage ofbetterimproving the empirical 
analysis (Wooldridge, 2002) 
 
This is not to suggest that there are no problems with panel data modelling. Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) observe that the omitted variable and non-uniformity bias is present in panel 
data regression analysis. This occurs when the unseen country effects are added in the 
disturbance term, and this creates bias and unreliable estimates. Bonin and Wachtel (2003), 
                                                          
18
 We rescale all numeric variables in the data in the order [0 1]. This is done using the following 
formula. 
 Where  is the variable in the data to be normalized,  is the normalised 
variable,  is the minimum value of the variable in the data and  is the maximum value of the 
variable. 
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argue that a spurious aggregate relationshipwould be generated bymaking country effects 
unchanging in panel regressions. This makes it inappropriate to advice on policy 
suggestions from such an extensive comparative analyses.  
4.5.2 Model diagnostics 
 
 Inferences from panel data are particularly sensitive to model specification and care must 
be taken to determine the correct estimation method. We carry out several tests to 
determine the appropriateness of a variety of estimators. 
 
4.5.2.1 Stationarity and unit root test 
 
Gujarati (2003) advances two crucial motives for data to be stationary. First, it minimises the 
likelihood of spurious OLS regressions. Second, it makes forecasting feasible. Since the 
main aim of this study is not to forecast, we would require a stationary series in order to 
avoid any spurious results in our initial analysis. Brooks (2002) argues that the incorporation 
of variables in a regression that are not stationary make the conventional suppositions of 
large sample invalid, suggesting that the statistical significance of the variable in question 
and the overall significance of the model will be flawed.  To induce stationarity in a series 
according to Harris (1995) the series must be differenced a certain number of times. All 
variables included in our model are checked for stationarity to avoid any stochastic trend in 
the series and differenced where necessary to induce stationarity. 
 
In a panel dataset, testing for unit root may be challenging but recent statistical advances in 
panel unit root testing have made it possible to obtain more reliable and valid tests. In 
general, the panel unit root tests average the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests across 
the panel. The Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997, 2003) test is probably the most common of the 
panel unit root tests but requires a balanced panel. The study uses two unit root tests 
developed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997, 2003) (IPS) and Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC) 
to investigate the panel time-series characteristics of the variables in the model. These two 
techniques apply to a balanced panel, which conformsto the balanced panel approach 
adopted for this study. However, the IPS represents a heterogeneous panel test whereas the 
LLC can be considered a pooled unit root test. 
 
4.5.2.2 Levin, Lin and Chu Test (LLC) 
 
Levin, Lin, and Chu, (1992, 1993) developed the first unit root test to be applied for panel 
data analysis. The test is formulated by the following equation: 
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TtNiutyy itiiitit ,...2,1,,...2,1,101    (4.14) 
the time element (t) and individual effects ( i ) are included. According to Levin et al., (1992, 
1993), it is important to note that the known relationships of the variables are an important 
source of non-uniformity in this model since the coefficient of the lagged regressand is 
confined to be identical across all units in the panel; itu  is assumed to be randomly chosen 
and follows an additive unchanging autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process for 
each individual: 
    
itjit
j
ijit uU
1
   (4.15) 
then-th moment prerequisites are supposed toensure the fragile convergence in Phillips 
(1987) and Phillips-Perron’s (Phillips & Perron, 1988) unit root tests. The LLCconsiders sub 
categories of model (4.14), which are all estimated by OLS as pooled regression models. 
 
Levin et al. (1992, 1993) notes that equation (4.14) makes provisionfor fixed effects for 
bothunits and time trends. When unit fixed effects are used it brings about non-uniformity in 
the data since the coefficient of the lagged regressand is confined to be the same across all 
units of the panel. The LCC test surmisesidentical autoregressive coefficients between 
individuals i.e. i  for all i , and test the null hypothesis 0H : 0iP  against the 
alternative hypothesis 0: iaH  for all i . 
 
The LLCtest, however, is not without its drawbacks. Maddala and Wu (1999) contend 
thatsince the test relies heavily on the on the independent and identically distributed 
supposition, its applicability to cross sectional data where correlation among the variables is 
present becomes flawed. Another significant demerit of the test lies in the fact that the 
parameters are considered homogenous across the panel.  
   
  0...: 210 NH  
  0...: 210 NH      (4.16) 
Maddala and Wu (1999) warn that under some circumstances, the null makes sense but as 
for Maddala (2001) the alternative hypothesis is too strong to be considered in empirical 
case. This drawback has been dealt with by the IPS (1997, 2003) test, who developed a unit 
root test that does not take into account the homogenous first-order supposition under the 
alternative hypothesis. 
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4.5.2.3 Im, Pesaran and Shin Test (IPS) 
 
The Im-Pesaran-Shin (1997) test extends the LLC configuration to accommodate non-
homogeneity in the value of the change in the response variable ( in the 
alternative hypothesis.  
 
The IPS equation is algebraically presented as follows: 
itjit
i
j
ijitiiit yyy
1
10    (4.17) 
Where, i ,,.......2,1 N  and  Tt .......2,1  
The null and alternative hypothesis can be written as: 
0H : 0i For all i  against the alternative:  
0{: iaH For all Ni ;...,1  
         { 0ip For NNi ,...,11  with NN10  
The representation, therefore, makes provision for some of the series, not all, to possess 
unit roots. The IPS test hence computes different unit roots for the different cross-sectional 
units (N). It then defines their t-bar statistic as a straightforward mean of the individual ADF 
statistics, iTt , for all the null as: 
N
I
iTt
N
t
1
1
 
(Im et al. 1997, 2003). The IPS test assumes that iT t are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d) random variables that possess finite first and second moments. Therefore, 
applying the Lindeberg-Levy central limit theorem, which guarantees the convergence of t-
bar to a normal distribution as the sample size increases (N  under the null hypothesis. 
A uniformity of the t-bar statistic is done by IPS (2003) by working out values for the mean 
and variance using Monte Carlo techniques for the values of T and p s . 
 
As a result, IPS (2003) test suggest that under the null hypothesis, all the series in the panel 
are considered as having a non-stationary process while under the alternative hypothesis; a 
fraction of the series in the panel is assumed to be stationary. This deviates from the LLC 
test, which supposes that all series in the panelexhibit constant mean variance 
autocorrelation etc. under the alternative hypothesis. The level errors and ti, are assumed to 
affect their future levels with different properties and differing variances across units (Im et 
al. 1997, 2003). 
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The IPS test considers the use of a group-mean Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic to test the 
null hypothesis. The ADF regressions are computed for each unit and a standardised 
statistic computed as the mean of the LM test for each equation. The IPS test also suggests 
the use of a group-mean t-bar distribution, where the statistics from each ADF test are 
averaged across the panel and adjustment factors are needed to translate the t- distribution 
of t-bar into a normal distribution under the null hypothesis. The IPS test demonstrates that it 
has better finite sample performance than the LLC test. (Im et al. 1997, 2003). 
 
The results of group unit root tests for all the variables used in the study (institutional, policy 
and social variables) are reported in chapter 5. We report only the group unit root test results 
for brevity. The unit root test for individual variables are reported in appendix B. 
 
4.5.2.3 Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
 
A considerable number of studies have been executed to determine the sources of FD 
culminating in a large number of candidate factors. These determinants that have been used 
to establish different theories under specific settings and suggest that the occurrence of one 
determinant does not preclude the occurrence of another, thereby, raising the robustness of 
the determinants in any cross-section regression used to explain FD (Huang, 2010). This 
raises the problem of model uncertainty which has been mitigated by the application of BMA, 
one of the most famous methods among others (Huang, 2010). It has been applied to 
rigorously test the results of cross-country growth regressions following the ground-breaking 
works by Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997a, b), Fernandez, Ley and Steel 
(2001) and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004). 
 
According to Huang (2010), in BMA possible models are determined by applying Bayesian 
techniques and the unpredictability about each model are epitomized using probability 
distributions. He suggests that the mean of all parameters’ posterior distribution under the 
possible models are determined with weights attached. These weights are the Posterior 
Model Probabilities (PMPs) which is the conditional probabilities that are assigned after the 
relevant evidence is taken into account.Bayes factors (the relative evidence in the data) are 
needed to calculate the PMP needed to evaluate the possible models. An estimate to the 
Bayes factor is the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), (Huang, 2010). The derivation of 
BMA is described below. 
 
We apply a version of BMA in this study suggested by Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997). 
This version treats all the models that show the least-fit as having a zero PMP. Objectively, 
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they suggest that the principle of parsimony is used and applying the Occam’s Window 
technique the number of models is greatly reduced though with the presence of model 
uncertainty. The posterior probabilities for the models with proper fit are then calculated and 
then the models with the worst fit are excluded by the Occam’s Window (Raftery, et al. 
1997). In this study we use the variables of the best five models generated using the bicreg 
software for  (Hoeting, Raftery & Volinsky, 1999). The cumulative posterior probability of 
the five best models is calculated during the computational procedure. Huang (2010) follows 
Raftery (1995), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) and Malik and Temple (2009) on deriving the 
posterior probability of inclusion in BMA as shown below. 
 
Consider that there are so many models given by, {X1, . . .Xm} and the data is given by Ζ. 
The vector of parameters (ω) for every model is given by βi = (βi1,βi2 . . . βiω), i = 1, 2 . . . m. 
The procedure is as such that the first model is obtained by constraining some of the 
parameters of the second model or not (nested models). The unknown parameters are 
treated in the Bayesian framework as random variables. 
Let us consider the parameter of interest be denoted by .The posterior distribution of  
given data Z is derived according to the following rule. 
 
P( |Z) =       (4.18) 
 
P(Xk|Z) denotes the Posterior Model Probabilities and P( |Z,Xk) represents the posterior 
distribution of  given the data Z and model Xk. 
 
Equation (4.18) contains all relevant information required to make inferences on . This 
indicates that the posterior distribution of  given data Z is a weighted average of its 
posterior distributions given data Zfor every specific model. Applying Bayes’ theorem we 
obtain an expression for the posterior is given by: 
 
P(Xm|Z) =        (4.19) 
Where: 
 
P(Xm) isthe prior probability of model i (i = 1, 2 . . . m),  
P(Z|Xi) is the probability of the data given Xi, alternatively regarded as the likelihood for 
model Xi 
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Given that P(X1) = P(X2) = · · · P(Xm) = ., suggesting that no preference is given to any 
model, thePosteriorModeProbabilities P(Xm|Z) boils down to: 
P(Xm|Z) =         (4.20) 
Identifying the value of P(Z|Xm) would require a comparison ofmodel Xm with a baseline 
model (X0), (a null model). A null model, often used as a baseline model represents one in 
which no regressors are included. 
 
Consider that  be the Bayes factor for model Mk against model M0, that is 
      (4.21) 
Then 
                                      2 log  = 2 log P(Z|Xm) − 2 log P(Z|X0)   (4.22) 
 
Following Raftery’s (1995) approach, multiplying the logarithm of the data evidence by two, 
given by(“2 log ”), can be intimated as an estimation of the difference between the 
values for BIC for the baseline model and model Xmas expressed below: 
                                     2 log  ≈ BIC0– BICm    (4.23) 
Given that BIC0 = 0 provides an estimation for the posterior probability P(Z|Xm), which is 
 
P(Z|Xm) ∝ exp          (4.24) 
 
Then an expression for thePosteriorModeProbabilities P(Xm|Z) yields 
 
P(Xm|Z) ≈       (4.25) 
 
The cumulative posterior probabilities of inclusion of the significant variables of the five best 
models are automatically calculated using the bicreg software for  and reported for each 
income group in chapter five. The significant variables for the best model serve as our 
explanatory variables when we estimate the different models to explain FD for each income 
group. 
 
4.5.2.4 Pooling of data and the panel poolability test 
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We need to determine whether the observations from the different income groups can be 
mergedor alternatively set apart across time and country. We determine whether the panel 
of countries be treated as homogenous or not.According to Gujarati (2003), combining all 
observations as a single group across time while assuming that there are no varying effects 
by country would suggest a pooled analyses. We make use of the F-test to evaluate 
statistically whether there exists a difference between pooling and non-pooling of 
observations worthy of attention. The hypothesis testing for pooling suggest a null 
hypothesis stipulating that there is no dissimilarity of any significance (Gujarati, 2003) 
 
When testing for poolabilitynull hypothesis assumes that the slope coefficients are identical. 
In panel data models Gujarati (2003) employs an F-test to determine poolability across 
sections. To carry out the F-test we save the sum of squared residuals for both the restricted 
model (SSEr) and the unrestricted model (SSEu) after running an OLS regression for each 
cross section.We may conclude that the restricted model is a pooled model if the test applies 
to all the coefficients including the constant, otherwise, a fixed one way model with fixed 
effects that are cross-sectional. 
 
We follow Gujarati (2003) in determining the value of the F (calculated F). If N and T 
represents the number of cross-sections and time periods respectively, then the number of 
observations is n=NT. Given that k be the number of explanatory variables excluding the 
constant, we can determine the degree of freedom for the unrestricted model to be dfu = n-
N(k+1). If the constant is included then the degree of freedom for the restricted model 
becomes dfr=n-k-1 and the number of restrictions is q=(N-1)(k+1). If however the restricted 
model is the fixed one-way model, the degree of freedom is dfr = n-k-N and the number of 
restrictions is q=(N-1)k. The F test is thus presented as follows: Given that SSEr=Rr and 
SSEu=Ru, then: 
 
    (4.26) 
       
The test in this study applies to all coefficients including the constant, which implies that the 
restricted model is the pooled model (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Beck and Katz (2004) argue that the F-test often rejects pooling of which the benefits of 
pooling outweigh the costs and that the crucial decision is whether the observation is 
generated by the same process as the others. Grouping the countries under study according 
to income levels tends to suggest homogeneity to a greater extent in economic, political and 
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to a lesser extent social policies. We lean towards Beck and Katz (2004) in this respect and 
estimate a pooled model for every income group – a fixed effects model as against a random 
effects model. In estimating a fixed effects model, we assume that the slope multipliers are 
the same and the intercepts may vary across countries. We use a series of dummy variables 
to account for differences in coefficients, Gujarati (2003). However, with very large panels, 
the huge volume of dummy variables depletes many of the degrees of freedom from the 
model and may also have difficulty in determining the effect of time-invariant variables. 
Essentially, a Hausman test is often applied to decide whether to estimatea fixed effects 
model ora random effects model Hausman (1978). The pooling tests results are reported in 
chapter five. 
 
4.5.2.5 Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 
 
In order to avoid the violation of these two classical assumptions when dealing with OLS 
estimators we executed econometric tests for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity on our 
model. Autocorrelation can be thought of as the interdependence between the residuals of a 
time-series data which renders the OLS estimators no longer unbiased, i.e. of low variance 
for possible values of the parameters (Gujarati, 2003). According to Toll, Mignon and VanZyl 
(2003) autocorrelation may arise when economic variables exhibit trend and cycles or when 
certain important variables are excluded from non-linearity in the data. When autocorrelation 
is present then OLS estimates become inefficient and necessitate the use of generalised 
least square estimators (Toll, et al., 2003). The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test is 
applied to test for autocorrelation since it provides more accurate results than the DW 
statistic (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Gujarati (2003) suggests that the presence of heterokesdasticity violates the assumption of 
equal variance in the data and thatin a panel dataset the presence of heterokesdasticity 
means the variance of one country will not be the same across all countries. The use of 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation when there is heteroskedasticity implies that more weight 
is placed on the estimations with large mean square errors than on those with small mean 
square errors, rendering the least square parameters inefficient, though unbiased and 
consistent (Gujarati, 2003). Transforming the variables by incorporating the natural log of 
explanatory variables, which has been done in this study, can correct for heterokesdasticity. 
We expect no heteroskedasticity in the model though this is confirmed using the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey Test. The results for the test of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are 
reported in appendices C and D. 
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4.5.2.6 Dealing with endogeneity, omitted variable bias, estimation risk and sample bias. 
 
Aggarwal et al., (2011) points out that the data may experience the econometric problems of 
endogeneity, omitted variable bias. Theoretically we, expect some simultaneity between 
financial market development and political development and also unobserved factors that 
have effects on political development and financial market development. 
 
The potential for endogeneity biases may arise from measurement error, reverse causation 
and omitted variables, Aggarwal et al (2011). Endogeneity occurs when there are some 
degrees of simultaneous interaction between dependent and independent variables. These 
suggest that the endogenous variables may be correlated with the disturbance term, Nickell 
(1981) and may result in inconsistent estimates if Ordinary Least Square estimators re used. 
Omitted variables are also likely to result in inconsistency and biased results.  
 
To address these problems, a more general approach would involve the use of instrumental-
variables – variables that are highly correlated with the endogenous variable and 
uncorrelated with the disturbance term and cannot act directly on the dependent variable - 
have been suggested more currently by Blundell and Bond (1998). It is a difficult process 
finding variables that meet such requirements especially when appropriate external 
instruments have to be sought. Instrument variable regressions (IV regressions) have been 
used in an attempt to redress the potential for endogeneity arising from measurement error, 
omitted factors, and/or reverse causation, though to a limited extent because the potential 
for bias sometimes still prevails (Roodman, 2009). 
 
Once an appropriate instrument is found within the model, it can be estimated applying the 
GMM estimator. This method has been improved upon with time by introducing lags of 
endogenous variables as instruments Anderson and Hsiao, (1982) and much later by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), to what 
is now popularly known as the difference and system GMM estimator. The Arellano-Bond 
approach uses lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments, which proved to be 
weak according to Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). To handle the 
weak instrument problem they assume that the mean is stationary and proceed and 
integrate the initial difference equations with appropriate lagged level instruments and 
lagged first difference instruments.Huang (2010) points out that the first difference 
instruments are weak in the presence of persistent data and suggest that the system GMM 
estimator is much more efficient. We apply the GMM, difference and system GMM to this 
study to address these problems. 
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One of our objectives is to determine how shocks in institutional and policy variables affect 
FD. We apply the Bayesian Vector Autoregressive Model to achieve this objective. Bayesian 
models assume that parameters are variables generated from the posterior distribution. 
Apart from taking care of the curse of dimensionality in BVAR models suggested by 
Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010), Muteba (2017) suggests that generally Bayesian 
models account for estimation risk and sample bias which previous studies on finance 
growth and finance institution association have benignly neglected. Bayesian inferences in 
the study account for model uncertainty, estimation risk and sample bias. It also accounts for 
the problem of over parameterisation and provides better forecasts (Sevinç & Ergûn, 2009) 
4.6 Conclusion: 
 
The chapter begins by specifying the models to be employed to analyse the relationship 
between institutions and FD. Our initial analysis systematically presents four models widely 
used in the literature – the classical OLS, GMM, difference GMM and system GMM. We then 
introduce the Markov switching and BVAR models to the FD literature to determine the 
probability of switching between regimes of weak or low FD and high FD and how shocks in 
the social and economic variables affect FD respectively. We suggest the results may inform 
policy in the countries of the different income groups. All the explanatory variables used in 
the different models are determined objectively by using Bayesian Model Averaging. The 
chapter also describes the various sources of data from which the variables were obtained, 
the necessary data transformation and the procedure in dealing with missing data. Panel 
model techniques and the various methods of dealing with endogeneity, omitted variable 
bias, estimation risk and sample bias are discussed. Having discussed the analytical 
framework, the study heads on to apply them using three FD indicators for each income 
group and a battery of control variables to determine the effect of democratic institutions on 
FD. The analyses will be done in accordance with our three main objectives of the study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction: 
 
In this chapter, the study presents the econometric analysis and the empirical findings from 
the three income groups (upper middle, lower middle and low-income) using the models and 
the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, for each income group the 
chapter employs OLS, GMM, difference and system GMM estimators to determine the effect 
of democratic institutions on FD. For each income group we apply BVAR to show how 
innovations in institutional variables affect FD together with the variance decomposition for 
each variable. The effect of the institutional variables is compared to those of the real 
variables that are determined by BMA for each income group. Finally, we apply the Markov 
Switching Model with constant volatility to determine the probabilities of moving from a state 
of weak or low state of FD to a state of high FD and the expected duration of being in a 
particular state of FD. The chapter is divided into six sections, including the introduction and 
conclusion. Generally the empirical findings and analyses will be based on the objectives19 of 
the study. The empirical findings in section two will be based on the first objective of the 
study. The panel regression results would inform our findings. Before proceeding with the 
panel regressions, we execute BMA to select our explanatory variables. We proceed with 
descriptive statistics, correlations of the determined institutional and policy variables used as 
controls in the models. This section will further include poolability tests, stationarity tests and 
the tests for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity20. To achieve the second objective of the 
study, section three will analyse the findings of the Markov Switching model. The third 
objective is achieved in section four by analysing the impulse responses of shocks to 
institutional variables on FD using BVAR. Section five assesses the effect of increasing 
democratisation on FD and section six concludes. All tables and graphs in this section are 
the author’s own determination using data from the sources stipulated in appendix A. 
5.2 Empirical findings and analysis for all income groups based on panel regression 
results. 
 
In this section, the study presents the findings and analysis for all the income groups based 
on the panel regression results. We first present the results of BMA that determine the key 
policy and social variables to be applied as control variables for the income groups, followed 
by descriptive statistics and correlations, stationarity and poolability tests. 
                                                          
19
 These objectives were outlined in chapter 1; page 15. 
20
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation tests are reported in appendices C and D respectively. 
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5.2.1 BMA for upper middle, lower middle and low income countries: 
 
To determine which control variables are to be used in the model each time we use a 
different proxy (bank deposits, liquid liabilities and private credit21) for FD, we apply BMA. 
Before applying BMA, pools of 16 determinants that are widely used in the literature are 
identified common for all income groups22. The variables presented in the table are those of 
the five best models which could either be positively or negatively associated with FD. 
Nuisance parameters are marginalised out of the joint posterior distribution (Huang, 2010). A 
variable that is conspicuously absent for the upper and lower middle income countries after 
applying all three proxies for bank development in BMA is inflation. Boyd et al., (2001) finds 
evidence indicating negative association between inflation and both banking sector 
development and equity market activity. This could suggest that the low rate of inflation is 
having a minimal negative effect on FD for these groups of countries.  The results indicate 
that for upper middle income countries the control variables include: population, school 
enrolment, government expenditure, per capita income and the lags of private credit and 
liquid liabilities. For the lower middle income group, the results suggest that the control 
variables include: per capita income, school enrolment, black market premium, foreign direct 
investment, population, government expenditure and the lags of private credit and liquid 
liabilities. Finally, the control variables determined for the low income group include: school 
enrolment, foreign direct investment, inflation, trade openness, government expenditure and 
per capita income and lags of bank deposits and liquid liabilities. From the BMA findings, per 
capita income, school enrolment and government expenditure appear as significant controls 
for all income groups.  Any control variable with a posterior probability of inclusion of less 
than 10 percent is excluded from the model except the institutional variables of interest. 
Their posterior probability of inclusion together with their mean and standard deviation are 
presented in tables 4.1a, 4.1b and 4.1c below. 
  
                                                          
21
 These three proxies for financial development were determined by using principal component 
analysis in chapter 4 (section 4.3.1). The first principal component is associated with bank deposits; 
the second principal component is associated with liquid liabilities while the third is associated with 
private credit analysed from the factor scores. 
22
 The determinants include: executive constraints, procedural democracy, substantive democracy, 
autocracy, black market premium, FDI, trade openness, population, school enrolment, government 
expenditure, GDP per capita, inflation, lag GDP per capita and lags of dependent variables.  
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Table 4.1a: Upper middle income –Results from BMA 
Variables P!=0 EV SD Parameter estimates (sign) 
[Bank deposits]- 36 models selected with (CPP) of 0.4554  
Constraint on executives 33.2 0.06 0.10 (+) 
Polity IV 34.9 -0.02 0.03 (-) 
S Polity IV 75.0 -0.16 0.12 (-) 
Population 100.0 0.19 0.05 (+) 
School enrolment 100.0 0.18 0.04 (+) 
Government expenditure 100.0 -0.18 0.04 (-) 
Per capita income 100.0 -0.02 0.03 (-) 
     
[Private credit] – 21models selected with CPP of 0.5828 
Constraint on executives 100.0 -0.29 0.06 (-) 
Autocracy 7.1 0.01 0.06 (+) 
S Polity IV 100.0 0.27 0.06 (+) 
Population 7.2 0.00 0.01 (-) 
Per capita income 100.0 -0.02 0.05 (-) 
Lag private credit 100.0 -0.31 0.07 (-) 
Government expenditure 52.0 -0.01 0.02 (-) 
     
[Liquid liabilities ]- 31 models were selected with CPP of 0.4497 
S Polity IV 25.5 -0.04 0.09 (-) 
Autocracy 85.5 -0.77 0.44 (-) 
Per capita income 23.5 -0.05 0.11 (-) 
Lag liquid liabilities 100.0 0.49 0.08 (+) 
     
Notes: the dependent variables are in parenthesis. BMA yields P!=0 which shows the posterior probability that the variable is in the model 
(in%). The column headed “EV” shows the BMA posterior mean, and the column headed “SD” shows the BMA posterior standard deviation 
for each variable. The last column shows the signs of the parameter estimates of the best 5 models found. The variables of the best 5 
models are selected together with their cumulative posterior probability (CPP) of inclusion. 
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Table 4.1b: lower middle income - Results from BMA 
Variables P!=0 EV SD Parameter estimates (sign) 
[Bank deposits]- 27 models selected with (CPP) of 0.5429 
Constraint on executives 54.1 -0.52 1.98 (-) 
Autocracy 50.3 0.04 0.05 (+) 
Black market premium 48.0 0.36 0.01 (-) 
Per capita income  100.0 0.47 0.08 (+) 
     
[Private credit] – 33 models selected with CPP of 0.4290 
Constraint on executives 100.0 80.45 6.71 (+) 
Autocracy 14.2 -0.01 0.03 (-) 
 Polity IV 41.8 0.03 0.05 (+) 
Black market premium 100.0 -80.52 6.71 (-) 
School enrolment 100.0 0.76 0.09 (+) 
Lag private credit 100.0 0.94 0.05 (+) 
Foreign direct investment 19.7 0.09 0.25 (+) 
Government expenditure 58.0 -0.32 0.22 (-) 
[Liquid liabilities ]- 22 models were selected with CPP of 0.5384 
 Polity IV 18.8 0.02 0.05 (+) 
Autocracy 17.6 -0.02 0.07 (-) 
Per capita income 21.4 0.07 0.15 (+) 
Lag liquid liabilities 100.0 -0.41 0.09 (-) 
Population 24.1 -0.06 0.13 (-) 
     
Notes: the dependent variables are in parenthesis. BMA yields P!=0 which shows the posterior probability that the variable is in 
the model (in%). The column headed “EV” shows the BMA posterior mean, and the column headed “SD” shows the BMA 
posterior standard deviation for each variable. The last column shows the signs of the parameter estimates of the best 5 
models found. The variables of the best 5 models are selected together with their CPP of inclusion. 
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Table 4.1c: Low income - Results from BMA 
Variables P!=0 EV SD Parameter estimates (sign) 
[Bank deposits]- 22models selected with (CPP) of 0.5798 
Constraint on executives 12.0 0.02 0.07 (+) 
Autocracy 100.0 -2.39 0.28 (-) 
Inflation 39.0 3.39 5.12 (+) 
Lag bank deposits  100.0 0.47 0.08 (+) 
S Polity IV 100.0 0.52 0.09 (-) 
FDI 8.3 0.23 1.08 (+) 
     
[Private credit] – 27 models selected with CPP of 0.4982 
School enrolment 49.0 -0.27 0.34 (-) 
Trade openness 93.0 -96.74 43.28 (-) 
Government expenditure 89.0 -0.39 0.21 (+) 
Per capita income 100.0 -2.92 0.73 (-) 
Inflation 8.0 0.56 2.51 (+) 
     
[Liquid liabilities ]- 34 models were selected with CPP of 0.4676 
     
 Polity IV 100.0 -1.03 0.29 (-) 
School enrolment 34.3 -0.19 0.31 (-) 
Government expenditure 72.3 -0.39 0.31 (-) 
Lag liquid liabilities 21.8 -0.03 0.07 (-) 
     
Notes: the dependent variables are in parenthesis. BMA yields P!=0 which shows the posterior probability that the variable is in 
the model (in%). The column headed “EV” shows the BMA posterior mean, and the column headed “SD” shows the BMA 
posterior standard deviation for each variable. The last column shows the signs of the parameter estimates of the best 5 
models found. The variables of the best 5 models are selected together with their CPP of inclusion. 
 
5.2.2 Correlation and descriptive statistics of key policy and social variables for each 
income group: 
 
The descriptive statistics of the economies of the upper middle income countries portray 
some heterogeneity with respect to foreign direct investment, population and black market 
premium. However, significant homogeneity of these economies is found with per capita 
income, trade openness, government spending and school enrolment. These suggest that 
though these countries are within the same income group, they may differ in certain 
economic and social characteristics. Though these countries fall within the same income 
group, South Africa and to a lesser comparative extent, Mauritius, have significantly more 
developed economies as opposed to Botswana and Namibia. Correlation among the 
variables is weak and sometimes negative. However, school enrolment and GDP per capita 
and government spending show a relatively high positive correlation, consistent with 
conventional wisdom that these three variables are closely associated. An increase in 
government expenditure (a fundamental component of the GDP) on human capital 
development which often takes centre stage in the governments’ expenditure programmes in 
92 
 
developing economies has a positive effect on economic growth (Idenyi, Onyekachi & 
Ogbonna, 2016) 
The economies of the lower middle income countries exhibit significant homogeneity with 
respect to trade openness, school enrolment, and government expenditure. However, 
heterogeneity of the economies of this income group is found when considering GDP per 
capita, inflation, population, foreign direct investment and black market premium. These 
suggest that these countries though within the same income group may differ in certain 
economic and socialfeatures.  The social and economic variables generally exhibit very low 
and sometimes negative correlation. Per capita income, trade openness and government 
spending, however, are highly positively correlated suggesting a close relationship where 
government spending is thus directed more towards economic growth and encouraging 
foreign trade in an increasingly globalised world economy. 
The descriptive statistics of the low income countries show some heterogeneity with respect 
to FDI, inflation, school enrolment and black market premium. However, significant 
homogeneity of the economies of this income group is found with respect to government 
spending, population, trade openness and GDP per capita. Again these results suggest that 
though these countries are within the same income group, they may differ in certain 
economic and social characteristics.  Correlation among the social and economic variables 
is found to be low and sometimes negative with the exception of population and trade 
openness showing a relatively high correlation. The correlation between country size 
(population) and openness is well documented. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argues 
that market size determines the extent to which firms can benefit from each other through 
positive spill overs in a globalised setting.The correlation between school enrolment and 
government expenditure suggests the governments’ prioritised spending towards human 
capital development. One may conclude from Rahman’s (2013) inferences on the 
relationship between GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment and literacy rates that the high 
correlation between GDP per capita and school enrolment may suggest that appropriate 
policies to increase the literacy rate of a country through high rates of school enrolment will 
reduce unemployment and increase GDP per capita. These may be having a positive 
feedback effect on FD and growth. Tables 5.1a and 5.1b; 5.1c and 5.1d; 5.1e and 5.1f below 
show the descriptive statistics and correlations of time-varying control variables for the upper 
middle, lower middle and low income countries respectively. 
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Table 5.1a: Correlation table with probabilities for key policy and social variables in the upper middle income 
countries  
         
Correlation        
Probability 
GDP per 
capita  Inflation  
Trade 
openness  
Government 
expenditure  
School 
enrolment  Population  
Foreign direct 
investment  
Black 
market 
premium  
GDP per 
capita  1.000000        
 -----         
         
Inflation  -0.053945 1.000000       
 (0.5222) -----        
         
Trade 
openness  -0.229181 -0.182730 1.000000      
 (0.0059) 0.0289 -----       
         
Government 
expenditure   0.392452 -0.277903 -0.072183 1.000000     
 (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.3916) -----      
         
School 
enrolment  0.860850 -0.037974 -0.498888 -0.350871 1.000000    
 (0.0000) (0.6525) (0.0000) (0.0000) -----     
         
Population  0.334777 0.156958 -0.801771 -0.181012 0.611507 1.000000   
 (0.0000) (0.0612) (0.0000) (0.0305) (0.0000) -----    
         
Foreign direct 
investment  0.238205 -0.088807 0.065787 -0.101575 0.121958 -0.040697 1.000000  
 (0.0042) (0.2915) (0.4350) (0.2274) (0.1468) (0.6294) -----   
         
Black market 
premium  -0.142547 0.001517 0.225748 0.016617 -0.211392 -0.068565 0.090599 1.000000 
 (0.0894) (0.9857) (0.0067) (0.8438) (0.0113) (0.4158) (0.2819) -----  
         
Notes:The variables are defined in sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3 in chapter 4. The values in brackets are the probabilities. 
 
Table 5.1b: Descriptive statistics of key policy and social variables in the upper middle income countries  
 
GDP per 
capita Inflation 
Trade 
openness 
Government 
expenditure 
School 
enrolment Population 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Black market 
premium 
 Mean  2699.510  8.309207  88.77503  20.43626  61.57072  10092015  1.712209  6.255639 
 Median  2598.513  8.032797  91.79650  19.46003  63.31561  1506037.  0.079947  3.941658 
 Maximum  5180.968  41.99951  140.0978  35.43803  95.69964  49320150  210.0531  42.44000 
 Minimum  785.8697  0.406950  33.86652  10.45355  14.57889  821942.0 -2.966545 -28.21000 
 Std. Dev.  914.0991  5.110084  29.01203  5.746800  20.98228  15867808  17.56189  10.97276 
 Observations  151  151  151  151  151  151  151  151 
Notes: The variables are defined in sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3 in chapter 4 
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Table 5.1c: Correlation table with probabilities for key policy and social variables in the lower middle income countries 
          
          
Correlation         
Probability 
GDP per 
capita  Inflation  
Trade 
openness  
Government 
spending  
School 
enrolment  Population  
Foreign direct     
investment  
Black market 
premium   
GDP per capita  1.000000         
 -----          
          
Inflation  -0.285114 1.000000        
 0.0028 -----         
          
Trade openness  0.779491 -0.429487 1.000000       
 0.0000 0.0000 -----        
          
Government 
spending   0.713070 0.014289 0.403975 1.000000      
 0.0000 0.8833 0.0000 -----       
          
School 
enrolment   0.308061 -0.395455 0.390826 -0.069975 1.000000     
 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.4718 -----      
          
Population  -0.520953 0.274214 -0.759427 -0.326098 -0.315763 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 0.0006 0.0009 -----     
          
Foreign direct     
investment  -0.114932 -0.094374 -0.094698 -0.194273 0.287527 0.030941 1.000000   
 0.2362 0.3313 0.3296 0.0439 0.0026 0.7506 -----    
          
Black market 
premium   -0.406182 0.206995 -0.532000 -0.217169 -0.310163 0.458130 -0.000900 1.000000  
 0.0000 0.0316 0.0000 0.0240 0.0011 0.0000 0.9926 -----   
          
          
Notes: The variables are defined in sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3 in chapter 4. The values in brackets are the probabilities 
Table 5.1d: Descriptive statistics of key policy and social variables in the lower middle income countries 
 
GDP per 
capita Inflation 
Trade 
openness 
Government 
expenditure 
School 
enrolment Population 
Foreign 
direct 
investment 
Black market 
premium 
 Mean  1367.424  29.67699  101.5083  21.62136  31.46991  3705868.  0.306168  41.45769 
 Median  1055.026  13.34872  111.7527  19.56947  31.98386  1714590.  0.000000  10.27500 
 Maximum  4223.082  542.5762  191.9663  39.83057  58.11352  12926409  6.764707  600.0000 
 Minimum  314.3101  3.437884  14.26850  8.827588  5.260414  517024.0 -1.311630 -107.4318 
 Std. Dev.  1080.315  58.70193  58.20152  8.225601  11.77533  3741700.  0.977895  93.99152 
 Observations  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113 
Notes: The variables are defined in sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3 in chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
Table 5.1e: Correlation table with probabilities for key policy and social variables in the low-income countries 
          
          
Correlation         
Probability 
GDP per 
capita  Inflation  
Trade 
openness 
Government 
spending  
School 
enrolment  Population  
Foreign direct     
investment  
Black market 
premium   
GDP  1.000000         
 -----          
          
INFLATION  0.034523 1.000000        
 (0.7228) -----         
          
TOPEN  -0.038381 0.144122 1.000000       
 (0.6933) (0.1367) -----        
          
GOV  0.256758 -0.118421 -0.047704 1.000000      
 (0.0073) (0.2222) (0.6239) -----       
          
SCH  0.240164 -0.263703 -0.356419 0.397095 1.000000     
 (0.0123) (0.0058) (0.0002) (0.0000) -----      
          
POP  -0.032205 -0.041713 0.428091 -0.463658 -0.136426 1.000000    
 (0.7407) (0.6682) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1592) -----     
          
FDI  -0.178284 -0.058935 0.232310 0.014037 0.140101 0.104075 1.000000   
 (0.0649) (0.5446) (0.0155) (0.8854) (0.1481) (0.2838) -----    
          
BMP  -0.059862 0.082648 0.061578 -0.075488 -0.197349 0.135897 -0.059072 1.000000  
 (0.5383) (0.3951) (0.5267) (0.4375) (0.0406) (0.1608) (0.5437) -----   
          
          
Notes: The variables are defined in sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3 in chapter 4. The values in brackets are the probabilities. 
 
 
Table 5.1f: Descriptive statistics of key policy and social variables in the low-income countries  
 
GDP per 
capita Inflation 
Trade 
openness 
Government 
expenditure 
School 
enrolment Population 
Foreign 
direct 
investment 
Black market 
premium 
 Mean  284.1519  54.05327  51.76603  15.15605  16.99884  11931102  0.019063  308.6332 
 Median  197.1479  17.75671  46.97866  15.07680  13.52122  11867336  0.000000  56.77000 
 Maximum  567.4543  1096.678  187.3392  31.55443  49.50807  23390765  0.836936  4806.890 
 Minimum  126.1884  1.024222  19.36594  2.047121  0.000000  5301861. -0.283145 -2578.242 
 Std. Dev.  153.7380  133.5411  26.57583  4.570875  14.17488  4109034.  0.105681  983.2058 
 Observations  113  113  113  113  113  113  113  113 
Notes: The variables are defined in sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3 in chapter 4. 
 
5.2.3 Correlation and descriptive statistics of financial development indicators 
The four measures of FD exhibit very low positive and in some cases negative correlation in 
the lower middle and low-income countries (see table 5.2a below). In the upper middle 
income countries, bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities exhibit significantly very 
high positive correlation with each other while the correlation between commercial 
bank/central bank with bank deposit, private credit and liquid liabilities is relatively low but 
significant. Generally, the FD indicators are highly correlated in the upper middle income 
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countries. We apply the Principal Component Analysis23 Hotelling (1933) to reduce the 
dimensionality of the correlated banking measures by expressing their common variation 
through their principal components. The principal components are orthogonal to each other 
so that each of them measures a particular aspect of banking quality (Hotelling, 1933). 
Based on the maximum likelihood method and scree plot, the first three principal 
components account for 97% of the variance in the data. The first principal component is 
associated with bank deposits; the second principal component is associated with liquid 
liabilities while the third is associated with private credit. These conclusions result from 
analysing the factor scores obtained from the Principal Component Analysis (Brown, 2008). 
The results are reported in table 5.2b. 
Table 5.2a: Correlation of key financial development indicators: 
Upper middle income  
   Liquid liabilities   private credit commercial/central bank  Bank deposits 
  
Liquid liabilities  1 
Private credit  0.7456(0.00) 1 
Commercial bank/CB  0.2086(0.01)*** 0.2874(0.00)*** 1  
Bank deposits  0.8715(0.00)*** 0.8218(0.00)*** 0.3030(0.00)***  1 
     Lower middle income 
Liquid liabilities  1 
Private credit  0.1985(0.04)** 1 
Commercial bank/CB  0.3152(0.01)*** 0.4034(0.00)*** 1  
Bank deposits  0.7176(0.00)*** 0.1451(0.13)* 0.3835(0.00)***  1 
Low-income 
Liquid liabilities  1 
Private credit  0.1542(0.11)* 1 
Commercial bank/CB  0.1743(0.07)** 0.0859(0.37) 1  
Bank deposits  -0.0142(0.88) -0.0472(0.67) 0.1254(0.19)  1 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. 
                                                          
23
Huang (2010) asserts that the principal components are transformed into new indices that are 
uncorrelated. The variances of the principal components are so low that they become of less 
importance and hence the bulk of the variation in the data will then be captured by a small number of 
indices. 
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Table 5.2b: Eigenvalues, Eigenvectors and factor scores of the Principal Component Analysis 
                                                                                           Eigenvalues 
Measure   Value  Proportion Cumulative value  Cumulative proportion 
Liquid liabilities  2.7484  0.6872  2.7488   0.6872 
Private credit  0.8850  0.2213  3.6338   0.9085 
Bank deposts  0.2558  0.0640  3.8897   0.9724 
Commercial/central bank 0.1102  0.0276  0.0276   1.0000 
 
    Eigenvectors                                               Factor scores 
    
PC 1   0.5508  -0.2264  0.5814  0.5541  0.8861  
PC 2   0.5474  -0.0970  -0.7923  0.2483  0.8367 
PC 3   0.5759  -0.1174  0.1637  -0.7922  0.9834 
PC 4   0.2551  0.9620  0.0768  0.0587  0.3022 
Notes: All values are based on the data for the four measures of financial development for the upper middle income countries. 
 In the lower middle income countries, the commercial bank/central bank exhibits a 
significant and positive correlation with the other three variables (bank deposits, private 
credit and liquid liabilities). Dropping one of them (commercial bank/central bank in this 
case) per se, may not result in any bias since these are dependent variables. Bank deposits, 
private credit and liquid liabilities are retained as these measures are often used as the 
standard measures of FD in the literature as highlighted above. In the low-income countries, 
bank deposits are negatively correlated with private credit and liquid liabilities while the 
correlation between liquid liabilities, commercial bank/central bank and private credit is 
significantly low (8.5%). The highest correlation in the low-income group of countries is 
between commercial bank/central bank and liquid liabilities (17.4%). We retain liquid 
liabilities to ensure consistency on the three measures of FD for each income group of 
countries. The three measures include; bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities. 
Since these indicators generally measure the size of the banking system, FD in this study 
encapsulates bank-based intermediation.  
The average (  ratios of the FD indicators and their associated standard deviations (SD) in 
the upper middle, lower middle and low-income countries are reported in table 5.3: 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of financial development variables: 
                                                 Share of bank credit to the private sector to GDP 
Upper middle income
a
   Lower middle income
b
   Low income
c
 
       
                                                                    Share of bank deposits to GDP 
       
             Share of commercial bank assets over the sum of commercial bank and central bank assets to GDP 
      
    Share of liquid liabilities to GDP 
       
Notes: 
a
 include Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, 
b 
include Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia and 
c 
include Malawi 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. All values are in percentages. 
The descriptive statistics above clearly indicate that there is significant heterogeneity of FD 
across the countries under study. The average share of bank credit, bank deposits the share 
of commercial bank assets to the total assets of commercial banks and the central bankas a 
percentage of the GDP is highest in the upper middle income countries and lowest in the 
low-income countries. This general trend tends to indicate differentiated levels of 
development being experienced in the financial sectors of the countries under study. The 
trend corroborates with Mowatt (2001), Nyawata and Bird’s (2004) arguments who suggest 
that financial liberalisation may generally not have achieved the desired level of deepening 
perceived in the SADC’s financial sector with sluggish performance coming from the lower 
middle and low incomes countries in the region. 
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5.2.4 Descriptive statistics of main institutional variables for all income groups 
Table 5.4a: Descriptive statistics of main institutional variables – combined polity score 
   Polity 2- Combined polity score (Democracy minus Autocracy scores) 
     Upper middle income countries 
         Group   Group SD 
Botswana    6.4   0.8 
Mauritius    8.9   4  6.1  1.93 
Namibia    3.2   2.7 
South Africa   6.0   0.22 
     Lower middle income countries 
Lesotho    -0.35   6.46 
Swaziland   -8.6   0.46  -3.43  2.51 
Zambia    -1.33   0.63 
     Low-income countries 
Malawi    -1.84   6.75 
Mozambique   -1.41   5.73  -1.73  5.34 
Zimbabwe   -1.91   3.56 
 
Notes: all values are in percentages.  is defined as the mean and  the standard deviation. The values reported are the 
author’s own calculations. 
The results on table 5.4a above suggest that the average level of democracy in the upper 
income group countries is 6.6 signifying a relatively high level of democratisation 
(substantive democracy) in these countries compared to the other income groups. The 
standard deviation (1.93) is relatively small signifying a lower possibility of transition from 
democracy to autocracy for this income group compared to the other income groups.  
Assessing the average of each country in the upper middle income group shows Namibia as 
the outlier. The low average score is as a result of the fact that only data from 1990 to 2013 
is available but the number of observations for the group was used to compute the mean, 
otherwise Namibia could have obtained an average democracy score of 5.4, which is still low 
but close to the 6.6 mark. The average in the lower middle and low-income countries are 
similar and are negative (-3.43 and -1.73 respectively) indicating that generally, these groups 
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of countries are still battling to put their democratic credentials in place. The low-income 
countries show a large deviation from the mean indicating some homogeneity in respect of 
transition from democracy more towards autocracy. Judging from the mean level of 
democracy and the associated standard deviation, for individual countries and as a group, 
there is a significant heterogeneity in democratic governance in the upper middle and lower 
middle income countries. 
Table 5.4b below illustrates the average values and standard deviations of executive 
constraints obtained by the different income groups. 
Table 5.4b: Descriptive statistics of main institutional variables – Constraint on executives: 
     Constraint on executives 
     Upper middle income countries 
         Group   Group SD 
Botswana    6.08   0.86 
Mauritius    7   0  5.76  1.23 
Namibia    2.97   2.48 
South Africa   6.62   1.60 
     Lower middle income countries 
Lesotho    3.62   2.89 
Swaziland   1.35   0.48  2.75  1.79 
Zambia    3.27   2.0 
     Low-income countries 
Malawi    3.11   2.24 
Mozambique   3.18   0.87  3.23  1.56 
Zimbabwe   3.40   1.58 
 
Note: all values are in percentages. is defined as the mean and  the standard deviation. The values reported are the 
author’s own calculations. 
As expected, the upper middle income countries outperformed the lower middle and low-
income countries, judging from the individual and group averages obtained. Considering the 
mean level of executive constraint and the associated standard deviation, one finds 
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significant heterogeneity between the different income groups with the upper middle income 
countries obtaining an average group score of 5.76 and a standard deviation of 1.3. The low 
standard deviation suggests that generally countries in this income group tend to effectively 
constraint the powers of the chief executive. The case of Mauritius stands out where the 
country obtained an average score of 7 on 7 and 0 deviation suggesting that the 
institutionalised decision making powers of the chief executive is fully constraint or to a 
greater extent. The group averages of the lower middle income and low-income countries 
stand at 2.75 and 3.23 and associated standard deviations of 1.79 and 1.56 respectively 
suggesting the executive powers of the chief executives are less constrained, an indication 
ofautocratic rule. The situation is more prevalent in two of the lower middle income countries’ 
political regimes (Lesotho and Swaziland) characterised by absolute monarchies in varying 
degrees with the preferences of the monarchy much more entrenched in Swaziland than in 
Lesotho. This suggests why Swaziland may have obtained the lowest score compared to the 
other countries under study.  
5.2.5 Pooling tests for each income group 
 
Since we are having a panel of different countries, we determine whether to treat them as 
homogeneous or heterogeneous, hence one needs a statistical test to conclude whether 
they are generally the same or different. The results from the F-test below indicate that the 
critical F (Fcr) is greater than the calculated F (Fc) test suggesting that the countries under 
consideration for each income group are the same. This implies that the impact of 
explanatory variables is the same across these countries; therefore, a restricted model is 
preferred over an unrestricted model. The pooling test results for upper middle, lower middle 
and low income countries are presented in table 6.1a, 6.2b and 6.3c respectively below. 
Table 6.1a: Poolability tests for upper middle income countries. 
RSSur  RSSr  F
c
  F
cr
  n  k  m 
[Bank deposits]: 
0.7859  0.8271  2.2367  2.46  151  15  4 
[Private credit]: 
0.4696  0.4893  1.7898  2.46  151  15  4 
[Liquid liabilities]:  
2.5194  2.9402  7.1263  2.46  151  15  4 
Notes: the dependent variables are in parenthesis. The other variables are defined as follows: RSSur is the residual sum of 
squares for the unrestricted model; RSSr is the residual sum of squares for the restricted model,; F
c
 is the calculated F value; 
F
cr
 is the critical value; m is the number of restrictions; k is the number of regressors; and n is the number of observations. 
Generally, F
cr
>F
c
 – suggest that the impact of explanatory variables are the same across income groups. 
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Table 6.1b: Poolability tests for lower middle income countries. 
RSSur  RSSr  F
c
  F
cr
  n  k  m 
[Bank deposits]: 
0.2518  0.2565  0.8679  3.09  113  13  3 
[Private credit]: 
1.4098  2.8973  0.7102  3.09  113  13  3 
[Liquid liabilities]:  
1.6570  1.6626  2.4025  3.09  113  13  3 
Notes: the dependent variables are in parenthesis. The other variables are defined as follows: RSSur is the residual sum of 
squares for the unrestricted model; RSSr is the residual sum of squares for the restricted model,; F
c
 is the calculated F value; 
F
cr
 is the critical value; m is the number of restrictions; k is the number of regressors; and n is the number of observations. 
Generally, F
cr
>F
c
 – suggest that the impact of explanatory variables are the same across income group. 
Table 6.1c Poolability test for Low-income countries: 
RSSur  RSSr  F
c
  F
cr
  n  k  m 
 [Bank deposits]: 
6.6475  7.1099  3.0916  3.09  106  14  3 
[Private credit]: 
7.7377  8.0087  1.6110  3.09  106  14  3 
[Liquid liabilities]:  
13.8084  14.6488  2.7996  3.09  106  14  3 
Notes: the dependent variables are in parenthesis. The other variables are defined as follows: RSSur is the residual sum of 
squares for the unrestricted model; RSSr is the residual sum of squares for the restricted model,; F
c
 is the calculated F value; 
F
cr
 is the critical value; m is the number of restrictions; k is the number of regressors; and n is the number of observations. 
F
cr
>F
c
 – suggest that the impact of explanatory variables are the same across income groups. 
 
5.2.6 Unit root, autocorrelation and heteroskesdasticity tests of variables for each 
income group 
 
Results from both LLC and IPS confirm that all the variable series for all the income groups 
are stationary at level as shown by P-values of the series which are below the accepted 
norm of 5%. This implies that all series are integrated at order 0 i.e. they are all [I (0)]. The 
results from LLC and IPS tests for the upper middle, lower middle and low income groups 
are reported in tables 7.1a, 7.2b and 7.3c respectively below. The stationarity tests for each 
variable reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at 5% for all income groups and are reported 
in the appendix B. The results of heteroskesdasticity test indicate an observed R-squared 
probability of less than 0.05 for all income groups, indicating the presence of 
heteroskedasticity exists in the model. However, white cross-section weights were used to 
correct its presence. The results are reported in appendix C for all income groups. Lastly, 
103 
 
autocorrelation tests are executed to determine whether the OLS estimators are of minimum 
variance. The results from appendix D suggest that we accept the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation in the model. This is indicated by the probability of the F-statistic being 
greater than 0.05 for all income groups, a strong indication of the absence of autocorrelation 
in the model.  
Table 7.1a: Group unit root test summary for upper middle income countries 
     
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -19.3752  0.0000  4 
                                                  
151 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -48.8009  0.0000  4 
                                                   
 151 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  1387.63  0.0000  4 
                                                   
 151 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  1072.43  0.0000  4 
                                                   
 151 
Notes: ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi -square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality 
Table 7.1b: Group unit root test summary for lower middle income countries 
     
     
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -11.3375  0.0000  3  113 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -28.9001  0.0000  3  113 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  810.533  0.0000  3  113 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  725.973  0.0000  3  113 
     
     
Notes: ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi   -square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1c: Group unit root test summary for low-income countries 
     
     
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -16.7522  0.0000  3  113 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -34.1995  0.0000  3  113 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  954.951  0.0000  3  113 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  961.238  0.0000  3  113 
     
Notes: ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality 
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The study now proceeds into the empirical analyses which are based on the following 
estimation techniques: OLS, GMM, difference and system GMM. The study makes the 
following panel specification. 
 =  + +       (5.1) 
All the variables are defined as in equation 4.1 of chapter 4. We apply all three measures of 
FD (bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities) as the dependent variables. Our 
conclusions will be drawn based on all three measures. All control variables employed are 
determined by BMA to mitigate model uncertainty which tends to change depending on the 
measure of FD used. The institutional variables of key interest for all income groups include; 
democracy (procedural and substantive), constraint on executives, autocracy and per capita 
income. We expect democracy (procedural and substantive), constraint on executives and 
per capita income to positively affect FD. The effect of autocracy on financial development is 
expected to be negative for all income groups. For all income groups we use Hansen’s 
statistics to test the validity of over-identifying restrictions. We do not reject null in all IV 
regressions suggesting that our instrument set is appropriate for all income groups. 
5.2.7 Democratic institutions and financial development: Cross-section results for the 
upper middle income countries: 
 
Tables 8.1a, 8.1b, and 8.1c display the results for the effects of democratic institutions on FD 
using the traditional OLS and instrumental variable (IV) estimators. Table 8.1d presents an 
analysis of t(z)-statistics and probabilities in all regressions. The results reported are based 
on the analyses of tables 8.1a, 8.1b, and 81.c condensed into table 8.1d for easy 
interpretation. This procedure is followed for all income groups. The results indicate that the 
coefficients of constraints on executives and procedural democracy are generally positive 
and significant, in support of the hypothesis that democracy and executive constraints 
positively impacts on FD. The coefficient of autocracy is negative and insignificant; giving 
credence to the hypothesis that autocracy may tend to render sub-optimal outcomes for FD. 
However, the coefficients of substantive democracy and per capita income are found to be 
negative, an unexpected sign, but however, statistically insignificant. The interaction 
between per capita income, government expenditure and procedural democracy are 
positive, though insignificant suggesting that the effect of per capita income and government 
spending on FD is increased with democracy. The interactions tend to suggest some non-
linearities between democracy and FD through its effects on policy variables such as 
government expenditure and per capita income.  
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Table 8.1a: OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Bank deposits 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.05(0.7) -0.02(0.7) 0.09(0.40) 0.21(0.63) 
Executive constraints
  
0.12*(0.08) 0.11*(0.07) 0.32***(0.00) 0.44***(0.00) 
S Polity IV -0.11***(0.00) -0.10*(0.06) -0.27***(0.00) -0.30***(0.00) 
Polity IV 0.13**(0.01) 0.10*(0.16) 0.13(0.34) -0.79*(0.10) 
Government 
expenditure 
-0.19(0.38) -0.16(038) -0.10(0.67) -0.11(0.82) 
Population 0.53*(0.09) 0.69***(0.00) 0.67*(0.10) 0.68(0.51) 
School 0.06(0.69) 0.09(0.40) 0.01(0.94) 0.41(0.27) 
Lag bank deposits  -0.03(0.55) 0.04(0.48) 0.08***(0.23) 0.17*(0.11) 
Per capita income -1.48***(0.00) -1.47***(0.00) -1.40***(0.00) -0.82**(0.01) 
Polity IV*Government 0.14(0.60) 0.14(0.57) 0.04(0.89) 0.13(0.86) 
Polity IV*school -0.16(0.5) -0.25(0.15) -0.07(0.76) -0.69(0.38) 
Polity IV*per capita 
income 
1.29***(0.00) 1.2***(0.00) 1.2***(0.00) 0.70*(0.08) 
Polity IV*population -0.66*(0.17) -0.94***(0.00) -0.95*(0.14) -1.11(0.49) 
Constant -0.005(0.85) 0.006(0.82) -0.0004(0.93) 0.002(0.69) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   2.22(0.31) 5.68(0.11) 4.53(0.13) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  151 151 151 151 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.35 
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
 
Table 8.1b: OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Private credit 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.04(0.76) 0.03(0.85) 0.05***(0.00) 0.44**(0.00) 
Executive constraints
  
-0.22*(0.06) -0.20***(0.00) -0.19***(0.00) -0.34**(0.01) 
polity IV -0.17***(0.00) -0.13**(0.04) -0.13***(0.00) -0.31**(0.03) 
S Polity IV 0.11***(0.00) 0.10***(0.01) 0.09***(0.00) 0.18*(0.1) 
Government 
expenditure 
-0.31**(0.03) -0.25**(0.03) -0.26***(0.00) -0.32*(0.06) 
Population 0.32**(0.04) 0.33***(0.00) 0.37***(0.00) -0.02(0.68) 
Lag private credit  -0.31***(0.00) -0.17*(0.14) -0.16***(0.00) -0.46***(0.00) 
Per capita income -0.18***(0.00) -0.22***(0.00) -0.22***(0.00) -0.13**(0.01) 
Polity IV*Government 0.35**(0.05) 0.15*(0.06) 0.28***(0.00) 0.36*(0.10) 
Polity IV*population -0.34*(0.07) -0.36***(0.00) -0.41***(0.00) 0.01(0.83) 
Constant 0.03*(0.15) 0.02(0.49) -0.0003(0.26) 0.003(0.64) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   3.40(0.18) 5.70(0.22) 4.71(0.21) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  151 151 151 151 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.37 0.34 0.99 0.55 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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Table 8.1c: OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Liquid liabilities 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.74**(0.03) -0.26(0.75) -0.43***(0.00) -0.15**(0.01) 
Executive constraints
  
0.11(0.39) 0.10(0.60) 0.36***(0.00) 0.39**(0.02) 
polity IV 0.17*(0.11) 0.08(0.53) 0.35***(0.00) 0.38(0.34) 
S Polity IV -0.11*(0.11) -0.03(0.76) -0.34***(0.00) -0.36**(0.02) 
Lag liquid liabilities 0.44***(0.00) 0.59***(0.00) 0.62***(0.00) -0.15**(0.01) 
Per capita income -0.16(0.37) -0.19***(0.00) -2.3***(0.00) -0.26(0.41) 
Polity IV*Per capita 
income 
-2.13(0.62) -0.03***(0.70) 0.02(0.41) 0.22(0.66) 
Constant -0.01(0.90) -0.01(0.90) -0.003(0.68) -0.02*(0.09) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   4.5(0.19) 6.00(0.09) 5.01(0.06) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  151 151 151 151 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.35 0.30 0.90 0.21 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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Table 8.1d: Analyses of t (z)- statistics and P-values in all regressions - Upper middle income countries: 
Explanatory variables 
of interest/dependent 
variables 
(+) significant (+) insignificant (-) significant (-) insignificant 
Autocracy     
Bank deposits 0 2 0 2 
Private credit 2 2 0 0 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 2 2 
     
Constraint on 
executives 
    
Bank deposits 4 0 0 0 
Private credit 2 2 0 0 
Liquid liabilities 2 2 0 0 
     
Democracy 
(procedural) 
    
Bank deposits 2 1 1 0 
Private credit 0 0 4 0 
Liquid liabilities 3 1 0 0 
     
Democracy 
(substantive) 
    
Bank deposits 0 0 4 0 
Private credit 4 0 0 0 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 3 1 
     
Per capita income     
Bank deposits 0 0 4 0 
Private credit 0 0 4 0 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 3 1 
Notes: Bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are the dependent variables. All control variables are determined by 
BMA. The values in the table indicate the sign and significance of the explanatory variable of interest in all regressions. The 
analyses are based on tables [(iii)a, (iii)b and (iii)c above) 
 
5.2.8 Democratic institutions and financial development: Cross-section results for the 
lower middle income countries: 
 
The model represented by equation (5.1) informs our empirical analysis in this section. The 
control variables include black market premium, school enrolment, foreign direct investment, 
population and lags of dependent variables. These variables tend to change depending on 
the measure of FD used. Our key variables of interest which represent democratic 
institutions are: democracy (procedural and substantive), constraint on executives, autocracy 
and per capita income.  
The regression results obtained from OLS, GMM, difference GMM and system GMM using 
bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are reported in tables 8.2a, 8.2b and 8.2c 
respectively. An analysis of the regression results is presented in table 8.2d. The results 
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generally indicate the coefficients of autocracy, substantive democracy and constraint on 
executives to be either negative and insignificant or significant. In this case we do not reject 
our hypothesis that autocracy negatively affects FD. Contrary to our hypothesis substantive 
democracy and constrained on executives negatively affects FD. The results, however, are 
consistent with the data – we find from the descriptive statistics that the level at which 
executives are constrained in this income group is limited and that democracy is far from 
substantive. These may be having a negative impact on FD. What clearly emerges from the 
findings is that ingredients of autocracy prevalent in the political regimes of these countries 
may be acting as an incentive for chief executives not to take into account the preferences of 
others when making decisions, thereby creating an environment of instability. Venieris and 
Steward (1987) assert that uncertainty lowers saving mobilisation and hence negatively 
affecting FD. Apart from Zambia, Lesotho and Swaziland adopted a form of governance 
where succession of people from the same family play a prominent role with a small group of 
people in both countries playing a key role in the governing of the country.  “In the case of 
Lesotho a constitutional monarchy was adopted with the king as head of state while the 
prime minister is head of government….Despite the positive developments regarding 
electoral reform in Lesotho and the consequent inclusiveness and broad political 
representation in the National Assembly, political tension is still rife in the small mountain 
kingdom” (Matlosa, 2006:9-10). Matlosa (2006) further contends that the governance system 
in Swaziland is still very much authoritarian and that the country has not embraced multi-
party electoral democracy despite the political pressure being heaped on the country’s 
leadership. 
The coefficient for procedural democracy is positive but insignificant as expected while per 
capita income seems to be contributing positively towards FD, showing some consistency 
with the hypothesis. Procedural democracy being insignificant shows its minimal contribution 
to FD. Though the results are somewhat mixed as expected when applying different 
measures of FD, what seems to emerge from the models suggests that democratic 
institutions in this group of countries contribute minimally in enhancing FD. Non-linear 
relationships between democracy and FD emerge through per capita income and black 
market premium for this income group. 
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Table 8.2a OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Bank deposits 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.08**(0.03) 0.11*(0.10) 0.12***(0.00) -0.04(0.70) 
Executive constraints
  
-0.17***(0.00) -0.10*(0.13) -0.10***(0.00) -0.27***(0.00) 
S Polity IV -0.01(0.34) -0.01(0.40) -0.01***(0.00) 0.01(0.83) 
Polity IV 0.001(0.97) -0.00*(0.83) 0.003***(0.00) 0.001(0.99) 
Lag bank deposits  0.03(0.71) 0.02(0.64) 0.03***(0.00) -0.43***(0.00) 
Per capita income 0.49***(0.00) 0.51***(0.00) 0.50***(0.00) 0.17*(0.11) 
Polity IV*per capita 
income 
0.91(0.64) 0.74*(0.57) -0.00(0.61) 1.12(0.31) 
Constant 0.01(0.14) 0.01(0.11) 0.001(0.64) -0.005(0.59) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   6.34(0.06) 5.27(0.08) 6.21(0.059) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  113 113 113 113 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.31 0.29 0.99 0.57 
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
 
Table 8.2b: OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Private credit 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.05(0.26) -0.05*(0.08) -0.05***(0.00) 0.01(0.98) 
Executive constraints
  
-0.07(0.56) -0.03(0.54) -0.03***(0.00) -0.34**(0.01) 
polity IV 0.01(0.90) 0.05(0.58) 2.89**(0.03) 0.05(0.87) 
S Polity IV -0.02*(0.12) -0.02(0.22) -0.03***(0.00) -0.04(0.95) 
Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) 
0.56**(0.04) 0.57**(0.03) 0.49***(0.00) 2.30(0.89) 
School enrolment 0.75***(0.01) 0.80***(0.00) 0.82***(0.00) 0.88*(0.10) 
Lag private credit  0.85***(0.00) 0.85***(0.00) 0.85***(0.00) 0.63(0.56) 
Per capita income -0.10(0.29) -0.09(0.42) -0.08***(0.00) -0.17(0.82) 
Polity IV*black market 
premium 
1.46*(0.10) 0.97**(0.32) 0.42***(0.00) 6.56(0.23) 
Polity IV*FDI -0.03(0.9)  -0.47(0.74) -0.28(0.2)  -2.55(0.89) 
Polity IV  School 
enrolment 
-1.66(0.3)  -1.08(0.33) -0.31*(0.11) 0.28(0.97) 
Constant -0.17***(0.00) -0.17***(0.00) -0.001(0.62) -0.43(0.62) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   5.08(0.11) 5.86(0.06) 4.32(0.14) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  113 113 113 113 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.97 0.78 
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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Table 8.2c: OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Liquid liabilities 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.09(0.39) -0.06(0.31) -0.06***(0.00) -0.02(0.72) 
Executive constraints
  
-0.11(0.40)   0.001(0.99) 0.005(0.69) 0.02(0.78) 
polity IV -0.29(0.22)             -0.28*(0.12) 1.65***(0.00)   -0.17(0.29) 
S Polity IV -0.03(0.28) -0.03(0.25) -0.02***(0.00) 0.42***(0.00) 
Lag liquid liabilities -0.39***(0.00) -0.27**(0.05) -0.29***(0.00) -0.75***(0.00) 
Per capita income 0.32*(0.11)       0.39***(0.00) 0.37***(0.00) 0.28(0.60) 
Population -0.15(0.22) -0.12(0.43) -0.09***(0.00) 0.37(0.55) 
Polity IV  Population -58.50**(0.04) -0.88**(0.01) -0.0001(0.99) -5.52(0.18) 
Polity IV*Per capita 
income 
-2.51(0.56) -49.87(0.82) -1.85(0.16) -10.19*(0.06) 
Constant 0.01*(0.42) 0.02*(0.08) 0.0002(0.94) -0.01(0.64) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   5.58(0.08) 3.59(0.06) 5.09(0.10) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  113 113 113 113 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.28 0.26 0.98 0.32 
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
Table 8.2d: Analyses of t(z)- statistics and P-values in all regressions: 
Explanatory variables of 
interest/dependent 
variables 
(+) significant (+) insignificant (-) significant (-) insignificant 
Autocracy     
Bank deposits 3 0 0 1 
Private credit 0 0 2 2 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 1 3 
     
Constraint on 
executives 
    
Bank deposits 0 0 4 0 
Private credit 0 0 1 3 
Liquid liabilities 0 3 0 1 
     
Democracy (procedural)     
Bank deposits 1 2 1 0 
Private credit 1 3 0 0 
Liquid liabilities 1 0 1 2 
     
Democracy 
(substantive) 
    
Bank deposits 0 1 1 2 
Private credit 0 0 2 2 
Liquid liabilities 1 0 1 2 
     
Per capita income     
Bank deposits 4 0 0 0 
Private credit 0 0 0 4 
Liquid liabilities 3 1 0 0 
Notes: Bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are the dependent variables. All control variables are determined by 
BMA. The values in the table indicate the sign and significance of the explanatory variable of interest in all regressions. The 
analyses are based on tables [(iii)a, (iii)b and (iii)c above) 
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5.2.9 Democratic institutions and financial development: Cross-section results for the 
low-income countries 
 
The results reported indicate that the coefficients of per capita income, procedural and 
substantive democracy are generally negative and insignificant, suggesting that democracy 
and per capita income do not play any significant role in improving FD, a finding not 
consistent with our hypothesis but expected for this income group following analysis of the 
descriptive statistics of the institutional variables. The coefficient of executive constraints is 
positive and significant in line with our hypothesis but inconsistent with the analysis of data 
on institutional variables, while autocracy is positive and insignificant – inconsistent with the 
hypothesis and data on institutional variables. The effect of autocracy on FD is, however, 
insignificant. There are two possible interpretations of this result. The autocrat with 
unconstrained powers could be carrying out policies that positively affect FD or the powers 
of the executive are now more constrained due to a decrease in autocracy and as such 
having a positive effect on FD. Overall, the results from the above models, though somehow 
mixed, seem to suggest that democratic institutions could be having a minimal impact on 
improving FD for this income group. This evidence corroborates with the results obtained 
from the lower middle income countries. The coefficient of trade openness, per capita 
income and school enrolment are negative when entered linearly into the models but 
becomes positive on interaction with democracy. This suggests that the positive effect of 
democracy on FD may be non-linear through its interaction with these policy and social 
variables. The regression results are reported in tables 8.3a, 8.3b and 8.3c, respectively.  
Analyses of the regression results are presented in table 8.3d. 
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Table 8.3a OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Bank deposits 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.47**(0.02) -0.24(0.43) -0.24***(0.00) -0.75(0.40) 
Executive constraints
  
0.89***(0.00) -0.16(0.70) -0.09**(0.03) 3.93*(0.08) 
S Polity IV -0.44***(0.00) 0.10(0.65) 0.09***(0.00) -1.15(0.52) 
Polity IV -1.05(0.54) -0.55(0.51) -0.025(0.22) -0.73(0.74) 
Lag bank deposits  0.02(0.80) 0.12*(0.14) 0.12***(0.00) -0.05(0.64) 
Per capita income -2.59***(0.00) -1.29(0.29) -1.28***(0.00) -2.31(0.39) 
Inflation  18.5***(0.00) 5.61(0.522) 6.06***(0.00) 23.32(0.39) 
FDI -0.31(0.93) 3.01(0.27) 2.75***(0.00) 5.15(0.42) 
Polity IV  FDI 20.7(0.78) 13.3(0.64) 8.45*(0.10) -156.52(0.64) 
Polity IV  Inflation 75.9(0.56) 41.3(0.47) 10.3*(0.17) -385.83(0.63) 
Polity IV x per capita 
income 
2.49(0.86) 1.29(0.87) 0.14(0.91) -5.12(0.92) 
Constant -0.43***(0.00) -0.05(0.71) 0.003*(0.17) -0.002(0.97) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   3.56(0.06) 5.39(0.08) 3.38(0.07) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  113 113 113 113 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.28 0.06 0.99 0.46 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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Table 8.3b: OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Private credit 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.33(0.18) 0.29**(0.02) 0.32***(0.00) 0.32(0.21) 
Executive constraints
  
-0.29(0.27) 0.13(0.46) 0.25***(0.00) 0.74(0.57) 
polity IV -0.64(0.69) -1.14(0.21) -0.09(0.28) -0.18(0.70) 
S Polity IV 0.29*(0.10) 0.002(0.98) -0.04(0.65) -0.23(0.78) 
Government expenditure 0.59***(0.00) 0.53***(0.00) 0.43***(0.00) 0.35(0.44) 
Inflation 13.2**(0.05) 5.41(0.32) -1.12(0.70) -7.98(0.77) 
Per capita income -3.0***(0.00) -3.78***(0.00) -3.53***(0.00) -1.36(0.34) 
School enrolment -0.46*(0.08) -0.63***(0.00) -0.61***(0.00) -0.36(0.25) 
Trade openness -94.2***(0.01) -85.3**(0.02) -77.3***(0.00) 5.92(0.92) 
Lag private credit -0.04(0.63) 0.08(0.16) 0.03(0.72) -0.58**(0.04) 
Polity IV  Government 8.81(0.20) 3.24(0.28) -0.24(0.75) -6.64(0.42) 
Polity IV  Inflation 15.29(0.91) 59.6(0.45) -310.8***(0.00) -992.14(0.17) 
Polity IV  Per capita 
income 
34.11(0.32) 14.5(0.21) 1.60(0.53) -7.29(0.83) 
Polity IV  trade openness 847.18(0.31) 426.5(0.56) 2120.6***(0.00) 6107*(0.10) 
Polity IV  school enrolment 8.05(0.36) 0.92(0.78) -5.34***(0.00) -18.16(0.23) 
Constant  -0.17(0.18) -0.13*(0.09) 0.008(0.55) 0.03(0.32) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   2.80(0.10) 5.91(0.01) 3.69(0.15) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  113 113 113 113 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.41 0.34 0.91 0.42 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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Table 8.3c: OLS, GMM, Difference GMM (DGMM) and system GMM (SGMM) fixed effect estimation (1975-2013) 
Dependent variable – Liquid liabilities 
 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.09(0.70) -0.08(0.52) -0.14**(0.02) 0.48(0.20) 
Executive constraints
  
0.25(0.30) 0.05(0.82) 0.37*(0.08) 2.49*(0.10) 
polity IV 1.08***(0.00) 0.81*(0.11) -0.78***(0.00) -0.87(0.25) 
S Polity IV -0.19(0.27) -0.09(0.58) -0.13(0.42) -2.06**(0.03) 
Per capita income  -0.29(0.68) -0.20(0.48) 0.04(0.81) -0.52(0.63) 
Government 
expenditure 
-0.14(0.47) -0.09(0.40) -0.06(0.33) 0.38(0.33) 
School enrolment -0.29(0.21) -0.07*(0.69) 0.005(0.93) -0.01(0.97) 
Lag liquid liabilities  -0.12*(0.08) -0.12(0.17) -0.14***(0.00) -0.27*(0.10) 
Polity IV  school 
enrolment 
22.0***(0.00) 17.5**(0.01) 10.8**(0.01) -2.83(0.82) 
Constant -0.03(0.66) 0.01(0.85) 0.003(0.83) -0.01(0.82) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   4.22(0.24) 3.06(0.11) 5.81(0.07) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  113 113 113 113 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.45 0.42 0.87 0.23 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported 
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Table 8.3d: Analyses of t(z)- statistics and P-values in all regressions: 
Explanatory variables 
of interest/dependent 
variables 
(+) significant (+) insignificant (-) significant (-) insignificant 
Autocracy     
Bank deposits 0 0 3 1 
Private credit 2 2 0 0 
Liquid liabilities 0 2 1 1 
     
Constraint on 
executives 
    
Bank deposits 2 0 1 1 
Private credit 1 2 0 1 
Liquid liabilities 2 2 0 0 
     
Democracy 
(procedural) 
    
Bank deposits 0 0 0 4 
Private credit 0 0 0 4 
Liquid liabilities 2 0 1 1 
     
Democracy 
(substantive) 
    
Bank deposits 1 1 1 1 
Private credit 1 1 0 2 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 1 3 
     
Per capita income     
Bank deposits 0 0 2 2 
Private credit 0 0 3 1 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 0 4 
Notes: Bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are the dependent variables. All control variables are determined by 
BMA. The values in the table indicate the sign and significance of the explanatory variable of interest in all regressions. The 
analyses are based on tables 5.18a, 5.18b and 5.18c above. 
 
5.2.10 Summary of panel regression results 
The above results overwhelmingly suggest that democratic institutions on average contribute 
positively towards FD using all three proxies for FDfor the upper middle income group. The 
results also show autocracy as having a negative association with FD. These findings are 
consistent with evidence shown by Girma and Shortland (2008), Huang (2010), Yang (2011), 
Miletkov and Wintoki (2012), Deepraj and Nabamita (2013), among others and imply that 
legal and institutional development which is positively associated with democracy matter for 
FD.For the lower middle income countries the results generally suggest that the contribution 
of democratic institutions to FD is mixed, skewed towards having minimal impact on FD. 
While there seems to be a positive contribution of procedural democracy and per capita 
income to FD as expected, their contributions are statistically insignificant. For the lower 
income group results of the panel regressions suggest that per capita income and both 
substantive and procedural democracy negatively affects FD, while the effect of constraints 
on executives seems to be positive and significant. The effect of autocracy is positive but 
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insignificant. What stands out is that weak legal and democratic institutions may be exerting 
negative effects on FD possibly as a result of political instability. This evidence seems to 
correlate with Matlosa’s (2006) observations for this group of countries. His findings suggest 
that the countries in this income group have a pervasive trend of an entrenched de jure one-
party system that ensures the continued dominance of ruling parties and constraints open 
competition for political power. Such conditions may provide a perfect recipe for political 
instability as has been observed in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. With the effect of autocracy 
and shocks thereof having a positive effect on FD, we follow La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Pop-Eleches and Shleifer (2004) and argue that such hegemony may entrench some 
competitive form of authoritarianism or advanced authoritarianism masked as democracy 
with the choices made by authoritarian regimes and not the constraints on them have 
allowed these countries to make some gains towards FD. 
5.3 The fragility of financial development in the SADC region 
One of our main objectives is to determine the probability of switching between states of high 
FD and weak or low FD following political regime changes. The study estimates the following 
MSM with constant volatility for all income groups to achieve this objective. 
if  = 1 
           (5.2) 
if =2     
Where  ; the definitions of the variables are the same as in equation (4.1).  = 1 
and =2 are the two states –high FD state and weak/low FD state. High FD shows the state 
of FD relative to the other income group of countries; in other words, the income group in 
question is financially developed compared to the other income groups.For all income 
groups, we consider regime 1 as a state of high FD and regime 2 a state of low/weak FD. 
Here, we report results from the simple switching model with unchanging transition 
probabilities. It is important to note that the model assumes simple switching and the 
probability of being in regime 1 and regime 2 depends on the origin state.The probability of 
being in regime 1 and regime 2 may be state independent. We run Markov switching 
regressions to this effect and the results suggest a higher probability of being in a state of 
high FD for the upper middle income countries than the lower middle and low-income 
countries, though the values are different as expected. These results are not reported as 
they deviate from the objective of this section but are available on request. These 
probabilities would imply a certain expected duration in a regime given by a number of years 
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since we are applying annual data in the study. Applying the Wald test, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the parameters are the same, suggesting that switching does occur.The 
results of the filtered and smooth regime probabilities that show the probabilities of transition 
from regime 1 (high FD) to regime 2 (low FD) are reported in the appendix E for all income 
groups. 
 
5.3.1Empirical findings from the upper middle income countries 
Using bank deposits, liquid liabilities and private credit as the dependent variables the 
following mean transition probabilities and expected durations are reported in table 9.1a 
below. It is expected that being in a state of high FD, these countries would spend an 
average of nine years in that state and an average of five years if in a state of low FD. These 
results suggest that these countries in general have an 0.80 chance of experiencing high FD 
and remaining in that state for an average of 9 years compared to a 0.75 chance of 
experiencing low FD and being in that state for an average of just 5years. This evidence 
lends some credence to a narrow version of the financial instability hypothesis which 
contends thatwhen the economy experiences periods of long prosperity itswitches from a 
stable system to an unstable system in its financial relations. Suggestive of the probabilities 
and expected durations, appropriate government policies towards improving FD may result 
in much more positive and sustainable outcomes for the financial sector for this income 
group of countries.  
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Table 9.1a: MSM: State dependent transition probabilities and expected durations 
Constant transition probabilities: Bank deposits 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.94725151 0.4453788 
  2 0.05274849 0.5546212 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  18.957888 2.245279 
    
Constant transition probabilities: Liquid liabilities 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.8325418 0.1132244 
  2 0.1674582 0.8867756 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  5.971639 8.832018 
    
Constant transition probabilities: Private credit 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.6176658 0.195987 
  2 0.3823342 0.804013 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  2.615512 5.102379 
    
Mean Constant transition probabilities: 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.799153 0.251530 
  2 0.200846 0.748469 
    
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  9.181679 5.393225 
    
    
Notes: the mean constant transition probabilities and expected durations are calculated from the transition probabilities for each 
proxy for financial development. The expected duration is calculated as 1/1-P11 for regime 1 and 1/1-P22 for regime 2 (Hamilton, 
1989). (i) Being the state of high financial development and (k) the state of weak or low financial development; (P) the 
probability; s(t) the present state of FD; s(t-1) the previous state. 
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5.3.2 Empirical findings from the lower middle income countries 
Using bank deposits, liquid liabilities and private credit as the dependent variables, the mean 
transition probabilities and expected durations are reported in table 9.1b below. The results 
suggest that these countries in general have a 0.53 chance of experiencing high FD and 
remaining in that state for an average of 2 years compared to a 0.79 chance of experiencing 
low FD and being in that state for an average of just 5years.The expected duration of being 
in a state of low FD for this income group of countries is 5 years on average and may spend 
2 years in a state of high FD.This evidence portrays some volatility in financial development 
given the duration of being in a particular state, suggesting that though policies might be in 
place to improve FD as reflected in their policies to reform the financial sector, appropriate 
implementation may be lacking in steering these group of countries towards a stable FD 
path.  
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Table 9.1b: Markov Switching Model: State independent transition probabilities and expected durations 
Constant transition probabilities: Bank deposits 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.4477442 0.1042139 
  2 0.5522558 0.8957861 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  1.810755 9.595648 
    
Constant transition probabilities: Liquid liabilities 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.6585067 0.1853622 
  2 0.3414933 0.8146378 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  2.928315 5.394843 
    
Constant transition probabilities: Private credit 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.4893995 0.3346974 
  2 0.5106005 0.6653026 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  1.958478 2.987773 
    
Mean constant transition probabilities: 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.531883 0.208071 
  2 0.468116 0.791908 
    
    
Mean constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  2.136220 4.806047 
    
Notes: the mean constant transition probabilities and expected durations are calculated from the transition probabilities for each 
proxy for financial development. The expected duration is calculated as 1/1-P11 for regime 1 and 1/1-P22 for regime 2 (Hamilton, 
1989)(i) Being the state of high financial development and (k) the state of weak or low financial development; (P) the 
probability; s(t) the present state of FD; s(t-1) the previous state. 
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5.3.3 Empirical findings from the low income countries 
For this income group of countries, the mean probability of being in a state of low FD is 0.96 
while the mean probability of being in a state of high FD is 0.69. The expected duration of 
remaining in a state of low FD on the average is 26 years compared to 3 years in a state of 
high FD. The evidence suggests that this group of countries is still experiencing some 
democratic institutional drawbacks in steering their economies towards achieving higher 
levels of FD. The results seem to reflect those obtained in the lower middle income countries 
but with a much higher probability of being in a state of low FD and being in that state for 
very long periods of time. These findings are reported in table 9.1c below. 
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Table 9.1c: MSM: State independent transition probabilities and expected durations 
Constant transition probabilities: Bank deposits 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.7224248 0.0350533 
  2 0.2775752 0.9649466 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  3.602627 28.527943 
 
Constant transition probabilities: Liquid liabilities 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.81932 0.0305657 
  2 0.18068 0.9694342 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  5.534646 32.71634 
    
Constant transition probabilities: Private credit 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.5523177 0.04971932 
  2 0.4476823 0.95028068 
    
Constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  2.233726 20.112905 
    
Mean constant transition probabilities: 
P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t-1) = i) 
(row = i / column = j)  
   1  2 
  1 0.698021 0.038446 
  2 0.301979 0.961554 
    
Mean constant expected durations:  
   1  2 
  3.3114867 26.01044 
    
Notes: the mean constant transition probabilities and expected durations are calculated from the transition probabilities for each 
proxy for financial development. The expected duration is calculated as 1/1-P11 for regime 1 and 1/1-P22 for regime 2 (Hamilton, 
1989) (i) Being the state of high financial development and (k) the state of weak or low financial development; (P) the 
probability; s(t) the present state of FD; s(t-1) the previous state. 
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5.3.4 Summary of the findings of the MSM 
Consistent with one of our hypothesis, we show evidence in the Markov Model that countries 
in this income group have a 0.80 probability of being in the regime of high FD and 0.75 
probability of being in a state of low FD and expected to spend an average of 9 years and 5 
years in these states respectively. We contend from the findings that relatively stronger 
democratic institutions may be helping in sustaining FD though susceptible to instability 
which may act as a hindrance to attaining meaningful FD levels. We suggest that 
appropriate government policies in strengthening institutions may mitigate instability and 
foster FD with the likely potential of producing long-term gains in the financial sectors for this 
income group. For the lower middle income group we also find some consistency with one of 
our hypothesis.We show evidence that countries in this income group have a 0.53 probability 
of being in the regime of high FD compared to a 0.79 probability of being in a state of low FD 
and expected to spend an average of 2 and 5 years on average in these states, respectively. 
The duration in each state suggests some volatility in FD which may be attributed to 
ineffective implementation of designed policies which may be resulting from democratic 
institutional weaknesses. Finally, for the low income group of countries the weak state of 
democratisation tends to corroborates the findings of the MSM where countries in this 
income group experience a 0.96 chance of being in a state of low FD and a 0.69 chance of 
attaining a high FD state. These groups of countries are expected to spend on the average 
26 years in the state of low financial development and only 3 years if they move into a state 
of high FD. Though high volatility is not exhibited, the long periods of being in a state of low 
FD is concerning. A diagrammatic representation of the transition probabilities (smooth and 
filtered) of FD are shown in appendix E. The vertical axis for each graph represents the 
probabilities and the horizontal axis show the panel data number of observations for each 
income group. Filtered probability refers to an estimate of the probability at time t based on 
data up to and including time t (but excluding time t+1,……,T). Smoothed probability refers 
to an estimate of the probability at time t using all the data in the sample. Applying the time-
varying transition probabilities, we can demonstrate how the expected duration of FD 
changes over time.  
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5.4 Impulse responses of financial development to shocks in the institutional 
variables. 
 
In this section, we present the findings and analysis for all the income groups based on the 
BVAR results in order to achieve our third objective. The empirical analyses are based on 
the following BVAR specification. 
 
 
  (5.3) 
 
All the variables in equation (5.3) are defined as in equation (4.1). We report impulse 
responses and variance decomposition following shocks to each of the institutional variables 
and the control (policy) variables for each income group. Cholesky decomposition is 
generally used to ascertain the collection of equations in order to obtain the impulse 
response function (Lutkepohl, 2007). As exemplified in the methodology, we apply Bayesian 
VAR estimates with the Litterman/Minnesota prior type. This suggests that our impulse 
responses contain prior information and updated by information in the data. However, the 
decomposition implies that the ordering of variables is of crucial importance and tends to 
yield different results with different ordering. We apply the Cholesky ordering with adjusted 
degree of freedom to obtain the impulse responses. The variables follow the ordering in 
which they are listed below24. Unlike Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) we determine the 
forecast error of the endogenous variables (bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities) 
decomposed over different time horizons25 into components attributed to unexpected shocks 
(or innovations) of each endogenous policy and institutional variables using the dynamic 
BVAR system. The impulse responses all show a 95% credible interval for the 10 periods. 
This means that the forecast in FD following shocks in the institutional, policy and social 
variables lies with a 95% probability in the interval over the forecast horizon. 
 
  
                                                          
24
 The order of the variables is as follows: procedural democracy, substantive democracy, executive 
constraints, autocracy and per capita income before any social and/or economic variable of 
importance, depending on the income group and the proxy of FD applied. 
25
 We apply horizons of 2, 5 and 10 years. 
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5.4.1 Variance decompositions and impulse responses for upper middle income 
countries. 
 
The forecast error variance decompositions of FD in BVAR for this income group are 
presented in table 10.1a after 2, 5 and 10 years ahead, while table 10.1b shows the 
contribution of each variable to variations in FD10 years ahead on the average (mean 
variation) using all three proxies for FD. The results suggest that after 10 years on the 
average, substantive democracy and constraints on executives contribute more towards 
variations in FD among the institutional variables. 
Table10.1a: Forecast error variance decomposition of financial development based on BVAR 
Period S 
Polity 
Polity xcon auto school pop pky Gov’t Bank 
Deposits 
Bank deposits (dependent variable) 
2 years 
ahead  
7.02 0.22 4.32 0.29 2.06 5.98 0.01 0.23 79.8 
5 years 
ahead 
6.22 0.32 4.16 0.33 11.52 5.94 0.01 0.28 71.2 
10 years 
ahead 
6.22 0.32 4.16 0.33 11.52 5.94 0.01 0.28 71.2 
         Private 
credit 
Private credit (dependent variable) 
2 years 
ahead  
0.39 0.01 0.19 0.06 - 1.08 0.81 0.02 97.41 
5 years 
ahead 
0.53 0.01 0.48 0.07 - 1.21 0.96 0.36 96.36 
10 years 
ahead 
0.56 0.01 0.48 0.07 - 1.21 0.96 0.36 96.36 
         Liquid 
liabilities 
Liquid liabilities(dependent variable) 
2 years 
ahead  
0.46 0.03 0.13 0.05 - - 0.05 - 99.27 
5 years 
ahead 
1.05 0.05 0.77 0.08 - - 0.09 - 97.59 
10 years 
ahead 
1.13 0.05 0.90 0.09 - - 0.09 - 97.73 
Notes: bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are proxies for financial development. The other variables are defined 
as follows: Spolitiy IV –substantive democracy; Polity IV- procedural democracy; xcon- constraint on executives; auto-
autocracy; school-school enrolment; pop-population; pky-per capita income; gov’t-government expenditure.  
 
  
126 
 
Table10.1b: Mean variance decomposition of innovations to institutional and real sector variables ten years ahead- 
Upper middle income countries 
S Polity Polity xcon auto school pop pky Gov’t 
Bank deposits 
6.2 0.2 4.1 0.3 11.5 5.9 - 0.2 
        
Liquid liabilities 
1.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 - - 0.1 - 
        
Private credit 
0.6 0.01 0.5 0.1 - 1.2 1.0 0.4 
        
Mean variation 
2.6 0.1 1.8 0.2 3.8 2.4 0.4 0.2 
        
Notes: All variables are defined as in tabl10.1a above 
We turn to the BVAR analysis by first highlighting the effect of shocks on the institutional and 
policy variables on FD for the income group and then providing an analysis of the forecast 
error variance decomposition of FD. It is conventional that a variable in any VAR analysis 
explains a huge proportion of its forecast error variance (Hassan et al., (2011). This is the 
case for all income groups. For all income groups, the response of FD would influence the 
direction of policy accordingly. Figures 1 to 6 portray how innovations to the institutional, 
policy and social variables affect FD. 
 
Procedural democracy 
A positive shock in democracy causes FD to increase in the first few years when using bank 
deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities as proxies for FD in the upper middle income 
countries. Bank deposits and liquid liabilities decline but remain positive, Figure 4a and 4b, 
respectively. Private credit, however, declines and stays negative (See Figure 4c). In all, 
using the three proxies for FD, a shock in procedural democracy positively impacts on FD. 
Procedural democracy accounts for an average of just 0.10% of the variation in FD for this 
income group of countries.  The results are consistent with the outcome of our initial 
estimates with democracy having a positive relationship with FD for the upper middle income 
countries.  
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Figures 4a, 4b and 4c: FD response to shocks in procedural democracy 
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Substantive democracy 
An innovation to substantive democracy portrays a J-curve effect - a short-term decline in 
private credit and bank deposits that gradually ends uprising in both. The response of private 
credit is negative for the entire period (figure 5c) while the response of bank deposits is 
negative for the first four years and then stays positive for the rest of the period (figure 5a). 
The shock sharply increases liquid liabilities but it gradually decays in the long-term. It stays 
positive throughout with the highest positive effect during the second year (figure 5b). In all, 
a one standard deviation shock to substantive democracy is positive for FD.  Substantive 
democracy accounts for averagely 2.6% of the variation in FD in the upper middle income 
countries and explains the highest proportion of the variation in FD among the institutional 
variables.  
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Figures 5a, 5b and 5c: FD response to shocks in substantive democracy 
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Constraint on executives 
A shock in constraints on executives is initially negative for private credit (figure 6c) and 
bank deposits (figure 6a) for the first year, increases in the second year for all variables 
measuring FD and decreases in the third year before dying out and remaining negative for 
liquid liabilities and private credit (figures 6b and 6c respectively). Though the results are 
seemingly mixed it weighs more on a positive impact on FD. Generally, when the impulse is 
constraint on executives, the response of FD is positive for upper middle income countries. 
Using all measures of FD, constraints on executives averagely explains 1.5% of the variation 
in FD in the region.  
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Figures 6a, 6b and 6c: FD response to shocks in procedural democracy 
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Autocracy 
Shocks to autocracy are mostly negative after six years before levelling off using bank 
deposits and private credit as measures ofFD (figure 7a and 7c respectively). The shocks 
fluctuate after the first few years but stay positive (figure 7b) when the FD proxy is liquid 
liabilities. The response of bank deposits and private credit to a shock in autocracy is 
negative for at least eight years (figures 7a and 7c respectively). Generally, innovations to 
autocracy negatively affect FD for this income group of countries. This tends to correlate with 
the results of our initial estimates with autocracy portraying a negative and insignificant 
relationship. Variations in autocracy explain averagely 0.2% of the variation in FD for the 
group of countries under study.  
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Figures 7a, 7b and 7c: FD response to shocks in autocracy 
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Per capita income 
Shocks to per capita income increase liquid liabilities and private credit during the first two 
periods. Liquid liabilities stay positive for the entire period (figure 8b) but private credit 
declines sharply after two periods before increasing and briefly stays positive and then 
levelling off (figure 8c). Bank deposits experience an initial decline after the shock before 
sharply rising after three periods before decaying (see figure 8a). The response of shocks to 
per capita income is mostly negative for bank deposits, positive for liquid liabilities and 
private credit. Generally, when the impulse is per capita income, the response of FD is 
positive. Per capita income averagely accounts for 0.40% of variation in FD for the upper 
middle income countries.  
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Figures 8a, 8b and 8c: FD response to shocks in per capita income 
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Response of financial development to shocks in social and economic (policy) 
variables 
 
This section analyses the response of FD to shocks in some of the important social and 
economic variables used as control variables for the study. The results tend to suggest that 
a shock in school enrolment and population positively affects FD in the upper middle income 
countries (figures 9a and 9b respectively). Shocks to school enrolment (which is not an 
institutional measure) explain 3.8% of fluctuations in FD in general compared to an average 
of 2.6% for substantive democracy, 0.10% for procedural democracy, 1.8% for constraint on 
executives, 0.2% for autocracy and 0.4% for per capita income. This evidence tends to 
suggest the primacy of human capital over institutions in determining FD. This seems to 
corroborate with Djankov et al., (2003) findings who contend that institutional outcomes 
depend on educational endowments. FD responds positively to a shock to government 
spending (figure 9d) which in turn accounts for 0.2% of variations in FD – though not very 
significant. Innovations to population positively affect FD (figure 9c) and account for 2.4% of 
the variation in FD. The evidence seems to suggest that appropriate government fiscal 
policies may be influencing FD positively for this income group.  
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Figures 9a, 9b, 9c and 9d: FD response to shocks in school enrolment, population and 
government spending 
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5.4.2 Variance decompositions and impulse responses for lower middle income 
countries. 
 
We first provide an analysis of the variance decomposition of FD and then highlight the 
effect of shocks on the institutional and policy variables on financial development for the 
income group. Similar to the upper middle income group, the dependent variables in any 
VAR analysis explains a huge proportion of its forecast error variance as stipulated above.  
 
The response of FD to shocks on institutional and real variables would influence the 
direction of policy especially when innovations negatively affect FD. A negative response to 
financial development following a shock would require the strengthening of institutions which 
may reduce political instability and hence instability of the financial system with the effect of 
improving confidence in the financial system and the saving and investment choices of 
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consumers and producers. A negative response to FD following a shock may trigger 
economic policies that impact on real variables with a positive feedback effect on FD. For 
instance, a shock to school enrolment that negatively affects FD may require some fiscal 
policy action; in this case an increase in government spending in education and training 
which may translate in the long-term to an increase in financial inclusion and hence 
positively influencing direct and indirect financing. A more educated and banked population 
would more probably increase the net worth households and firms thereby reducing risks 
associated with asymmetric information(adverse selection and moral hazard) hence 
increasing lending. Risk amelioration is thereby achieved.  
 
The results from innovations to institutional and policy variables and responses of FD 
together with their variance decomposition is based on the BVAR specification in equation 
5.3 above. Tables 10.1c and 10.1d portrays the results of variance decomposition and their 
mean values respectively for the lower middle income group with the three proxies for FD 
while figures 10 to 15 show the effect of shocks to institutional, policy and social variables on 
FD. 
Table 10.1c: Forecast error variance decomposition of financial development based on BVAR 
Period S 
Polity 
IV 
Polity IV xcon auto school pop pky fdi Bank 
Deposits 
Bank deposits (dependent variable) 
2 years ahead  0.001 0.17 0.13 0.31 - - 1.57 - 97.75 
5 years ahead 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.37 - - 1.65 - 97.50 
10 years 
ahead 
0.08 0.17 0.13 0.37 - - 1.74 - 97.36 
         Private 
credit 
Private credit (dependent variable) 
2 years ahead  0.02 0.02 0.04 0.34 5.61 - 0.05 0.51 98.71 
5 years ahead 0.52 0.02 0.24 0.32 9.01 - 0.09 0.79 97.33 
10 years 
ahead 
0.58 0.02 0.57 0.36 9.44 - 0.09 0.80 97.28 
         Liquid 
liabilities 
Liquid liabilities(dependent variable) 
2 years ahead  0.01 0.11 0.14 0.68 - 0.06 0.01 - 99.27 
5 years ahead 0.67 0.12 0.28 1.21 - 0.06 0.01 - 97.59 
10 years 
ahead 
0.69 0.12 0.28 1.24 - 0.06 0.01 - 97.73 
Notes: bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are proxies for financial development. The other variables are defined 
as follows: Spolitiy IV –substantive democracy; Polity IV- procedural democracy; xcon- constraint on executives; auto-
autocracy; school-school enrolment; pop-population; pky-per capita income; fdi-foreign direct investment 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Table 10.1d: Mean variance decomposition of innovations to institutional and real sector variables ten years ahead 
S Polity IV Polity IV xcon auto school pop pky fdi 
Bank deposits 
0.08 0.17 0.13 0.36 - - 1.73 - 
        
Liquid liabilities 
0.69 0.12 0.28 1.24 - 0.06 0.01 - 
        
Private credit 
0.58 0.02 0.57 0.37 9.44 - 0.09 0.81 
        
Mean variation 
0.45 0.10 0.33 0.66 3.15 0.02 0.61 0.27 
        
Notes: All variables are defined as in table 10.1c above 
 
Procedural democracy 
 
An innovation to democracy results in a decrease in FD after the first two periods before it 
sharply recovers and decays thereafter but remains negative for liquid liabilities and private 
credit (figures 10b and 10c respectively) and marginally positive for bank deposits (figure 
10a). Generally shocks to democracy negatively affect FD using all three measures of FD.  
Democracy averagely accounts for 0.10% of variation in FD for these groups of countries.  
 
Figures 10a, 10b and 10c: FD response to shocks procedural democracy 
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Substantive democracy 
 
A shock in substantive democracy causes liquid liabilities and private credit to rapidly 
decrease during the first three years before it recovers and dies out after 10 years, though 
remaining negative for the entire period (see figure 11b and 11c respectively). Bank 
deposits, however, increase after an initial decline for two years and stay positive before 
decaying (Figure 11a). In all, the response of FD to shocks in substantive democracy is 
generally negative taking into consideration all the measures of FD. Substantive democracy 
explains averagely 0.45% of variation of FD in the lower middle income countries compared 
to 2.6% in upper middle income countries.  
Figures 11a, 11b and 11c: FD response to shocks substantive democracy 
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Executive constraints 
 
Private credit responds negatively to a shock in executive constraints (figure 12c) while bank 
deposits initially increase for two periods before declining sharply (figure 12a). The response 
of liquid liabilities is negative for two periods, increases for the next two periods and finally 
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declines before decaying (figure 12b). In all, a shock in executive constraints negatively 
affects FD taking all three measures of FD into consideration. Executive constraints 
averagely contribute 0.33% of the variation in FD in the lower middle income countries 
compared to 1.8% in the upper middle income countries.  
Figures 12a, 12b and 12c: FD response to shocks inconstraints on executives 
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Autocracy 
 
Shocks in autocracy decrease private credit and liquid liabilities for the first two years then 
gradually rise in the long-term, though not significantly above zero (figure 13c and 13b 
respectively). The effect on bank deposits is positive in the first four years, but declines and 
decays in the long-term (figure 13a). Generally, the impulse response function shows that a 
shock in autocracy positively affects FD. This forecast suggests decreasing levels of 
autocracy following increasing democratisation. Autocracy explains 0.66% of FD variation on 
average.  
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Figures 13a, 13b and 13c: FD response to shocks inautocracy 
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
.0020
.0025
.0030
.0035
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of bank deposits to one SD autocracy innovation
Figure 13a
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of liqiud liabilities to one SD autocracy innovation
Figure 13b
 
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of private credit to one SD autocracy innovation
Figure 13c
 
 
Per capita income 
 
Private credit responds positively to shocks in per capita income for their entire response 
period (figure 14c) while liquid liabilities respond positively for the first four years and 
negatively for the next four years before dying out (figure 14b). Bank deposits respond 
negatively to the shock for almost the entire period (figure 14a). An innovation in per capita 
income generally increases FD for the lower middle income countries. Per capita income 
accounts for 0.61% of the variation in FD for this income group of countries.  
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Figures 14a, 14b and 14c: FD response to shocks inper capita income 
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Response of financial development to shocks in social and economic variables 
The social and economic variables of interest are school enrolment a proxy for human 
capital development and FDI respectively. A shock to school enrolment is negative for FD 
(figure 15a) and explains 3.15% of variations in FD compared to 0.45%, 0.10%, 0.33%, 
0.66% and 0.61% for substantive democracy, procedural democracy, constrain on 
executives, autocracy and per capita income respectively in lower middle income group of 
countries. The importance of human capital development is highlighted by this evidence and 
would warrant some fiscal policy intervention, most likely an increase in governments’ 
budgetary allocation towards improving education and training to mitigate the negative 
effects on FD. An innovation to FDI which measures capital account openness positively 
affects financial development (figure 15b) and accounts for 0.27% of variations in FD. 
Though the variation is not very significant, it still underscores the relation between trade 
openness, the institutional quality and FD, (Do and Levchenko, 2007; Minier, 2007).  
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Figures 15a and 15b: FD response to shocks inschool enrolment and 
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5.4.2 Variance decompositions and impulse responses for low income countries. 
In the same spirit as for the other income groups, we carry out impulse responses and 
forecast error variance decompositions of FD. Tables10.1e and 10.1f below reports the error 
variance decompositions 2, 5 and 10 years ahead and their mean values respectively, while 
figures 16 to 21 display the effect of shocks to institutional, policy and social variables on FD. 
Table 10.1e: forecast error variance decomposition of financial development based on BVAR 
Period S 
Polity 
IV 
Polity 
IV 
xcon auto inf sch fdi gov top pky Bank Deposits 
  Bank deposits (dependent variable) 
2 years 
ahead  
0.19 0.001 0.41 1.14 0.99 - 0.59 - - 0.00
2 
96.6 
5 years 
ahead 
0.31 0.01 0.90 1.16 1.01 - 0.60 - - 0.02 95.9 
10 years 
ahead 
0.32 0.01 0.97 1.17 1.01 - 0.61 - - 0.03 95.5 
           Private credit 
  Private credit (dependent variable) 
2 years 
ahead  
0.16 0.001 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.26 - 0.09 0.13 0.00
1 
98.8 
5 years 
ahead 
0.18 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.26 - 0.12 0.15 0.00
2 
98.4 
10 years 
ahead 
0.18 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.26 - 0.12 0.15 0.00
2 
98.2 
           Liquid liabilities 
  Liquid liabilities(dependent variable) 
2 years 
ahead  
0.01 0.11 1.29 0.01 - 0.27 - 0.13 - 0.10 97.8 
5 years 
ahead 
0.09 0.11 1.29 0.05 - 0.29 - 0.14 - 0.11 97.3 
10 years 
ahead 
0.09 0.11 1.29 0.05 - 0.29 - 0.14 - 0.11 97.4 
Notes: bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are proxies for financial development. The other variables are defined 
as follows: Spolitiy IV –substantive democracy; Polity IV- procedural democracy; xcon- constraint on executives; auto-
autocracy; sch-school enrolment; pky-per capita income; fdi-FDI; top-trade openness; gov-government expenditure  
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Table 10.1f: Mean variance decomposition of innovations to institutional and real sector variables ten years ahead 
S Polity IV Polity IV xcon auto pky inf gov sch fdi 
 Bank deposits 
0.33 0.01 0.97 0.16 0.02 - - - 0.61 
         
 Liquid liabilities 
0.09 0.08 1.49 0.05 0.11 - 0.12 0.23 - 
         
 Private credit 
0.18 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.15 
         
 Mean variation 
0.20 0.10 0.83 0.42 0.05 0.38 0.08 0.18 0.25 
         
Notes: All variables are defined as in table 10.1e above 
 
 
 
Procedural democracy 
 
A shock in democracy causes liquid liabilities and private credit to decrease during the first 
three years, then recovers after a year and decays (see figures 16b and 16c). The shock 
results in growth in bank deposits for three periods before facing a decline in the next year 
and gradually dies out (figure 16a). The response of liquid liabilities and private credit to an 
innovation in democracy is negative and positive for bank deposits. Generally, a shock in 
democracy decreases FD. A procedural democratic shock explains just 0.10% of FD 
fluctuations on average.  
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Figures 16a, 16b and 16c: FD response to shocks inprocedural democracy 
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Substantive democracy 
 
The impulse response function shows that innovations to substantive democracy decrease 
private credit for three years and bank deposits for two years before recovering (figure 17a 
and 17c respectively). The shock increases liquid liabilities for three years before it declines 
and dies out (figure 17b). The shock negatively affects bank deposits and private credit. 
Generally, a shock in substantive democracy tends to decrease FD. Substantive democracy 
explains 0.20% of FD variation for this group of countries.  
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Figures 17a, 17b and 17c: FD response to shocks insubstantive democracy 
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Executive constraints 
 
An innovation to constraints on executives is generally negative for FD with the highest 
negative effect occurring during the first two years. A shock decreases bank deposits for the 
entire period (figure 18a), decreases liquid liabilities for the first two periods before 
marginally becoming positive and eventually levelling off (figure 18b). The effect on private 
credit is negative for the first five years, recovers briefly and becomes negative (figure 18c). 
Constraints on executives seem to play the most important role in explaining variations in FD 
compared to the other democratic institutional and real variables. Executive constraints 
account for 0.83% of variation in FD for this group of countries.  
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Figures 18a, 18b and 18c: FD response to shocks inexecutive constraints 
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Autocracy 
 
Shocks in autocracy increase bank deposits and private credit promptly for the first three to 
four years. The effect on bank deposits is positive for the entire period (figure 19a) while 
private credit becomes negative after the third period, briefly recovers for two periods before 
becoming negative again (figure 19c). The shock decreases liquid liabilities for the first three 
years, recovers and becomes positive for a year or so and once again becoming negative for 
the rest of the period (figure 19b).  The effect of an innovation on autocracy is generally 
positive for FD. Autocracy explains the second-highest proportion of FD variation (0.42%) for 
this group of countries.  
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Figures 19a, 19b and 19c: FD response to shocks inautocracy 
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Per capita income 
A shock in per capita income decreases bank deposits for the first four periods before 
recovering but remains the entire period (figure 20a). The effect on private credit is negative 
for the first two periods, then recovers and stays positive for the next two periods, then it 
declines and becomes negative before itrecovers and decays (figure 20b).Liquid liabilities 
increase for the first three years, then quickly decline before dying out (figure 20c). 
Generally, an innovation in per capita income is negative for FD. Per capital income 
insignificantly contributes to variations in FD, accounting for just 0.05%.  
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Figures 20a, 20b and 20c: FD response to shocks inper capita income 
-.0028
-.0024
-.0020
-.0016
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of bank deposits to one SD per capita income innovation
Figure 20a
-.0050
-.0025
.0000
.0025
.0050
.0075
.0100
.0125
.0150
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of liquid liabilities to one SD per capita income innovation
Figure 20b
 
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
.0004
.0008
.0012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of private credit to one SD per capita income innovation
Figure 20c
 
 
Response of financial development to shocks in social and policy variables: trade 
openness, school enrolment, government expenditure and inflation 
Innovations on inflation, government expenditure, trade openness and FDI positively affect 
FD at least for the first two periods before declining and decaying (see figures 21a, 21b, 21c, 
21d, 21e, 21f, 21g and 21h) for this income group. Shocks on school enrolment produce 
some mixed results – they positively affect FD when using private credit (figure 21d) but 
negatively when using liquid liabilities as a measure (figure 21c) for the first two periods 
before dying out. This suggests that different measures of FD may lead to different 
outcomes. 
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Real sector variables generally explain a very low proportion of financial sector development 
variation compared to democratic institutions for this income group. Of the policy variables, 
inflation accounts for the greatest variation in FD. On average, constraints on executives 
seem to account for the greatest variation in FD followed by autocracy considering both real 
and institutional variables. 
5.5 Effect of Democratisation 
The African continent was hit by a wave of democratisation since the 1990s26, a period that 
coincided with SADC countries designing and implementing policies to improve the 
development of their financial sectors (see chapter 2). In order to determine whether 
democratisation is having a meaningful effect on FD for all income groups during this period, 
we split the sample and run similar regressions from 1990 – 2013 and compare it with the 
results obtained between 1975 and 2013. 
The initial results obtained from panel regressions for the upper middle income countries 
during the period 1975-2013 are similar to that obtained from 1990 -2013. Evidence for the 
two periods suggests that democratic institutions generally have a positive effect on FD 
except for the coefficient of substantive democracy which tends to be negative though 
insignificant for the period 1990-2013. The coefficient of autocracy is negative and significant 
suggesting that the level of autocracy during this period decreased with increasing 
democratisation. For the lower middle and low-income countries, the scenario seems to be 
the same for the two periods as well. The results in general suggest that democratic 
institutions negatively affect FD, though statistically insignificant. Some positive effects of 
                                                          
26
According to Matlosa (2006) a large number of studies affirming the fact that many countries in the 
African continent have been experiencing the process of democratization in the 1990s(see: Ake, 
1996; Hyslop, 1999; Reynolds, 1999; Ake, 2000; UNDP, 2002; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; 
Huntington, 1991; Bujra & Buthelezi, 2002, among others). 
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improved democratisation emerged for the low-income countries with autocracy being 
negatively associated with FD for the period 1990-2013, contrary to the result observed for 
the period 1975 – 2013, though it could be argued that it may be as a result of the choices of 
the regime in power, not necessarily constraints on them by democratic institutions. 
The results from the BVAR impulse responses tend to corroborate with the evidence 
obtained from panel regressions for both periods. Evidence from the low-income group 
unambiguously shows that innovations to all democratic institutional variables negatively 
affect FD for both periods. For the lower middle income countries shocks to executive 
constraints and per capita income positively affect FD between 1990 and 2013. The results 
were negative between 1975 and 2013. Shocks in autocracy positively affect FD in both 
periods, suggesting that the dictatorial choices of governments for this income group tend to 
favour policies that seem to promote FD. One could argue that the governments of this 
income group of countries carry out policy choices not subjected to pressures from any 
institution or it could be as a result of some bandwagon effect – replicating policies to 
improve FD of other governments in the region since that is the trend, in order not to be left 
out. The results for the upper middle income countries are similar in both periods, generally 
suggesting that shocks to democratic institutional variables positively affect FD and 
negatively affect FD in the case of autocracy as expected. 
The MSM for the two periods suggests that the probability of remaining in a state of high FD 
is greater for the upper middle income countries though this income group experience a 
decrease in probability in absolute terms. However, the expected duration of being in a state 
of high FD increased. The effects of democratisation could clearly be seen in the lower 
middle and low-income countries where the probability of staying in a state of low FD is 
lower between 1990 and 2013 suggesting the positive effect of increasing democratisation. 
Table 11 below shows comparative results of the MSM between the two periods.The panel 
regression results (1990-2013) and the analyses of t(z) statistics are reported in appendices 
F and G respectively while a comparative analyses of the two periods (1975-1990) and 
1990-2013) is reported in appendix H.Results of the BVAR together with analyses between 
(1990-2013) are reported in appendix I. 
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Table 11: Mean regime transition probabilities and expected durations between 1975-2013 and 1990-2013 
Upper middle income 
Regime 1   Regime 2  
  1975-2013   
Probability 0.80  Probability 0.75 
Duration 9  Duration 5 
  1990-2013   
Probability 0.66  Probability 0.34 
Duration 13  Duration 3.4 
Lower middle income 
Regime 1   Regime 2  
  1975-2013   
Probability 0.53  Probability 0.79 
Duration 2  Duration 4.8 
  1990-2013   
Probability 0.60  Probability 0.40 
Duration 3.4  Duration 1.9 
Low-income 
Regime 1   Regime 2  
  1975-2013   
Probability 0.69  Probability 0.96 
Duration 3.3  Duration 26 
  1990-2013   
Probability 0.75  Probability 0.25 
Duration 4.4  Duration 1.3 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The empirical findings for the upper middle income countries overwhelmingly suggest that 
democratic institutions on average contribute positively towards FD using all three proxies 
for FD in the OLS and IV regression models. The results also show autocracy as having a 
negative association with FD. These findings corroborate with evidence shown by Girma and 
Shortland (2008), Huang (2010), Yang (2011), Miletkov and Wintoki (2012), Deepraj and 
Nabamita (2013), among others and imply that legal and institutional development which is 
positively associated with democracy matter for FD. For the upper middle income countries, 
we show evidence that innovations to democracy (substantive and procedural), constraint on 
executives and per capita income produce positive outcomes for FD and that substantive 
democracy accounts for highest FD variation among the institutional variables applied. 
However, shocks to school enrolment and population explained the highest variation in FD, 
suggesting the importance of educational endowments on institutional outcomes. The 
positive effect of population on FD suggests the increasing level of financial inclusion in the 
economies of this income group of countries. The results also reveal that the effect of 
democracy on FD could be non-linear through government spending and per capita income 
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suggesting that democratic institutions do matter for policy variables. The non-linearities are 
consistent with evidence revealed from the work of Minier (2007). 
For the lower middle income countries, the initial results from OLS and IV regression models 
generally suggest that the contribution of democratic institutions to FD when applying all 
three measures of FD is mixed. The results are generally skewed towards having a minimal 
impact on FD. While there seems to be a positive contribution of procedural democracy and 
per capita income to FD, their contribution is insignificant. These results are, somehow, 
reflected in the BVAR estimations where shocks in the institutional variables negatively 
affect FD except for autocracy and per capita income where shocks positively contribute 
towards FD. The contribution of executive constraints is negative and significant, seemingly 
suggesting that elements of autocracy within the political regimes of the countries in question 
may be creating instability which negatively impacts on FD.  A seemingly interesting result 
from the variance decomposition shows autocracy as contributing the most towards variation 
in FD among the institutional variables. Since the forecast is ten periods ahead, the result 
suggests that decreasing levels of autocracy may be having a positive impact on FD. The 
importance of human capital development is once again highlighted, significantly contributing 
the highest towards variations in FD for this income group (3.51%). Consistent with one of 
our hypothesis, we show evidence from the MSM that countries in this income group have a 
0.53 probability of being in the regime of high FD compared to a 0.79 probability of being in a 
state of low FD and expected to spend an average of 2 and 5 years on average in these 
states, respectively. The duration in each state suggests some volatility in FD which may be 
attributed to ineffective implementation of designed policies probably resulting from 
democratic institutional weaknesses. 
 
The initial findings of the low income countries after applying OLS and IV regressions with all 
three measures of FD, suggest that per capita income and both substantive and procedural 
democracy negatively affect FD, while the effect of constraints on executives seems to be 
positive and significant. The effect of autocracy is positive but insignificant. These results, 
somehow, in line with the BVAR findings for this income group which show that per capita 
income and both substantive and procedural democracy produce negative outcomes for FD 
following innovations on these variables. Shocks to constraints on executives result in 
negative outcomes for FD while innovations on autocracy are positive for FD. The effect of 
social and economic variables following shocks emerge to be weaker for FD, with inflation 
accounting the most towards variation in FD. What stands out is that weak legal and 
democratic institutions may be exerting negative effects on FD possibly as a result of 
political instability. This evidence seems to correlate with Matlosa’s (2006) observations for 
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this group of countries. His findings suggest that the countries in this income group have a 
prevalent trend of a lawfully ensconce one-party system that ensures the continued 
supremacy of ruling parties that stifles open political competition. Such conditions may 
provide a perfect recipe for political instability as has been observed in Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. With the effect of autocracy and shocks thereof having a positive effect on FD, 
we follow La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches and Shleifer (2004) and argue that the 
dominance of the ruling party may entrench some competitive form of 
authoritarianism or advanced authoritarianism masked as democracy with the choices made 
by authoritarian regimes and not the constraints on them that have allowed these countries 
to make some gains towards FD. The policy choices of authoritarian regimes and not the 
constittutional constraints on them could be having a positive effect on FD. A possible 
reason for the negative impact on FD by per capita income may be attributed to the low 
levels of intermediation by financial institutions due to the high levels of financial exclusion or 
the increasing use of the curb market thereby drastically decreasing intermediation by 
financial institutions. Low levels of per capita income may suggest that a significant 
proportion of the population are either unemployed or are engaged in the informal sector 
which makes it difficult for them to open bank accounts or get any form of credit. These 
results, though suggestive, tend to corroborate with evidence obtained from the MSM where 
this group of countries experience a 0.96 chance of being in a state of low FD and a 0.69 
chance of attaining a high FD state accompanied by a very long duration of staying in the 
state of low FD (26 years). 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the study presents summaries of findings and conclusions as well as some 
policy implications based on the findings of the three income groups analysed in the 
previous chapter. The primary objective of the study is to determine whether democratic 
institutions are a sine qua non to FD in ten SADC countries subdivided into three income 
groups.  
Initially, the study employs robust OLS, GMM, difference GMM and system GMM estimators 
to establish the association between institutions and FD. In order to establish how shocks in 
the democratic institutional variables affect FD, the study employs BVARs. Finally, the MSM 
is introduced to the FD literature to determine the probability of switching between states of 
high FD and states of weak or low FD following political regime changes. Three measures of 
FD are used to arrive at our conclusions, namely the ratio of private credit to GDP, the ratio 
of bank deposits to GDP and liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries 
to the GDP. 
The study contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of FD; more specifically it 
contributes to the scarce literature on the institutional determinants of FD in SADC countries. 
We suggest some proximate determinants of FD in each income group of the countries 
under study in the SADC region.We show that the probability of staying in a regime of low 
FD in countries experiencing low FD is high compared to countries experiencing high FD by 
applying the MSM. By employing Bayesian inferences, we show how shocks in the 
institutional variables affect FD compared to the specific social and economic variables used 
in the study. The next section presents a summary of the study and empirical findings. 
6.2 Summary of Empirical Findings 
6.2.1 Panel regressions 
 
Apart from the institutional variables, the study finds that school enrolment, government 
expenditure, FDIs, per capita income, population, inflation and black market premium are 
proximate determinants of FD for the countries in the three income groups under study. 
These findings were obtained by applying BMA. Considering all three measures of FD as the 
dependent variables with all measures of democratic institutions (democracy- substantive 
and procedural, executive constraints, autocracy and per capita income) and controls (the 
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proximate determinants for each income group) as explanatory variables in the panel 
regression models, the study supports the hypothesis that democratic institutions tend to 
promote FD for the upper middle income countries. This finding is consistent with the work of 
Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2008), Huang (2010), Yang (2011), Deepraj and 
Nabamita (2013) who show a positive association between political institutions and FD. 
Exploring the possibilities of non-linearities27, the results reveal that democratic institutions 
also matter for policy variables, where per capita income and government expenditure tend 
to increase FD with democracy. This is a reasonable conclusion because democracy tends 
to increase the standard of living in a country as well as financial inclusion. With a bigger 
government size in developing countries experiencing democracy, there is the likelihood that 
funds would be sufficiently and efficiently allocated to set up banks in unbanked and under-
banked areas to increase access to finance.  One anomaly, however, remains for the upper 
middle income countries, whereby substantive democracy emerges to be negatively 
associated with FD. This suggests that being a democracy may not guarantee higher levels 
of FD. A possible justification for this is that the democratic credentials of this group of 
countries are in order in terms of rivalry for public office but the policies in place are not 
effectively implemented to achieve higher levels of FD. Though this is troublesome, the 
results were, however, statistically insignificant. 
The panel regression results for the lower middle income countries is somewhat mixed, with 
democratic institutions weighted more towards having a minimal impact on FD. What clearly 
emerges from the results is that the contribution of executive constraints is negative and 
significant, seemingly suggesting that elements of autocracy within the political regimes of 
the countries in question may be creating instability which negatively impacts on FD. Two of 
the lower middle income countries’ political regimes (Lesotho and Swaziland) are 
characterised by absolute monarchies suggesting that the preferences of the monarchy are 
much more entrenched in relation to the preferences of the populace in making decisions. 
This evidence is consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (2004). Non-linearities 
between democracy and FD emerge through per capita income and black market premium 
for this income group. This suggests that with democratisation appropriate government 
policies would be implemented to curb exchange market imperfections (through regulations 
that limit the flow of foreign exchange through the black market), thereby increasing the 
amount of foreign exchange intermediated by banks and hence increasing the financial 
sector size. 
                                                          
27
 Non-linearities could not be determined from the cumulative effect on the three proxies of financial 
development, since the control variables tend sometimes to differ depending on the measure of 
financial development applied when carrying out Bayesian model averaging. 
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The panel regression results for the low-income countries also suggest that weak democratic 
institutions may be exerting negative effects on FD possibly resulting from political instability. 
This evidence seems to corroborate with Matlosa’s (2006) observations that the countries in 
this income group have a pervasive trend of an entrenched de jure one-party system that 
ensure the continued dominance of ruling parties and stifles open political competition, a 
perfect recipe for political instability. Again, consistent with La Porta’s et al. (2004) findings, 
autocracy positively affects FD for this income group suggesting that the choices made by 
authoritarian regimes and not the constraints on them have allowed these countries to make 
some gains towards FD. The findings tend to contradict Huang’s (2010) assertion that 
democratic transformation is followed by improvements in FD in the short-run to medium run 
for the lower middle and low-income countries and seem to support the view by Mulligan, Gil 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004) who contend that democracies have important effects on the 
degree of competition for public office, but otherwise have insignificant effects on public 
policies. For this income group, evidence of non-linearities between democracy and FD 
emerge through per capita income, trade openness and school enrolment. Though it is not 
obvious that democratisation necessarily leads to trade openness Tavares (2007), one may 
argue that a positive relationship could increase the inflow of funds intermediated by banks, 
e.g. through FDIs, thereby increasing FD.   
Overall, evidence from the panel regression results corroborates the view in existing 
literature that democratic institutions tend to promote FD28 for the upper middle income 
countries; having a minimal role in the lower middle income countries and seemingly the 
least role in the low-income countries. The reader should bear in mind that the three 
measures of FD produce different results for the different income groups and the analyses 
are based on the t(z)-statistics and probabilities of the explanatory variables of interest of all 
three measures of FD averaged over the different models applied.  Using different estimation 
techniques to cater for endogeneity, model uncertainty and analyses of t-statistics and 
probabilities for each estimator with the three dependent variables ensures robust results. 
The Hansen’s J –statistic is used to test the validity of over-identifying restrictions of the IV 
regressions. The statistic is far from the rejection of its null, giving us the confidence that our 
instrument set is appropriate.  
6.2.2 Markov Switching Model (MSM) 
 
Evidence from the MSM suggests that in the upper middle income countries where 
democratic institutions are stronger, they have on the average a greater probability to be in a 
                                                          
28
 This is because of institutional features such as increasing political competition and political checks 
and balances (Yang, 2011). 
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state of high FD than being in a state of low FD. The results also suggest that being in a high 
FD state is sustainable from the medium to long-term for the countries under this income 
group. On the other hand, the lower middle and low-income countries in which weaker 
democratic institutions prevail tend to have a greater chance of being in a state of low FD 
and remaining in that state for longer periods of time. The findings from the Markov Model 
reveal that the weaker the democratic institutions of the countries under study the greater 
the probability of being in a state of low FD and the longer the durationof being in such a 
state. We argue and show evidence in the lower middle and low-income countries that 
instability in financial relations could be reinforced by political instability in autocratic 
regimes, thereby, negatively affecting FD and vice versa – the probabilities and expected 
durations of being in a state of high or low FD highlight this point where less democratic 
regimes have a higher probability of being in a state of low FD (lower middle and low income 
countries) and for longer periods compared to more democratic regimes upper middle 
income countries). The findings also reveal that there is the possibility of hovering between 
states of low and high FD irrespective of the state of democracy of the income group, 
consistent with the financial instability hypothesis. 
6.2.3 Impulse responses and variance decomposition 
 
The impulse responses suggest that innovations to democratic institutional variables results 
in positive outcomes for FD for the upper middle income countries as a whole with 
substantive democracy proving to be the most important variable in accounting for variations 
in FD among the institutional variables. The effect of human capital development (school 
enrolment) supersedes all other variables in explaining FD for this income group. The effect 
of human capital development on growth in the literature is widely documented but not the 
case with FD. This evidence adds to the scarce literature on the effect of human capital 
development on FD. 
The effect of shocks to all institutional variables in the lower middle income countries 
negatively affects FD except for autocracy having a positive effect and accounts the most for 
variations in FD among the institutional variables. The importance of human capital 
development is once again highlighted; significantly contributing the highest towards 
variations in FD for this income group. Evidence from innovations to institutional variables in 
low-income countries is shown to be negative for FD except for autocracy, which positively 
affects FD following shocks. Constrain on executives accounts for the highest variation in FD 
among both institutional and policy variables for this income group. The implications of these 
findings were discussed above. 
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6.3 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
A significant policy implication from the empirical finding is that, on average, democratic 
institutions promote FD for the upper middle income countries where they are stronger and 
tend to retard FD for the lower middle and low-income countries where they are weaker. 
Though each country has developed a strategic framework to improve FD which more or 
less is running concurrently with the process of democratisation, democratic institutions in 
general, in the lower middle and low-income countries are still not positively associated with 
FD. This finding seems to be consistent with the work of Yang (2011), Mulligan et al. (2004) 
who find that democracies seem to increase political competition and the quest for public 
office but have little effect on the policies of the government. Taking the lower middle and 
low-income countries into consideration, autocracy seems to be having a positive effect on 
FD supporting La Porta et al.’s (2004) argument that the choices made by authoritarian 
regimes and not the constraints on them have allowed some countries to make gains 
towards FD. We contend that in order for these countries to take significant strides towards 
sustaining and improving the financial sector, developing and empowering democratic 
institutions is sacrosanct. For all three income groups, governments should be aware of the 
positive indirect channels through which democratic institutions may affect FD when it seeks 
to pursue other policy objectives such as increasing per capita income, government 
expenditure, trade openness, human capital development and black market premium. 
The association between democratic institutions and FD is undeniably complex given the 
different measures of FD. The different measures of FD produce different results for the 
different income groups.  In light of this, the study holds that the results are at best 
suggestive but overall, the evidence corroborates with the view that democratic institutions 
tend to promote FD for the upper middle income countries where their democratic 
credentials seem to be in place, having a minimal impact for the lower middle income 
countries and the least effect on the low-income countries where weaker democratic 
institutions tend to prevail. In conclusion we argue that improving democratic institutions are 
important requisites in promoting FD and ensuring relatively stable financial sectors. 
6.4 Limitation of the Study and Areas for Further Research 
 
First, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes (2004) contend that the institutional measures 
widely used in the literature are not formulated to indicatelimits on government or 
enduringcharacteristics of the political environment. They measure outcomes rather than 
institutional constraints (for instance, a country experiencing autocratic rule, where the 
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incumbent freely chooses good policies should not be ranked as having good institutions). 
Though there is still no consensus on this, an avenue for further research could be to rely on 
executive constraints as the institutional measure when exploring the relationship between 
institutions and FD in the SADC region.  
Secondly, cross-country data tend to encounter measurement and comparability problems29. 
The deficiency of quality data with similarities across countries is a basic impediment for 
applying the results of extensive comparative studies. Ang (2008) notes that analyses on 
extensive comparative studies done on a composite level may not be able to effectively 
encapsulate the peculiarities of the financial environment and history of the countries under 
study and hence may not provide any credible policy direction.  In view of this limitation, 
further studies could be executed on country specific bases where a thorough 
comprehension of the financial historical environment of each country is considered (Ang, 
2008). 
The study has mainly focused on bank-based intermediation, playing down the role 
institutions might have on the other constituents of the financial system, such as bond 
markets, stock markets, pension funds, insurance companies, etc. Though the market-based 
financial sector is still in its infancy in most of the countries under study, ignoring these 
intermediaries may lead to an underestimation of the level of FD in the region. Including the 
market-based proxies in the estimation could present a more ‘complete’ picture of FD. In 
essence, exploring what institutional factors shape the financial sector (including both bank-
based and market-based intermediation) could serve as another avenue for research in the 
SADC region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 We attempt to mitigate this problem by the use of Bayesian inferences – the curse of 
dimensionality. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Variables, description and data sources: 
Variable Description Source 
 
Per capita income (constant 2000 US$) GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data 
are in current U.S. dollars. 
 
World Development Indicators,2015 
Private credit to GDP (%) The share bankcredit to the private 
sector, defined as the credit issued to 
the private sector by banks and other 
financial intermediaries divided by the 
GDP (hereafter private credit), excluding 
the credit issued to government, 
government agencies, and public 
enterprises, as well as credit issued by 
the monetary authority and development 
banks. This captures the general 
financial intermediary activities provided 
to the private sector 
World Financial Structure and Economic 
Development database, 2015 
Bank Deposits to GDP (%)  The ratio of bank deposits to the GDP 
includes the total assets held by deposit 
money banks as a share of GDP. 
Assets include claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector which includes 
central, state and local governments, 
nonfinancial public enterprises and 
private sector. Deposit money banks 
comprise commercial banks and other 
financial institutions that accept 
transferable deposits, such as demand 
deposits. 
World Financial Structure and Economic 
Development database, 2015 
Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid 
liabilities are also known as broad 
money, or M3. They are the sum of 
currency and deposits in the central 
bank (M0), plus transferable deposits 
and electronic currency (M1), plus time 
and savings deposits, foreign currency 
transferable deposits, certificates of 
deposit, and securities repurchase 
agreements (M2), plus travellers 
checks, foreign currency time deposits, 
commercial paper, and shares of mutual 
funds or market funds held by residents. 
 
World Financial Structure and Economic 
Development database, 2015 
Enrolment ratio secondary (% gross) This includes the gross enrolment ratio 
in secondary education in all 
programmes. Total is the total 
enrolment in secondary education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a 
percentage of the population of official 
secondary education age. Gross 
enrolment ratio can exceed 100% due 
to the inclusion of over-aged and under-
aged students because of early or late 
school entrance and grade repetition. 
World Development Indicators, 2015 
Government expenditure to GDP (%)
  
General government final consumption 
expenditure (formerly general 
government consumption) includes all 
government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees). 
It also includes most expenditure on 
national defence and security, but 
excludes government military 
World Development Indicators, 2015 
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expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation. 
FDI to GDP (%) FDI are the net inflows of investment to 
acquire a lasting management interest 
(10 percent or more of voting stock) in 
an enterprise operating in an economy 
other than that of the investor. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other longterm capital, and 
short-term capital as shown in the 
balance of payments. This series shows 
net inflows (new investment inflows less 
disinvestment) in the reporting economy 
from foreign investors, and is divided by 
GDP. 
World Development Indicators, 2015 
Population, total Total population is based on the de 
facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship--except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the 
country of asylum, who are generally 
considered part of the population of their 
country of origin. The values shown are 
midyear estimates. 
World Development Indicators, 2015 
Black market premium It is calculated as the premium in the 
parallel exchange market relative to the 
official market (i.e. the formula is 
(parallel exchange rate/official exchange 
rate-1) x100). 
 
Global Development Network database, 
2009 
Trade openness (current account 
openness) 
The trade-to-GDP-ratio is the sum of 
exports and imports divided by GDP. 
This indicator measures a country’s 
'openness' or 'integration' in the world 
economy. It represents the combined 
weight of total trade in its economy, a 
measure of the degree of dependence 
of domestic producers on foreign 
markets and their trade orientation (for 
exports) and the degree of reliance of 
domestic demand on foreign supply of 
goods and services (for imports). 
Penn World Table 7.1, 2015 
Polity IV index (procedural democracy) Index of democracy. It is called the 
“combined polity score”, equal to the 
democracy score minus the authority 
score. The democracy and authority 
scores are derived from six authority 
characteristics (regulation, 
competitiveness and openness to 
executive recruitment, operational 
independence of chief executive or 
executive constraints, regulation and 
competition of participation). Based on 
these criteria each country is assigned a 
democracy and autocracy score that 
ranges from 0 to 10. Accordingly, polity 
2 ranges from -10 to 10 with higher 
values representing more democratic 
regimes.  
 
Polity IV Database (Marshall, Jaggers 
and Gurr, 2015) 
S Polity IV (substantive democracy) 
 
This variable is drawn from the Polity IV 
index. We use dummies to compute a 
series of substantive democracy in each 
country. Where the score is greater than 
or equal to six we allocate the value of 1 
otherwise 0 from 1975 to 2010 for each 
country under study across the different 
income groups. 
Author’s own determination. 
 
Inflation 
 
Consumer prices, annual percentage. 
 
World Development Indicators, 2015 
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Appendix B: Diagnostic test results, Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity: 
Individual variables 
B1: Upper middle income countries 
Variables      t-Statistic    Probability* 
Bank deposits     -13.3023    0.0000 
Autocracy     -11.8321    0.0000 
Black market premium    -10.0676    0.0000 
Polity IV      -11.7898    0.0000 
FDI      -13.8939    0.0000 
Government expenditure    -9.5099    0.0000 
Inflation      -10.8763    0.0000 
Liquid liabilities     -6.8072    0.0000 
Per capita income     -15.6875    0.0000 
S Polity IV     -11.8311    0.0000 
Population     -10.4212    0.0000 
Private credit     -18.4169    0.0000 
School enrolment     -12.9545    0.0000 
Trade openness     -14.7626    0.0000 
Constraint on executive    -11.8321    0.0000   
*MacKinnon (1996) one sided p-values at 5% level of significance. 
B2: Lower middle income countries 
Variables      t-Statistic    Probability* 
Bank deposits     -11.2927    0.0000 
Autocracy     -10.2007    0.0000 
Black market premium    -11.5662    0.0000 
Polity IV      -10.1700    0.0000 
FDI      -4.1310    0.0013 
Government expenditure    -3.0031    0.0379 
Inflation      -9.1565    0.0000 
Liquid liabilities     -15.6042    0.0000 
Per capita income     -10.3929    0.0000 
S Polity IV     -9.3247    0.0000 
Population     -8.0714    0.0000 
Private credit     -2.8769    0.0500 
School enrolment     -11.7327    0.0000 
Trade openness     -10.5635    0.0000 
Constraint on executive    -11.5662    0.0000   
*MacKinnon (1996) one sided p-values at 5% level of significance. 
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B3: Low-income countries 
Variables      t-Statistic    Probability* 
Bank deposits     -9.8655    0.0000 
Autocracy     -9.9650    0.0000 
Black market premium    -4.1729    0.0012 
Polity IV      -12.2200    0.0000 
FDI      -4.7739    0.0001 
Government expenditure    -12.6064    0.0000 
Inflation      -5.3630    0.0000 
Liquid liabilities     -15.6042    0.0000 
Per capita income     -11.0529    0.0000 
S Polity IV     -10.7456    0.0000 
Population     -6.7888    0.0000 
Private credit     -2.8769    0.0500 
School enrolment     -10.9162    0.0000 
Trade openness     -11.0440    0.0000 
Constraint on executive    -3.5980    0.0000   
*MacKinnon (1996) one sided p-values at 5% level of significance. 
Appendix C:  Heteroskedasticity tests 
C1: Upper middle income 
Bank deposits 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 20.15582 Prob. F(12,131) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 93.40862 Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 382.3364 Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.0000 
     
     
All three statistics reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
 
Liquid liabilities 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 3.377826 Prob. F(9,134) 0.0009 
Obs*R-squared 26.62805 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0016 
Scaled explained SS 70.19836 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
All three statistics reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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Private credit 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 1.411616 Prob. F(11,132) 0.1747 
Obs*R-squared 15.15647 Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.1754 
Scaled explained SS 34.62199 Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.0003 
     
     
The first two statistics does reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity while the third does reject H0 
 
C2: Lower middle income 
Bank deposits 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 1.145231 Prob. F(8,97) 0.3405 
Obs*R-squared 9.147879 Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.3300 
Scaled explained SS 10.43658 Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.2357 
     
     
 
All three statistics does not reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
Liquid liabilities 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 2.924662 Prob. F(9,96) 0.0042 
Obs*R-squared 22.80970 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0066 
Scaled explained SS 38.54359 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
All three statistics does reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
 
 
Private credit 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 1.142120 Prob. F(9,96) 0.3413 
Obs*R-squared 10.25209 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.3305 
Scaled explained SS 16.70513 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0535 
     
     
All three statistics does not reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
C3: Low-income 
Bank deposits 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 2.830441 Prob. F(9,96) 0.0054 
Obs*R-squared 22.22897 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0082 
Scaled explained SS 254.2020 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
All three statistics does reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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Liquid liabilities 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 4.841057 Prob. F(9,96) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 33.09009 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0001 
Scaled explained SS 221.0423 Prob. Chi-Square(9) 0.0000 
     
     
All three statistics reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
 
Private credit 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     
F-statistic 0.607641 Prob. F(12,93) 0.8308 
Obs*R-squared 7.706718 Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.8076 
Scaled explained SS 105.6121 Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.0000 
     
     
The first two statistics reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity while the third does reject H0 
 
Appendix D:  Autocorrelation tests 
 
D1: Upper middle income 
 
Bank deposits 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.615896    Prob. F(2,128) 0.2027 
Obs*R-squared 3.521603    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.1719 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order two 
Liquid liabilities 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.407036    Prob. F(2,132) 0.6665 
Obs*R-squared 0.882635    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6432 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order two 
Private credit 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.343957    Prob. F(2,130) 0.7096 
Obs*R-squared 0.757985    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6846 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order two 
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D2: Lower middle income 
Bank deposits 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.231670    Prob. F(2,94) 0.7937 
Obs*R-squared 0.519928    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7711 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order two 
Liquid liabilities 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.254621    Prob. F(2,94) 0.2899 
Obs*R-squared 2.756002    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2521 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order two 
Private credit 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.681124    Prob. F(2,94) 0.1917 
Obs*R-squared 3.660538    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.1604 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order two 
D3: Low-income 
Bank deposits 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.865459    Prob. F(3,93) 0.1408 
Obs*R-squared 6.016610    Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.1108 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order three 
Liquid liabilities 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.338100    Prob. F(2,94) 0.7140 
Obs*R-squared 0.757077    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6849 
     
     
 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order three 
Private credit 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.405757    Prob. F(2,91) 0.6677 
Obs*R-squared 0.936925    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.6260 
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Appendix E: Filtered and smoothed regime probabilities: 
E1:  Upper middle income 
Bank deposits as dependent variable:
 
 
Private credit as dependent variable: 
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Liquid liabilities as dependent variable: 
 
E2: Lower middle income 
 
Bank deposits as dependent variable: 
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Private credit as dependent variable: 
 
 
Liquid liabilities as dependent variable: 
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E3: Low-income 
 
Bank deposits as dependent variable: 
 
 
 
 
Private credit as dependent variable: 
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Liquid liabilities as dependent variable: 
 
 
Appendix F: Panel regressions: Democracy and financial development: Cross-section 
results: (1990-2013) 
F1: Upper middle income countries: 1990-2013 
OLS, GMM, Difference and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Bank deposits 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.15 (0.36) 0.11(0.31) 0.38*(0.09) 0.40***(0.00) 
Executive constraint 0.24*(0.03) 0.23***(0.00) -0.11(0.21) 0.18*(0.10) 
S Polity IV -0.25***(0.00) -0.25***(0.00) -0.28***(0.00) -0.25***(0.00) 
Polity IV 0.20***(0.00) 0.18*(0.00) 0.21***(0.00) 0.30***(0.00) 
Government expenditure 0.46(0.41)    0.76(0.12) 1.13***(0.00) 1.01(0.28) 
Population 0.06(0.89) 0.02(0.94) 0.42*(0.10) 0.68(0.51) 
School -0.98(0.12) -1.43**(0.02) -0.64(0.17) -1.99*(0.09) 
Lag bank deposits  -0.01(0.91) 0.04(0.48) 0.14*(0.09) 0.17*(0.11) 
Per capita income -0.62(0.79) 0.86(0.70) -0.90(0.23) -4.24(0.15) 
Polity IV*Government -0.69(0.35) -1.04*(0.10) -1.47***(0.00) -1.34(0.25) 
Polity IV*school 1.14*(0.10) 1.64**(0.01) 0.63(0.26) -1.99*(0.09) 
Polity IV*per capita 
income 
-0.02(0.99) -1.3(0.59)  -0.32(0.76) 2.44*(0.40) 
Polity IV*population 0.14(0.83) 0.21(0.69) -0.63(0.17) 0.15(0.92) 
Constant -0.005(0.85) 0.08**(0.04) 0.001(0.88) 0.002(0.69) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   2.96(0.23) 6.09(0.09) 0.04(0.84) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  92 92 92 92 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.45 0.42 0.91 0.35 
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Private credit 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.09(0.36) -0.30***(0.00) 0.45***(0.00)) 0.12**(0.65) 
Executive constraint -0.33***(0.00) -0.30***(0.00) 0.08(0.56) -0.24*(0.07) 
polity IV -0.21***(0.00) -0.19***(0.00) -0.30***(0.00) -0.20*(0.06) 
S Polity IV 0.21***(0.00) 0.21***(0.00) -0.04(0.22) 0.22***(0.00) 
Government expenditure 0.04**(0.77) 0.02(0.78) -0.40(0.40) -0.02*(0.18) 
Population 0.30**(0.02) 0.29***(0.00) -0.21*(0.06) -0.001(0.98) 
Lag private credit  -0.10(0.36) 0.05(0.68) -0.56***(0.00) -0.46***(0.00) 
Per capita income -3.77**(0.04) -3.25(0.23) 1.34(0.41) -9.67(0.22) 
Polity IV*Government -0.08(0.67) -0.06(0.49) 0.48(0.41) -8.59(0.26) 
Polity IV*population -0.35**(0.02) -0.33***(0.00) -0.41***(0.00) -3.55(0.04) 
Constant -0.03(0.35) -0.04(0.36) 0.0003(0.26) 0.05(0.73) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   3.32(0.16) 5.08(0.12) 1.73(0.42) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  92 92 92 92 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.62 0.21 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
 
OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Liquid liabilities 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.79**(0.00) -0.70***(0.00) -0.71***(0.00) -0.83(0.25) 
Executive constraints 0.54***(0.00) 0.49***(0.00) 0.31***(0.00) 0.56**(0.02) 
polity IV 0.02*(0.82) -0.01(0.84) 0.14***(0.00) 0.38*(0.06) 
S Polity IV -0.42***(0.00) -0.40***(0.00) -0.27***(0.00) -0.24(0.12) 
Lag liquid liabilities 0.44***(0.00) 0.59***(0.00) 0.13(0.30) -0.15**(0.01) 
Per capita income 9.61*(0.01) 7.33***(0.27) 2.71***(0.09) -5.05*(0.04) 
Polity IV*Per capita 
income 
-9.92*(0.05) -7.24***(0.38) -2.81*(0.14) 8.04***(0.00) 
Constant 0.50***(0.00) 0.52***(0.00) 0.001(0.84) -0.02*(0.09) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   6.49(0.07) 5.74(0.17) 0.06(0.80) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  92 92 92 92 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.52 0.51 0.89 0.29 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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F2: Lower middle income countries: 1990 – 2013. 
OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
 
Dependent variable – Bank deposits 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.05(0.19) 0.05(0.46) -0.001***(0.99) -0.09(0.14) 
Executive constraints 0.02(0.84) 0.01(0.93) -0.23**(0.04) -0.16(0.18) 
S Polity IV 0.01(0.48) 0.01(0.61) -0.0001(0.99) 0.05(0.21) 
Polity IV -0.01(0.61) -0.01(0.50) 0.01(0.65) 0.06**(0.03) 
Lag bank deposits  0.17(0.20) 0.16(0.18) -0.33***(0.00) -0.43***(0.00) 
Per capita income -0.71(0.14) -0.70(0.18) -0.93***(0.00) -1.60**(0.01) 
Polity IV*per capita 
income 
3.86(0.15) 4.00**(0.03) 3.24***(0.00) 3.56***(0.00) 
Constant -0.01(0.66) 0.01(0.11) 0.001(0.64) -0.05(0.59) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   0.20(0.65) 3.41(0.17) 6.28(0.06) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  69 69 69 69 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 16 0.15 0.41 0.01 
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
 
OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Private credit 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.14***(0.00) -0.13(0.87) -0.02(0.63) -0.24*(0.09) 
Executive constraints  -0.23(0.14) -1.20(0.28) -0.07(0.66) -0.46*(0.06) 
polity IV 0.02(0.83) 0.01(0.98) 2.89**(0.03) 0.11(0.21) 
S Polity IV -0.02(0.28) -0.04(0.81) -0.01(0.90) 0.01(0.74) 
FDI (fdi) 0.93***(0.00) 1.27(0.54) 0.47(0.31) 0.51(0.38) 
School enrolment 0.67***(0.00) 0.88**(0.01) 0.43**(0.01) 0.90***(0.00) 
Lag private credit  0.79***(0.00) 1.03***(0.00) 0.53***(0.00) 1.04***(0.00) 
Per capita income -0.44(0.48) -0.09(0.42) 0.47(0.31) -0.17(0.82) 
Polity IV*fdi 1.32(0.61) -0.47(0.74) -0.28(0.2)  -2.55(0.89) 
Polity IV  School enrolment 3.21(0.34) -1.08(0.33) -0.31*(0.11) 0.28(0.97) 
Constant -0.26***(0.00) -0.17***(0.00) -0.001(0.62) -0.43(0.62) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   0.98(0.60) 7.36(0.04) 6.29(0.09) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   69 69 69 69 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.92 0.77 0.97 0.87 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Liquid liabilities 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.01(0.94) -0.03(0.73) -0.03(0.75) 0.04(0.77) 
Executive constraints -0.53(0.15)   -0.12(0.66) -0.30(0.34) -0.30(0.43) 
polity IV -0.18(0.65) -0.28*(0.12) 0.11*(0.11)   0.15(0.15) 
S Polity IV -0.06(0.28) -0.14(0.60) -0.02(0.81) -0.03(0.73) 
Lag liquid liabilities -0.48***(0.00) -0.32**(0.03) -0.63***(0.00) -0.83***(0.00) 
Per capita income -1.57(0.25)       -0.61(0.73) -3.64(0.13) -6.29**(0.04) 
Population 0.06(0.75) 0.06(0.64) -0.05(0.75) -0.004(0.98) 
Polity IV  Population -48.44(0.35) -37.78**(0.22) 2.87(0.17) -5.52(0.18) 
Polity IV*Per capita 
income 
-1.44(0.88) -4.70(0.47) -7.80(0.20) -10.19*(0.06) 
Constant 0.01*(0.42) 0.02*(0.08) 0.0002(0.94) -0.01(0.64) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   6.87(0.08) 6.45(0.09) 6.12(0.06) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  69 69 69 69 
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 
R-squared 0.34 0.29 0.60 0.54 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
 
F3: Low-income countries: 1990-2013 
OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Bank deposits 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.06(0.67) -0.02(0.83) -0.01(0.74) 0.04(0.79) 
Executive constraints 0.30(0.25) -0.26*(0.08) -0.38*(0.06) -0.19(0.29) 
S Polity IV -0.11(0.42) 0.17**(0.03) 0.13*(0.09) 0.04(0.55) 
Polity IV -1.05(0.54) -0.55(0.51) 0.003(0.98) -0.05(0.38) 
Lag bank deposits  0.40***(0.00) 0.44***(0.00) -0.18(0.23) -0.05(0.64) 
Per capita income -2.59***(0.00) -1.29(0.29) -1.28***(0.00) -2.31(0.39) 
Inflation  22.9***(0.00) 2.5(0.60)  5.69(0.63) 8.79(0.15) 
FDI -0.31(0.93) 3.01(0.27) 2.75***(0.00) 5.15(0.42) 
Polity IV  FDI 20.7(0.78) 13.3(0.64) 8.45*(0.10) -156.52(0.64) 
Polity IV  Inflation 75.9(0.56) 41.3(0.47) 10.3*(0.17) -385.83(0.63) 
Polity IV x per capita 
income 
2.49(0.86) 1.29(0.87) 0.14(0.91) -5.12(0.92) 
Constant -0.40***(0.00) -0.05(0.71) 0.003*(0.17) -0.002(0.97) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   2.72(0.25) 3.36(0.18) 2.68(0.26) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  69 69 69 69 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.48 0.36 0.07 0.19 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Private credit 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy 0.13(0.48) 0.10(0.44) 0.11***(0.00) 0.23*(0.10) 
Executive constraints  -0.21(0.55) 0.02(0.91) -0.02(0.76) 0.03(0.87) 
polity IV -2.48(0.62) 0.07(0.72) -0.09(0.28) 2.06(0.45) 
S Polity IV 0.16(0.43) 0.03(0.75) 0.03(0.17) -0.02(0.88) 
Government expenditure 0.12(0.37) -0.05(0.58) -0.05***(0.00) -0.01(0.93) 
Inflation -11.51(0.14) -0.55(0.89) -0.61(0.31) 0.54(0.91) 
Per capita income -2.41**(0.01) -1.14(0.20) -1.12***(0.00) -1.12(0.22) 
School enrolment -0.07(0.81) 0.04***(0.80) 0.03(0.38) -0.18(0.59) 
Trade openness 16.43(0.58) 11.60(0.55) 11.70***(0.00) 17.28(0.53) 
Lag private credit 0.13(0.36) 0.25*(0.08) 0.25***(0.00) -0.58**(0.04) 
Polity IV  Government 9.81(0.69) 4.82(0.39) -0.14(0.85) 34.78(0.41) 
Polity IV  Inflation 191.84(0.58) 59.6(0.45) -310.8***(0.00) -992.14(0.17) 
Polity IV  Per capita income 34.11(0.32) 14.5(0.21) 1.60(0.53) -7.29(0.83) 
Polity IV  trade openness 1123.45(0.83) 1107**(0.02) 153.76(0.32) 6714.29(0.39) 
Polity IV  school enrolment 3.48(0.89) 5.04*(0.09) -0.05(0.93) -18.16(0.23) 
Constant  -0.17(0.18) -0.13*(0.09) 0.008(0.55) 37.95(0.40) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   2.36(0.30) 5.07(0.10) 1.73(0.42) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  69 69 69 69 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.33 0.25 0.99 0.18 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
 
OLS, GMM, DGMM and system GMM fixed effect estimation  
Dependent variable – Liquid liabilities 
Explanatory variables OLS GMM DGMM SGMM 
Autocracy -0.29(0.37) -0.23(0.12) -0.10(0.49) -0.36(0.30) 
Executive constraints 0.09(0.84) 0.10(0.43) 0.39(0.38) 0.38(0.52) 
polity IV 0.43(0.49) 0.38**(0.02) 0.18**(0.05) -0.08(0.54) 
S Polity IV -0.05(0.49) -0.06(0.54) -0.10(0.56) -0.15(0.41) 
Per capita income  -0.29(0.68) -0.20(0.48) 0.04(0.81) -0.52(0.63) 
Government expenditure -1.45***(0.00) -1.16***(0.00) -0.06(0.33) -0.24(0.63) 
School enrolment 0.35(0.54) 0.03(0.94) 0.005(0.93) 0.19(0.79) 
Lag liquid liabilities  -0.23**(0.02) -0.13(0.12) -0.35**(0.01) -0.86***(0.00) 
Polity IV  school 
enrolment 
5.11(0.42) 5.04***(0.00) 4.59**(0.02) 3.94(0.01) 
Constant 0.001(0.99) 0.01(0.85) 0.003(0.83) -0.01(0.82) 
     
Hansen’s J statistic   5.79(0.06) 3.40(0.18) 2.95(0.22) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  69 69 69 69 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.52 0.44 0.44 0.56 
     
Notes: P-values are reported in parenthesis. * denote significance at 10%, ** denote significance at 5%, and *** denote 
significance at 1%. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Country dummy included but not reported. 
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Appendix G: Analyses of t (z)- statistics and P-values in all regressions: (1990-2013) 
G1:  Upper middle income countries 
 
Explanatory variables of 
interest/dependent 
variables 
(+) significant (+) insignificant (-) significant (-) insignificant 
Autocracy     
Bank deposits 2 2 0 0 
Private credit 2 0 1 1 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 3 1 
     
Constraint on 
executives 
    
Bank deposits 3 1 0 0 
Private credit 0 1 3 0 
Liquid liabilities 4 0 0 0 
     
Democracy (procedural)     
Bank deposits 4 0 0 0 
Private credit 0 0 4 0 
Liquid liabilities 3 0 0 1 
     
Democracy 
(substantive) 
    
Bank deposits 0 0 4 0 
Private credit 3 0 0 1 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 3 1 
     
Per capita income     
Bank deposits 0 0 1 3 
Private credit 0 1 2 1 
Liquid liabilities 3 0 1 0 
Notes: Bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are the dependent variables. All control variables are determined by 
BMA. The values in the table indicate the sign and significance of the explanatory variable of interest in all regressions. The 
analyses are based on tables [(iii)a, (iii)b and (iii)c above) 
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G2:  Lower middle income countries 
Analyses of t(z)- statistics and P-values in all regressions: 
Explanatory variables of 
interest/dependent 
variables 
(+) significant (+) insignificant (-) significant (-) insignificant 
Autocracy     
Bank deposits 0 2 1 1 
Private credit 0 1 0 3 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 0 4 
     
Constraint on 
executives 
    
Bank deposits 0 2 1 1 
Private credit 0 0 1 3 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 0 4 
     
Democracy (procedural)     
Bank deposits 1 1 0 2 
Private credit 1 3 0 0 
Liquid liabilities 1 1 1 1 
     
Democracy 
(substantive) 
    
Bank deposits 0 2 1 1 
Private credit 0 1 0 3 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 0 4 
     
Per capita income     
Bank deposits 0 0 2 2 
Private credit 0 0 1 3 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 1 3 
Notes: Bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are the dependent variables. All control variables are determined by 
BMA. The values in the table indicate the sign and significance of the explanatory variable of interest in all regressions. The 
analyses are based on tables [(iii)a, (iii)b and (iii)c above) 
G3: Low-income countries 
Analyses of t(z)- statistics and P-values in all regressions: 
Explanatory variables of 
interest/dependent 
variables 
(+) significant (+) insignificant (-) significant (-) insignificant 
Autocracy     
Bank deposits 0 2 0 2 
Private credit 2 2 0 0 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 0 4 
     
Constraint on 
executives 
    
Bank deposits 0 1 2 1 
Private credit 0 2 0 2 
Liquid liabilities 0 4 0 0 
     
Democracy (procedural)     
Bank deposits 0 1 0 3 
Private credit 0 2 1 1 
Liquid liabilities 2 1 0 1 
     
Democracy 
(substantive) 
    
Bank deposits 2 1 0 1 
Private credit 0 3 0 1 
Liquid liabilities 0 0 0 4 
     
Per capita income     
Bank deposits 0 0 2 2 
Private credit 0 0 2 2 
Liquid liabilities 0 1 0 3 
Notes: Bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities are the dependent variables. All control variables are determined by 
BMA. The values in the table indicate the sign and significance of the explanatory variable of interest in all regressions. The 
analyses are based on tables 5.18a, 5.18b and 5.18c above. 
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Appendix H: Comparative analysis 
Results from OLS, GMM, DGMM and System GMM: 1975-2013 
Upper middle income Lower middle income Low-income 
Autocracy - negative and insignificant – 
consistent with hypothesis. 
Constraints on executives – positive and 
significant – consistent with hypothesis 
Polity IV (procedural democracy) – 
positive and significant – consistent with 
hypothesis 
S Polity IV (substantive democracy) – 
negative and insignificant 
PKY – negative and significant  
 
Autocracy: negative and 
insignificant/significant 
Constraint on executives; negative but 
significant 
Democracy (procedural): positive and 
insignificant  
Democracy (substantive) negative and 
insignificant  
Per capita income: positive and 
significant 
 
Autocracy: positive significant 
Constraint on executives; positive and 
significant 
Democracy (procedural): negative and 
insignificant  
Democracy (substantive) negative and 
insignificant  
Per capita income: negative and 
insignificant 
 
 
Results from OLS, GMM, DGMM and System GMM: 1990-2013 
Upper middle income Lower middle income Low-income 
Autocracy - negative and significant  
 
Constraints on executives – positive and 
significant  
 
Democracy (procedural) – positive and 
significant 
 
democracy (substantive) – negative and 
significant 
 
Per capita income – negative and 
insignificant 
Autocracy: negative and insignificant 
 
Constraint on executives; negative 
insignificant 
 
Democracy (procedural): positive and 
insignificant  
 
Democracy (substantive) negative and 
insignificant  
 
Per capita income: negative 
insignificant. 
 
Autocracy: negative and insignificant 
 
Constraint on executives; positive and 
insignificant 
 
Democracy (procedural): negative and 
insignificant  
 
Democracy (substantive) negative and 
insignificant  
 
Per capita income: negative and 
insignificant 
 
 
 
Appendix I: BVAR, Impulse responses: (1990-2013) 
I1: upper middle income 
Democracy (procedural) 
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-.0006
-.0004
-.0002
.0000
.0002
.0004
.0006
.0008
.0010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCBD to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
-.0007
-.0006
-.0005
-.0004
-.0003
-.0002
-.0001
.0000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCLL to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
 
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCPC to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
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Executive constraints 
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCBD to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCPC to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
 
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCLL to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
 
 
Autocracy 
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCBD to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
.010
.012
.014
.016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCLL to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
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-.007
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCPC to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
 
Per capita income 
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCBD to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
.0000
.0004
.0008
.0012
.0016
.0020
.0024
.0028
.0032
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCLL to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
 
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCPC to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
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School enrolment/government expenditure/population 
-.0010
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
.0020
.0025
.0030
.0035
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCBD to Cholesky
One S.D. SCH Innovation
-.0001
.0000
.0001
.0002
.0003
.0004
.0005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCBD to Cholesky
One S.D. GOV Innovation
 
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
.0004
.0008
.0012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCPC to Cholesky
One S.D. POP Innovation
-.0006
-.0004
-.0002
.0000
.0002
.0004
.0006
.0008
.0010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCBD to Cholesky
One S.D. POP Innovation
-.0001
.0000
.0001
.0002
.0003
.0004
.0005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FCPC to Cholesky
One S.D. GOV Innovation
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Summary, BVAR IMPULSE RESPONSES – upper middle income 
Shock    Response of FD (1975-2013)  Response of FD (1990-2013)  
Procedural democracy  positive    positive 
Substantive democracy  positive    negative 
Executive constraints  positive    positive 
Autocracy   negative    negative 
Per capita income   positive    positive 
School enrolment   positive    positive 
Population   positive    negative 
Government spending  positive    positive 
Notes: the analyses are based on all three measures of FD (bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities. 
I2: lower middle income 
Democracy (procedural) 
-.0024
-.0020
-.0016
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
.0004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. DEMO Innovation
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. DEMO Innovation
 
-.0032
-.0028
-.0024
-.0020
-.0016
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. DEMO Innovation
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Democracy (substantive) 
.0000
.0004
.0008
.0012
.0016
.0020
.0024
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
-.007
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
 
-.008
-.007
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
 
Executive constraints 
-.0003
-.0002
-.0001
.0000
.0001
.0002
.0003
.0004
.0005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
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.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
.007
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
 
Autocracy 
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
.0020
.0025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
 
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
.0020
.0025
.0030
.0035
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
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Per capita income 
.0000
.0002
.0004
.0006
.0008
.0010
.0012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
 
 
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
.010
.012
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
 
School enrolment/foreign direct investment/population 
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. POP Innovation
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. FDI Innovation
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-.016
-.014
-.012
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. SCH Innovation
 
 
Summary, BVAR IMPULSE RESPONSES – lower middle income 
Shock    Response of FD (1975-2013)  Response of FD (1990-2013)  
Procedural democracy  negative    negative  
Substantive democracy  negative    negative   
Executive constraints  negative    positive    
Autocracy   positive    positive    
Per capita income   negative    positive    
School enrolment   positive    negative    
FDI    positive    positive 
Population   -    negative    
     
Notes: the analyses are based on all three measures of FD (bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities 
I3: low-income 
Democracy (procedural) 
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-.0012
-.0010
-.0008
-.0006
-.0004
-.0002
.0000
.0002
.0004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. DEMO Innovation
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. DEMO Innovation
 
-.0020
-.0015
-.0010
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. DEMO Innovation
 
Democracy (substantive) 
-.0036
-.0032
-.0028
-.0024
-.0020
-.0016
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
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-.0024
-.0020
-.0016
-.0012
-.0008
-.0004
.0000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. DDEMO Innovation
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Executive constraints 
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
.010
.012
.014
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
 
-.008
-.007
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. XCON Innovation
 
 
 
Autocracy 
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
.010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
-.016
-.014
-.012
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
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.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
.007
.008
.009
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. AUTO Innovation
 
 
Per capita income 
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
 
 
-.007
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. PKY Innovation
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Foreign Direct Investment/Inflation/School/Government/Trade openness 
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. FDI Innovation
 
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of BD to Cholesky
One S.D. INF Innovation
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
.007
.008
.009
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. INF Innovation
 
 
 
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. SCH Innovation
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. SCH Innovation
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.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LL to Cholesky
One S.D. GOV Innovation
-.0008
-.0006
-.0004
-.0002
.0000
.0002
.0004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. GOV Innovation
 
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PVC to Cholesky
One S.D. TOPEN Innovation
 
 
Summary BVAR IMPULSE RESPONSES – low-income 
Shock    Response of FD (1975-2013)  Response of FD (1990-2013)  
Procedural democracy  negative    negative    
Substantive democracy  negative    negative     
Executive constraints  negative    negative     
Autocracy   positive    positive    
Per capita income   negative    negative    
  
School enrolment   positive    mixed     
FDI    positive    negative 
Inflation    -    positive 
Government expenditure  positive    positive 
Trade openness   positive    positive    
    
Notes: the analyses are based on all three measures of FD (bank deposits, private credit and liquid liabilities 
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Appendix J: Derivation of posterior moments: 
We rely on Litterman (1986) in determining the posterior moments of the parameters of 
interest. 
To relate the general framework (equation 4.11) to BVAR models, consider the VAR (p) 
model: 
 
Where  for t=1,…,  T is an x1 vector with observations on  different series and  is an 
x1 vector of the disturbance term and assuming  is i.i.d. . For compactness the 
model can be expressed as,  
                  (1) 
Or 
         (2) 
Where and  are  matrices and  is a  matrix for 
 is the identity matrix of dimension and . 
Using equation (2) the likelihood function is 
        (3) 
To derive the posterior moments, assume that   is known and a multivariate normal prior 
for, : 
             (4) 
Where  the prior mean and  the prior covariance. Combining the prior with the likelihood 
function in equation (3), we obtain the posterior density can be written as, 
 
                     (5) 
It is a multivariate normal probability distribution function. To simplify, define 
 
          (6) 
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the exponent in equation (5) now becomes,  
 
 (7) 
Where the posterior mean  is, 
 
Since  is known, the second term of equation (7) has no randomness about . The 
posterior densitycan summarised as, 
 
=  
 
And the posterior covariance  is given as,  
)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
